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A B S T R A C T
Formal Methods started primarily as a software development method, but 
now embrace a wide spectrum of purposes and techniques. This report 
considers one possible application of Formal Methods to Safety Critical 
Systems, namely its use in validation of a mechanism for a safety critical 
system. The technique involves construction of a Formal Model covering the 
mechanism, the real world aspects of interest, and the safety requirement. 
The technique supports exploring the behaviour of mechanisms in a 
mathematical way, and in particular establishing whether the behaviour 
complies with a safety property. The technique enables the analysis of 
mechanisms with complex behaviour, such as software based mechanisms, 
to be treated with a confidence not achievable with informal techniques 
such as Fault Tree Analysis. Proof has the power to show the absence of 
errors, and this is quite unlike the basis of other safety analysis techniques. 
It is this potential of proof which enables Formal Modelling to deal succintly 
with the enormous numbers of cases typical of software mechanisms. The 
critical issue with Formal Modelling is Validity, ensuring the conclusions 
generated are valid in the real world. The approach adopted is based 
on the standard mathematical modelling method employed by Applied 
Mathematics. A variety of typical Formal Methods techniques are then 
integrated into this method to customise it. This integration is shown to 
be readily achieved, and results in a powerful Formal Modelling method. 
Certain pragmatic difficulties are identified. Chief amonst these is the 
considerable skill and experience needed to master the mathematical basis 
of the method. Overall, the conclusion is that Formal Modelling is a new 
analysis technique that is both complementary and supplementary to 
existing Safety Analysis techniques.
(C) Norman Derek Pratt 1995
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1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
1.1 OBTECTÏVE
The objective of this study is to investigate the use of Formal Methods as 
a Validation Technique applied in the domain of safety. This will be achieved 
by consolidating existing work into a method and illustrating this by a case 
example. The study will also consider the relationship between the resulting 
method and the traditional Safety Analysis techniques.
1.2 DESCRIPTION OP THE STUDY
1.2.1 Introduction
This section provides a description of the study covering the use of Formal 
Methods as a Validation Technique and the basis of the method. Next the 
relationship between Formal Modelling used as a Validation Technique and 
the traditional safety analyses is considered. The section concludes by 
describing the approach to the work and the assumptions made.
1.2.2 Formal Methods as a Validation Technique
In this report we consider the use of Formal Methods in support of the 
development or use of Safety Critical Systems. The use of Formal Methods on 
Safety Critical Systems is still a subject of considerable debate (Littlewood, 
1993), (McDermid, 1992) and (Malcolm, 1992). However, this debate centres on 
the use of Formal Methods as a software development method. This is not 
the area of interest here. Rather, the use of Formal Methods as a Validation 
technique is considered.
The idea is to use Formal Method techniques to build a Mathematical Model. 
This idea is not new, and there are a number of cases published in the
literature based on different formal systems, such as Prepositional Logic
(Stalmarck and Saflund, 1990), Universal Algebra (Gikas and Johnson, 1992) and 
(Halang and Kramer, 1992), Modal Action Logic (Atkinson and Cunningham, 
1991), Petri nets (Halang and Kramer, 1992), and Process Algebras (Baillie, 1991).
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The technique involves the construction of a mathematical model of a 
system in sufficient detail that its complex behaviour is captured, A model 
of those aspects of the real world or plant that are of interest is also 
constructed so that the interaction between the two can be explored. Used 
as a Safety Analysis, one would also specify the safety properties of interest,
which then become the focus of the investigation into the behaviour. Such a
technique is called Formal Modelling in this report.
1.2.3 Basis of the Method
When using Formal Modelling there is a fundamental question which needs 
to be answered: "When does an abstract piece of mathematical symbol 
manipulation tell us something valid about a given real world situation?" 
This is the central question that needs to be answered before the Formal 
Modelling technique can be used with confidence.
The question of validity is not special to Formal Modelling, but affects 
Mathematical Modelling in general. Thus it is possible to borrow the 
techniques used in applied mathematics and use them for Formal Modelling. The 
work here explores the use of these applied mathematical techniques 
to ensure the validity of the results of Formal Modelling.
The work aims to use a number of pre-existing Formal Method techniques, 
and see how these might be incorporated into the overall Mathematical 
Modelling method.
1.2.4 Traditional Safety Analyses
Where a system which exhibits complex behaviour is to be used in a safety 
critical role then there is a real problem in ensuring that the behaviour complies 
with the safety requirements. Such systems may well be based on software 
which is widely recognised as presenting significant validation problems because 
of the potentially enormous number of cases that need to be considered, and 
because the behaviour can be discontinuous.
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Current safety analyses, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), rely on expert 
human judgement. Although a method is prescribed the analysis is necessarily 
informal. Such techniques encounter significant difficulties when the system 
being analysed exhibits complex behaviour because it is beyond the capability 
of these informal techniques.
The primary interest of the traditional Safety Anal ses is in Failures, and most 
traditional safety analysis techniques investigate faults or failures. However, 
while the impact of hardware failures resulting from random failures is 
effectively handled by these analyses, treatment of systematic failures, 
such as those resulting from software, are not the focus of these traditional 
analyses.
1.2.5 Potential of Formal Modelling
Formal Modelling is based on mathematical proof. Proof is a powerful 
technique since it has the potential to establish the absence of errors. The 
traditional safety analyses lack this power except in situations that exhibit 
a small number of cases that are each easy to treat completely.
The potential of Formal Modelling to deal with systematic failures or the 
correctness of behaviour, sets it apart from the traditional safety analyses. 
Formal Modelling should be complementary to them.
An analysis such as a Fault Tree Analysis will reach a point where the question 
is the correctness of a mechanism, such as a piece of software. The 
traditional techniques are not designed to deal with this issue, and hence the 
systematic failure of complex mechanisms is left as a "basic event". Although 
there have been initiatives to extend the analyses into such basic events, the 
assertion here is that it would be better to employ the Formal Modelling 
technique rather than extend the traditional technique. In this sense. Formal 
Modelling should be supplementary to the traditional Safety Analyses,
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1.2.6 Approach
The work is based on a case example which provides a concrete demonstration 
of the approach and shows feasibility. The chosen example (DACS) is big, 
complex, real time, a parametric product and representative of industrial 
practice for process control. The problem was not simplified to make it more 
tractable, and stays close to the original implementation. In particular, the 
real time nature of the problem is addressed directly with the model embodying 
the realistic principle that the computer system's operations are not 
instantaneous, but will have finite durations.
The approach adopted is one of pragmatic application of established 
techniques, not a theoretic treatment, or attempt to establish new techniques. 
The aim of this work is a consolidation of these disparate techniques resulting 
in a Formal Modelling Method with wide applicability.
1.2.7 Assumptions
The main assumption underlying this work is that the various elements upon 
which the method is based are themselves sound. Hence Formal Notations, 
Logics, Formal Method Techniques and Scientific Laws are all employed, and 
all assumed correct.
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1.3 STRUCTURE
The structure of the rest of this report is as follows:
a) Chapter 2 surveys the research background covering Safety and Formal 
Methods.
b) Chapter 3 provides a description of the mathematical notation used and a 
definition of the terms employed.
c) Chapter 4 presents an informal description of the DACS case example and 
the generic kind of problem that it is being applied to.
d) In Chapter S the model for the DACS example is developed, the property 
proofs performed and the results interpreted.
e) The objective of Chapter 6 is to provide a definition of the general method 
demonstrated in Chapter S, This is structured around the Modelling Cycle with 
the Formal Methods techniques incorporated as appropriate. In addition many 
application domain problems, such as deadbands and initialisation, are discussed.
f) In Chapter 7 we return to  the broad issues of the relationship of Formal 
Methods to Safety as well as other ideas considered in Chapter 2. The aim is 
to reflect on the work performed and see how it contributes.
g) Chapter 8 looks back at the work performed and summarises what has been 
achieved.
At the back of the document is a number of Annexes which provide supporting 
material, and the Bibliography.
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2. R E S E A R C H  B A C K G R O U N D
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the research background is surveyed. It covers the following 
topics:
a) Safety
b) Safety Research Themes
c) Formal Methods
d) Formal Methods and Software Development
e) Formal Methods and Validation
f) Formal Methods and Safety Analyses
g) Mathematical Modelling.
This report is concerned with the use of Formal Modelling in support of 
Safety, and hence this provides the focus of this chapter. The subjects of 
Formal Methods and Safety are covered in order to set the work in its 
appropriate context, but no great depth of treatment is given to them.
2.2 SAFETY
2.2.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to survey the current safety scene in order to provide 
the context within which the work on applying Formal Methods to safety is set.
2.2.2 Context
There are many aspects to the safe operation of a system. Most notable are:
a) Technical System Development
b) System Certification
c) System Operation
d) Maintenance.
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There are also broad economic and environmental issnes. The work here concerns 
the development of the system, so while acknowledging these other aspects to 
safety, development will be the focus, though certification issues are also relevant.
Figure 1 of (Wells and Wardman, 1994) is reproduced below as Figure 2.1 and 
shows the phases of a capital project.
Table 2 of (Wells and Wardman, 1994) is also reproduced as Figure 2.2 and 
shows there are potentially a large number of analyses, audits, reviews, 
inspections and reports that safety demands over and above the normal 
system development documentation.
Appropriation
Requests
Project
Authorisation
Process, 
Design, 
and Review
Technical Feasibility 
Economic Feasibility
Process Flow Diagram
Develop Specifications 
and Drawings
Installation
Check-out
Run-in
Phase V 
Commissioning
Phase II 
Basic
Engineering
Phase III
Detailed
Engineering
Phase I
Conceptual
Engineering
Phase IV  
Equipment 
Procurement & 
Construction
FIGURE 2.1 - The Phases of a Capital Project
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M OM N1 IS NG
ENGB IA NS EI Ec RING
P CR OO NC SU TR RE UM CE TN IT O& N
B PE RN OE DF UI CC TI IA OL N
Project Review
Concept Hazard Analysis: Initial Review 
Concept Hazard Analysis
Critical Examination Preliminary Consequence Analysis Process Safety Sociotechnical System Review Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Task Analysis/HAZOP (Batch)
Hazard and Operability study Task Analysis, FMEA (if required) Safety ReportProcess Safety Management Audit Environmental Audit
Process Safety Management Audit
Operability Review Precommissioning Review Precommissioning Inspection
Operating Review
Process Safety Audit (periodic)
Incident Reports (as they occur)
HAZOP (periodic)Process Hazard Review (periodic) Special Studies as determined
FIGURE 2.2 - The Timing of Project Reviews
~ 15 ~
The Hazard Identification set of safety analyses aim at identification of 
potential heizards by considering whether the process will require toxic 
or flammable substances, or high pressures or temperatures, for example. 
Another broad class of safety analyses are referred to as "Process Safety 
Sociotechnical System Studies" by (Wells and Wardman, 1994). (Wells and 
Wardman, 1994, pl32) "The sociotechnical approach emphasises the individual 
social, organisational and managerial aspects which influence human 
behaviour and ultimately affects the systems' performance and safety." 
For (Wells and Wardman, 1994) these include Environmental Audits and 
Compliance reviews. (P 133) "Compliance reviews are used to confirm 
that a facility's operations comply with applicable laws and regulations."
The safety analyses that fall under the heading of Hazard Analysis aim to 
check whether a proposed design or implementation will be safe. The case 
example is in this general area and we will have reason to consider a number 
of these analyses later. Hence these are given a more detailed treatment in 
the next sub-section.
2.2.3 Hazard Analyses
(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p37.) "It is the dangerous failure modes 
that are of interest in the safety integrity examination i.e. those leading to 
an unsafe or potentially unsafe condition on the plant. The possible hazardous 
failure modes of the PES (Programmable Electronic System), and other 
conditions which in combination may lead to a hazard, can sometimes be 
identified easily without special techniques. If the combination of events 
involving the PES and causing a hazard are not easy to identify then a 
hazard analysis using special techniques will need to be carried out. There 
are several hazard analysis techniques each with particular strengths and 
weeiknesses and fields of application." Analyses typically used are Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure 
Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOP) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). There are many sources covering 
various aspects of such safety analyses such as (Bums and Pitblado, 1993),
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(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p37.) "Fault tree analysis (FTA) can be used 
when a particular hazard or undesirable event has been identified and it is 
necessary to determine the combinations of failures and operating circumstances 
which could cause that hazard. The method uses top down or deductive 
reasoning. Starting with the hazard or top event the analyst asks 'What 
failure or event or combination of failures and events would cause the top 
event?' These contributing events are represented on the fault tree and are 
connected to the top event by an OR gate denoting that any one of the events 
would cause the top event, or by an AND gate denoting that the top event 
results only if all the events happen. The next stage is to consider how each 
of the contributing events could arise and to repeat the process until each 
event has been split into a logical combination of 'basic events' connected by 
logic AND or OR gates."
(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p. 38) "Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) is a procedure for determining the effect on the plant of 
each mode of failure of each part of the system. The reasoning used is 
bottom up or inductive. The analyst asks 'What happens if this component 
fails in this particular failure mode?' In general, it can be applied at any level 
within the system e.g. subsystem, module or component level according to the 
resources available and the level of detail required."
(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p. 39) "An extension of FMEA, Failure 
Mode effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), categorises each component 
failure according to the seriousness of its effect and its probability of 
frequency of occurrence, When several levels of hazard are possible then a 
FMECA is useful in determining the most critical components and in identifying 
where reliability engineering resources should be allocated to greatest effect."
(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p. 39) "A hazard and operability (HAZOP) 
study is a technique which has been developed for use in the chemical industry. 
The analyst studies the instrumented flow diagram (sometimes called the piping 
and instrument (P&I) line diagram) and considers the effect on the plant of 
deviations in the normal parameters of the substances contained by every pipe 
and vessel. As an aid to thoroughness, the analyst uses guide words to ensure 
that every possible deviation is considered. Examples of guide words are:
- 17
a) high flow e) high temperature
b) low flow f) low temperature
c) no flow g) high pressure
d) reverse flow h) low pressure.
The effects of each of these deviations are considered in each phase of 
operation including maintenance, commissioning, testing, start up, shut down 
and failure services.
Hazard and operability studies are useful in plants with the potential for a 
serious accident but which are too complex for possible accident causes to be 
identiHed with any degree of certainty by any meaps other than systematic 
search. They can be time consuming and costly."
(Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p. 40) "Event tree analysis is useful in 
representing and evaluating the possible sequence of events following from 
a failure in a critical part of the system. It is only practicable to apply the 
technique to failures which are known to be potentially hazardous. The 
technique uses the same bottom up reasoning as FMEA in that the assessor 
asks: 'What happens if this component fails?' An event tree can represent 
multiple and cascade failures and so is useful when there are several lines 
of defence between the initiating failure and the final hazard. It is also 
possible to introduce a time dimension into an event tree and so represent 
the effects of different system response times."
2.2.4 Risk Assessment
(Wells and Wardman, 1994, pl38) "The target of any company is to have zero 
accidents. However, it is inevitable that unlikely major events will occur at 
some location because of the large number of companies worldwide. So 
arguments have been accepted by Regulators that the staff of an operating 
company should when carrying out a design use a company standard which 
sets target values for the maximum risk which might be tolerated from 
their activities,
- 18 -
The current company target values for land-based operations which companies 
in the UK appear to be using are similar to those given in Table 3 [and 
repoduced here as Figure 2.3].
The highest targets might be exceeded by an order of magnitude (xlO) in 
circumstances deemed important by the company. If any vulnerable groups 
were in the vicinity then the higher values would apply. These are compromise 
best estimates obtained from canvassing opinions in industry and values 
quoted by HSE (Health and Safety Executive). In the UK these values have 
been greatly influenced by publications on risk criteria for land use planning. 
An intolerable risk is specified which cannot be Justified on any grounds, say 
an individual risk of 10”* fatalities per year, a broadly acceptable region is 
stated in which the risk is considered by the Regulators to be negligible, say 
10”* per year, and in between is the ALARP region where the risk should be 
as low as reasonably practicable and only undertaken if a benefit is desired."
Employee individual risk
All process causes 3*10”* per year
Specific process cause 10“* per year
Public individual risk
All process causes 10”* per year
Specific process cause 10”* per year
Risk of major incidents (i.e. societal risk)
Near miss from all process causes 10”* per year
Accident from all process causes 10”* per year
Catastrophic accident from all process causes 10”* per year
Accident from specific process causes 10”* per year
Catastrophic accident, specific process causes 10”  ^ per year
FIGURE 2.3 - Target Values of Risk
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2.2.5 Developments in Software Safety Standards
DEF STAN 00-41 (Ministry of Defence, 1983) starts very much from the 
basis that the overall safety target is to be met whether or not software 
is used in the design: (Part 2, p. 3) "In apportioning system reliability, the 
consequence of any software within the system must be taken into account and 
allowance should be made for the contribution software makes towards system 
failure. This apportionment to  the software elements can then be used as 
targets for the software designers to achieve." (Part 3, p. 5) "It should be 
recognised that neither hardware nor software is referred to or implied in the 
definitions of reliability, simply the ability of the item to perform certain 
functions. The fact that neither hardware nor software is referred to is 
important. It highlights reliability as an operational characteristic. Designers may 
separate hardware and software for convenience during design, testing, etc, 
but they should not be separated when specifying or assessing the reliability 
of each item or the system."
Nevertheless, the difficulty in handling software is acknowledged by 
DEF STAN 00-41: (Part 3, p. 5) "There is no recognised method for predicting 
the reliability of a computer program at present although a number of 
approaches have been published."
RTCA/D0178A (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 1985) is specific 
to civil aviation. This makes it very clear that techniques that would enable 
software to be treated like hardware are not available: (section 2.2.1) "During 
the preparation of this document, techniques for estimating the post-verification 
probabilities of software errors were examined. The objective was to develop 
numerical requirements for such probabilities for digital computer-based 
equipment and systems certification. The conclusion reached, however, was 
that currently available methods do not yield results in which confidence can 
be placed to the level required for this purpose. Accordingly, this document 
does not state post-verification software error requirements in these terms."
Rather than continue to insist that a system must meet its overall safety 
target despite containing software RTCA/D0178A basically enforces a 
formal software quality assurance scheme on the development process. It 
specifies the minimum documentation set, and the level of formal review of
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these. It also mandates a level of software testing. At the most stringent 
"Flight Critical" level the standard mandates a level of quality control 
equivalent to todays' best commercial practice. It mandates no techniques or 
tool support. However, the evident shortcomings in this approach are 
acknowledged: (section 3.3 note) "It is appreciated that, with the current state 
of knowledge, the software disciplines described in this document may not, in 
themselves, be sufficient to ensure that the overall system safety and 
reliability targets have been achieved. This is particularly true for certain critical 
systems, such as full authority fly-by-wire. In such cases it is accepted that 
other measures, usually within the system, in addition to a high level of 
software discipline may be necessary to achieve these safety objectives and 
demonstrate that they have been met."
"Programmable Electronic Systems in Safety Related Applications" (Health and 
Safety Executive, 1987) goes further than either DEF STAN 00-41 or 
RTCA/D0178A by stating that software can only ever be handled qualitatively: 
(Page S) "In determining safety integrity, all causes of failures which lead to an 
unsafe state should be included. Some of these types of failures, in particular 
random hardware failures, may be quantified using such measures as the failure 
rate in the dangerous mode of failure. However, the safety integrity of a 
system also depends on many elements which cannot be quantified but can 
only be considered qualitatively - such as the software."
INT DEF STAN 00-56 (Ministry of Defence, 1991) goes further still saying 
that the inability to handle software failures in a quantatitive way is not 
unique to software, but general to all aspects of engineering, and that 
such systematic failures are now the main source of unsafe failures: (Page F.l) 
"This standard makes a clear distinction between random failure, that is failure 
that is due to physical change and whose probability can be predicted to a 
reasonable degree of accuracy, and systematic failure, that is failure due to, 
for example, environmental factors or errors in the specification of the design 
of the system. Because software has no wearout mechanism, all software 
failures are systematic. Systematic failure is also an important failure 
mechanism in hardware logic and in all types of mechanical system." (Page 26) 
"Systematic failures usually dominate the achieved failure rate of any function 
or component, particularly where redundant hardware is employed."
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Current thinking recognises the broad scope of the problem; (Malcolm, 92 pH) 
"It encompasses all aspects of human involvement in systems from 
conception to operation and beyond. If a Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis were to be performed for this whole 'system' rather than just 
the system under development, then many of the failure modes which 
would have to be included would be those of humans, whether operators, 
maintalners, designers or software programmers. The effect of leaving 
them out of the calculations is to  treat them as perfect whereas, ultimately, 
humans are always the weakest links in the chain."
Safety used to be handled qnantitively when applied to hardware based 
systems. However, once the need to address software, or systematic failures 
from any source was recognised there was a strong tendancy to apply 
qualitative techniques. (Littlewood, 1993 p217) argues that this trend must be 
reversed: "A system may fail because of its engineering hardware, computer 
hardware, computer software, or because of a human component. The impact 
on overall system dependability of hardware is well understood, provided it 
is free from design faults. Furthermore, we can often engineer our systems 
so that the impact of these sources of unreliability is negligible. However, 
some hardware failures and all software failures are due to design faults. 
Reliability in the presence of design faults and human operator errors is not 
well understood. This poses acute problems for the assessment of safety- 
critical systems in the presence of the effects of human errors, made during 
the design process or operation. It can easily be shown that only modest 
reliability can be demonstrated by the direct observation of the system in 
test or operation. ... It is our contention that safety assessments should 
ideally be quantitative, ... We believe it is inevitable that these quantitative 
requirements for the safety of such systems be expressed in probabilistic 
terms, because of the inherent uncertainty about the behaviour of all real 
systems during operational use. ... It is generally agreed that the major 
problem facing anyone with the responsibility for deciding whether a safety- 
critical system is fit for purpose -  safe enough -  is in quantifying the 
contribution to its failure behaviour of human errors, manifested both as 
design faults and as operator errors."
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2.3 SAFETY RESEARCH THEMES
2.3.1 Introduction
The main contribution of the work will be to the use of Formal Modelling on 
safety critical systems. However, there are a number of other research themes 
(Malcolm, 1993) against which the work undertaken is positioned. These are 
identified here:
a) Quantification
b) Human Factors
c) Artificial Intelligence.
2.3.2 Quantification
Given a requirement for the quantitive assessment of systems (Littlewood 1993) 
is critical of Formal Methods (p220): "The use of formal methods is widely 
advocated as a way of increasing confidence in the dependability of safety- 
critical systems. Although there is a clear prima facie case for consenting to 
this view there is, in general, a dearth of facts to support it. For example, it 
is often stated that testing coupled with diversity can only yield a failure rate 
of about 10”* per hour, and thus the use of formal methods is advocated for 
reaching the required ultra-high reliability levels of over 10”’ . There is no hard 
experimental evidence to support this view. This situation is most unsatisfactory 
since the key notion in dependability is that reliance must be justifiable. This 
means that we need explicit and testable requirements as well as credible 
analytical and experimental evidence demonstrating the satisfaction of the 
requirements by the system. Such evidence is simply not available for application 
of formal methods technology." Littlewood then states his intention (p227) "to 
capture realistic data on the effectiveness of formal methods in industry and 
academic settings."
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2.3.3 Human Factors
Given the nature of the work here, the focus is on the designer and the nature 
of the error he might make. (Littlewood, 1993, p222) "There is evidence that 
human judgement, even from expert subjects, shows fairly consistent bias when 
unaided by a formal framework that can check for such errors. It is interesting
that these judgements err in two ways: experts tend to give a view of their
likely achievement that is too optJmistiCt and they underestimate their own 
chances of error in the making of such judgements. We see no reason to 
believe that 'engineering judgement' about the dependability of software (or 
any complex design) will not suffer from these errors."
2.3.4 Artificial Intelligence (AI)
(Canning, 1994 p237) "During the work at ERA Technology Ltd. on advanced 
software systems for safety critical applications, we have had cause to note a 
similarity between certain types of industrial safety systems and some AI 
systems, notably KBS (Knowledge Based Systems). We have also encountered 
significant difficulty in the validation of large database systems using 
conventional software testing techniques, particularly in achieving adequate 
test coverage for all data input conditions. For these reasons we have become 
interested in techniques used to verify and validate KBS. Further, since the 
primary focus during the development of AI type systems is on a better 
understanding of the problem domain, we have become interested in the 
effect the use of this type of system would have on the safety of the 
overall system. Indeed, our investigations, far from confirming the view that 
AI systems cannot be considered for critical applications, have led us to the 
view that there are several features of an AI approach which could have a 
beneficial effect on safety." (p 238) "For example, the greater emphasis placed 
on understanding the problem definition during the AI development process, is 
likely to result in a better understanding of the proposed use of the system 
by the designer, which in turn places him in a position to provide more 
comprehensive information regarding the safe use of the system to the end user."
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Another potential of AI or KBS is that the approach separates the application 
specific from the implementation technology. (Canning, 1994 p241) "Separation 
of the application knowledge from its interpretation has the advantage that, 
to some extent, the application model can be analysed without regard to the 
effects of limitations of the expressive adequacy (power) of the implementation 
technology. Indeed, the approach can be considered as a form of abstraction, 
which is widely used as a means to  reduce complexity and improve visibility 
during the specification of safety critical systems. Conventional examples 
using separation of application from it's  interpretation include the MASCOT 
run time kernel, programmable logic controllers and SCADA systems." This 
idea is given a more industrial safety perspective by (Malcolm 1992 pH) "Among 
the important requirements for objective assurance are simplicity, intelligibility 
and traceability. 'Separation of concerns' is often said to help. This may be 
seen as one of the benefits of parametric packages and sub-systems - such 
as the general -purpose programmable process-controller. Also, some sectors 
are seeing the emergence of 'task programming' of generic applications (or 
application generators). In each of these cases, reasoning about the assurance 
of systems is separated between reasoning about the generic package or 
system; reasoning about the parameterization or programming; and reasoning 
about the combination. Is it possible to  provide a rigorous basis for such 
separation of concerns?" While not seeking to answer this question, the case 
example is of this type and illustrates this 'separation of concerns' approach.
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2.4 FORMAL METHODS
2.4.1 Introduction
(Cohen, 1990a, pi) "A formal, that is mathematical, notation is one which 
admits analysis by the application of a collection of purely symbolic rules, 
known as a calculus (of transformations) or a logic (of proof). The combination 
of notation and rules constitutes a formal system. The goal of the user of a 
formal system is to formulate in it a theory whose semantics can be shown 
to "capture" the properties of some required (concrete) system, in the sense 
that these properties are interpretations of decidable theorems of the theory " 
In this report "Formal Methods" means any such use of a formal system.
2.4.2 Formal Notations
Formal Notations "are all syntactically sugared versions of various mathematical 
systems: set theory in the case of Z (Spivey, 1989a), (Spivey, 1989b), (Spivey, 
1989c), (Woodcock, 1989) and VDM (Jones, 1990), heterogeneous algebra (OBJ), 
process algebras for CSP (Hoare, 1985) and CCS (Milner, 1989), Horn clause 
logic for PROLOG (Clocksin and Mellish, 1984) and so on." (Cohen, 1989, p37).
(McDermid, 92, p96) "It is possible to distinguish five types, or classes, of 
formal methods which can be roughly characterized as follows:
1. Model-based approacdies, giving an explicit (albeit abstract) definition of 
system (program) state and operations which transform the state, but no 
explicit representation of concurrency (e.g. Z and VDM);
2. Algebraic approaches, giving an implicit definition of operations by relating 
the behaviour of different operations without defining state, but again no 
explicit representation of concurrency (e.g. OBJ and PLIISS);
3. Process algebras, giving an explicit model of concurrent processes and 
representing behaviour by means of constraints on allowable observable 
communication between processes (e.g. CSP and CCS);
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4. LogiC"based approaches, a variety of approaches using logic to describe 
properties of systems, including low-level specification of program behaviour 
and specification of system timing behaviour (e.g. temporal and interval logics);
5. Net-based approaches, giving an implicitly concurrent model of the system 
in terms of (causal) data flow through a network, including representing 
conditions under which data flow from one node in the net to another (e.g.
Petri nets and predicate transition nets).
In practice, the distinctions are not always clear, and there are hybrid methods 
which Incorporate facets of more than one approach. Most of the methods 
have set theory and predicate logic as their underlying basis, so there is some } 
technical similarity between all the approaches."
New formal systems are still being developed for various purposes (Bradley, 1993).
The formal systems used in tlds report are considered in chapter 3.
2.4.3 Power of Formal Systems
The power of a formal system can be characterized by its:
a) Expressive power
b) Analytic power
c) Cognitive power.
(Cohen, 1990a, pi) "The expressive power of the notation determines the 
class of concrete systems which can be represented (modelled, specified) in 
it." McDermid compared a number of formal methods and summarised the 
comparison: (McDermid, 1992, pl41) "we can now see clearly that the three 
methods permit us to  do quite different things. Z enables us to give quite 
detailed specifications of the required behaviour of the actions to be carried 
out in the system, but was rather poor at modelling communication and has 
no way of representing concurrency. In contrast. MAL and TCCS are much 
clearer about system structure (including potential for parallel execution) and 
communication, although they are relatively weak at defining functionality. The 
differences between MAL and TCCS largely stem from the fact that MAL is
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intended to define allowable behaviour, in the sense of a set of requirements, 
and TCCS specification is much more at the design level, being concerned with 
showing more concrete process structures. Similarly, MAL and TCCS allow us 
to make statements about timing behaviour, whereas Z does not, Thus we 
conclude that different methods have quite different expressive powers." 
McDermid also identified non-functional requirements as one of the common 
areas of weakness with formal methods (1992, pill) "non functional requirements 
such as performance, cost and reliability drive the design process. This is 
significant, because formal specifications do not, for the most part, enable 
this non-functional information to  be recorded. There are, of course, exceptions 
to this and some of the specification logics deal specifically with timing." 
Given the various expressive powers of current notations McDermid concludes 
that they need to be used in combination (1992, pl42): "since the methods 
illustrate different facets of systems, then they can be used together - 
assuming we can map adequately between the notations (e.g. to relate a Z 
action specification to a TCCS process action). Thus we believe that it is 
both possible and beneficial to use an eclectic approach to specification".
(Cohen, 1990a, pi) "[A formal system's] analytic power is measured by the 
degree to which desirable results (transformed e3q>ressions or theorems relating 
to the intended semantics) are decidable in it." So, it is the analytic power of 
the formal system that enables us to employ such techniques as consistency 
verificaton and stronger invariant that are use in chapter 5, and to prove 
properties of interest such as safety properties,
A good cognitive model is one that helps you to think about the problem. Most 
long standing scientific theories, such as magentic flux, are also good cognitive 
models. Formal systems that enable good cognitive models to be constructed 
will be a benefit to formal methods also. However, it is clear that the community 
consider there are still problems with the cognitive power of current notations:
a) (Malcolm 1992, pl6) "[Formal notations] have been likened to the assembly 
languages of specification - well-defined operators, leaving open the meaning 
of the operands and whether the operation of the operators on the operands 
achieves the desired effects."
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b) (McDermid 1992, pi 47) "The most striking aspect of the example 
specifications is the forbidding symbology and, to a lesser extent, the arcane 
terminology. The mathematical abstractions embodied in notations such as Z 
and timed CCS facilitate brevity and precision, but they do not necessarily 
contribute to clarity. ... Even seasoned users of formal methods often have 
difficulty in reading someone else's specifications, at least until they get 
used to the style."
c) (McDermid 1992, p 109) "Algebraic specification techniques have been widely 
applied to small examples, but there is little evidence, as yet, that they are 
suitable for specifying large systems. ... In the author's experience problems 
... arise with the algebraic approach, and such specifications tend to obfuscate 
rather than elucidate the problem being specified."
The problems with handling large specifications is a recurrent theme. De 
Neumann (1990, p48) makes the point that "typical mathematical axiomatic 
systems have of the order of 5 to 20 axioms, whereas for typical formal 
specifications the number of statements will be of the order of 10* to 10*". 
Hence the most notable problem is the difficulty that results from the 
application of the first generation of Formal Notations to large specifications 
(Cohen, 1989) and (Barden et al. 1991). In VDM, for example, the problem was 
'modularisation': large specifications tended to be monolithic and there was 
little support for their construction by the composition of 'little ' pieces. More 
modem notations aim to address these problems. Of particular note is the 
movement to give Formal Notations an "Object Oriented" structuring. Stepney 
(1992) provides a survey of object orientation in Z covering Hall's Style (1990), 
Schuman-Pitt (Schuman et al. 1989) and Object-Z (Carrington et al, 1990).
In summary, while current formal systems have considerable expressive and 
analytic power, their cognitive power remains a problem with modularity, 
conciseness and clarity being the issues.
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2.4.4 Methods. Models and Specifications
This report uses the term "formal method" in the same way as McDermid 
(1992, p96) "to refer to methods with a sound basis in mathematics." This 
usage can be different from some people's use for whom it just means a 
software development method, typically refinement of a formal specification 
into code with the associated "program correctness proofs".
The work covered by this report is about the use of formal systems for 
modelling some part of a safety critical system. This use of formal methods 
is thus referred to as "formal modelling".
A specification, whether formal or not, is usually intended to be complete 
and detailed. This is not usually the case for a model. Normally a model will 
be more abstract leaving out detail that is not needed. This aids the clarity 
of the model. The model may not be complete either. The model will focus 
on the aspects of interest and leave other aspects out altogther.
2.4.5 Pragmatic Difficulties
(Bradley 1993, pl70) "Formal methods offer considerable benefits for the 
production and assessment of high integrity systems. However, the adoption 
of formal methods has been slow. This can be attributed partly to  the 
following issues;
a) Large investment in staff training is required. The application of formal 
methods requires a discrete mathematics and logic background and many of 
the current generation of saftware engineers lack this knowledge.
b) Lack of robust tool support for formal development. Tool support is 
essential for constructing error free specifications. Writing a formal 
specification without a good syntax and type checker can be likened to 
writing a computer program without the support of a compiler.
c) Little evidence of a quantified improvement in the final product.
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d) Few guidelines on how formal methods can be integrated into current best 
practice. Although research is advancing the theory of formal methods little 
progress has been made in the practical use of them within the software 
development process."
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2.5 FORMAL METHODS AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
2.5.1 Introduction
In this section the ideas, concepts and issues surrounding the use of Formal 
Methods for the development of safety critical software are explored. This 
has been a very active area for more than two decades, with many books 
and papers published such as Wirth (1983), Cries (1981), Jones (1980, and 1990), 
Backhouse (1986), Litteck and Wallis (1992), Plat et al. (1992).
2.5.2 Benefits
(Byers 1994, p2S2) states the benefits of adopting formal methods: "A formal 
approach assists this process in two ways. Firstly, a formal language provides 
a means of precise description. This allows the elements of the design, and 
the objectives themselves, to be documented unambiguously, so that the 
designers, reviewers and the implementors can all agree on the meaning of 
the design. Secondly, and more importantly, the mathematical foundation of 
the language means that, in principle, the argument justifying that the design 
objectives are satisfied can be provided in the form of a mathematical proof. 
This means that errors and inconsistencies in the argument can be identified 
and omissions, if not fully resolved, can be documented and subjected to 
further (possibly only empirical) analysis."
2.5.3 Limitations
Whilst acknowledging the value of formal methods (Malcolm 1992, pl6) identifies 
the main limitation: "formal techniques are concerned with expression of design 
in a formal notation which allows some kind of manipulation of a mathematical 
nature, in order to assist verification. This is a considerable step forward, and 
it is a development which should be encouraged, but it should be set in the 
context that verification is itself limited in what it can achieve by our 
understanding of the requirement and our ability to express that understanding 
clearly, precisely and consistently throughout the design process."
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(McDermid 1992, pl02) expands on the limitation when applied to  safety: 
"Analytic reasoning is something that can be carried ont entirely within a 
logical framework (e.g. predicate calculus or differential calculus). Synthetic 
reasoning requires one to look at the 'real world' ... There is a strong link 
between validation and synthetic reasoning, and. similarly, between verification 
and analytic reasoning, but the terms are not identical. In essence, the problem 
arises due to the additional information (design detail) in the software 
development process. Considering only functionality, verification is enough to 
guarantee validity of this additional information, assuming valid specifications. 
However, the same is not true for safety specifications (e.g. due to  the need 
to take failures into account), and further synthetic activity is required to 
show the acceptability of the added information. ... Safety is a property of 
the 'real world', thus it is (ultimately) the province of synthetic (not 
analytic) reason. Design (and design verification) techniques work within a 
logical framework. Most obviously, formal verification/program proving are 
analytical techniques and cannot o f themselves ensure safety of a software 
controlled system."
2.5.4 Application
(McDermid 1992, pi SO) describes his approach which is very much where the 
work in this report is positioned: "I would use formal methods to produce 
top-level specifications for systems, but carry out development by a 
systematic application of stepwise refinement (informal variety), perhaps 
supplemented by formal refinement where there are adequate techniques. 
Moreover, I would use an eclectic approach to specification. For example, I 
would use a notation such as timed CCS to represent concurrent and 
communication structure but specify the effects of the individual actions in 
another formalism such as Z. I would also derive a number of theorems, e.g. 
stating that the system will not deadlock, or giving a top-level statement of 
safety policy. I would reason about these (putative) theorems formally, but |
not use theorem provers to assist in these endeavours. I would also link the I
formal techniques, so far as possible, to standard safety techniques (e.g. fault 
tree analysis). It would seem quite possible to apply such techniques in a 
manner analogous to the use of fault trees on programs. In summary, I 
would supplement existing good practices with the use of formal specifications 
in order to gain clarity in top-level specifications, to aid consistency
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checking of specifications and to assist in validation through derivation 
of key properties from the specifications."
2.5.5 Summary
The main benefit is seen as the formality that Formal Methods offer. The 
main weakness is the fact that the method works within a closed system 
which has two main implications:
a) It is necessary to Validate the specification before any development work 
is based upon it.
b) The extra information added during the refinement process impacts 
safety, and means that the standard verification techniques are not adequate 
by themselves.
2.6 FORMAL METHODS AND VALIDATION
2.6.1 The Need for Validation
Keenan (1992) illustrates why Validation of the Formal Specification is an 
essential part of any formal method of software development. An airborne 
collision avoidance system is intended to implement the following aircraft 
separation rule:
"Aircraft must fly at 1000 foot intervals, or five miles laterally."
Implementation of this requirement will be achieved by monitoring air traffic 
and raising an alarm if the requirement is violated. This rule is then formalized, 
and Keenan lists many problems with the resulting formal specification. Two 
of the most striking are that aircraft are permitted to fly below sea level, 
and that only one is allowed on the ground at any time!
Validation is critical because if the Specification is not right then the 
development process will produce the wrong system. Also, any consideration of 
properties such as Safety will be invalid.
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Existing Mathematical Theories such as Group Theory, or Scientific Theories 
such as Newton's Laws of Motion are general purpose, are widely understood 
and have their domain of applicability well scoped. By contrast a Specification 
is special purpose, and what is more has been constructed to correspond to 
the case. So the specifier has no body of experience to draw on with regard 
to the behaviour that the specification may exhibit, and because he has 
constructed the Specification for the application naturally assumes it is correct. 
The process that ought to be adopted is to spend more time Validating the 
Specification.
2.6.2 Nature of the Validation Task
(McDermid 1992, plOl) "Demonstrating to our complete satisfaction that we 
have achieved the first objective, i.e. adequate specifications, is generally 
accepted to be impossible. In essence, the difficulty is that we do not have a 
way of knowing that we have identified all the possible threats to, or failure 
modes of, the system, so we can never be sure that our specification is complete."
(Cohen and Pitt 1990b, p3) state the essential nature of the validation task: 
"There is, of course, no way to prove that any specification is absolutely 
correct, just as one cannot prove the correctness of a scientific theory. The 
goal of validation is to formulate and conduct experiments which seriously 
attempt to refute the hypothesis that the specification captures the customer's 
requirement."
2.6.3 Formal Validation
There is no right "answer" to the Validation problem. Its essence is to subject 
the Specification to a series of test cases aimed at showing that it is not 
what is required. There are many informal requirements capture and analysis 
methods such as SSADM (Structured Analysis and Design Method). Other 
traditional techniques that are employed include prototyping and trials, both 
of which can be used even where the specification is not formal.
Since Validation is an open ended process while Formal Methods are 
necessarily confined to a closed system, there would not, at first sight, seem 
to be a role for formal techniques as part of Validation. This is not in fact
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the case as it is possible to employ formal techniques effectively within an 
overall open framework.
2.6.4 Formal Validation Techniques
One way to Validate a Specification is to see whether it possess expected 
properties. While identification of such properties is a creative open ended 
task, the verification that the specification possess them can be performed 
formally. It is not necessary to have a complete specification for this activity, 
but rather only the aspects of interest need be included. Hence This Formal 
Validation Techique is referred to as "Formal Modelling" in this report. The 
central aim of the work here is to demonstrate the use of Formal Modelling 
as a Formal Validation technique.
À formal specification can be subjected to a number of techniques aimed at 
identification of various kinds of problems that the specification may exhibit. 
Examples are the Consistency Verification and Stronger Invariant concepts 
that are demonstrated later in this investigation.
Domain experts will typically be unfamiliar with the notations used for formal 
specifications. Hence some means of allowing the expert to explore the 
behaviour implied by a formal specification is needed and the technique of 
producing an executable prototype has become established (Sowerbutts, 1992). 
There is a real intent to avoid a large programming effort in the production 
of the executable prototype, and the most common approach that has 
developed is to use a declarative programming language such as Prolog (West 
and Eaglestone, 1992). The ideal solution would be for the prototype to be 
machine generated, and one approach to this goal is that the specification 
Itself should be executable. Hayes and Jones (1989) argue that executable 
specifications should be avoided because executability can restrict the 
expressiveness of specification languages and can adversely affect 
implementations. Fuchs (1992) counters by showing that non-executable formal 
specifications can be made executable on almost the same level of abstraction, 
and without essentially changing their structure. Though potentially 
interesting, no use is made of this technique in this investigation. Rather, 
the emphasis here is on fully formal validation, that is proof.
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2.6.5 Implications of Formal Validation
"The use of theorem proving in software engineering is usually seen as an aid 
to verification. The use of proof methods in validating requirements is much 
less familiar. It can be seen as a means of increasing confidence in a 
specification of requirements by deriving desirable properties. Given the potential 
for verifiable design once we have a formal specification, the need to establish 
confidence in the specification is of paramount importance" (Atkinson and 
Cunningham, 1991, p47). There are other benefits since proofs on the specification 
level are easier to perform than traditional proofs of correctness, because they 
operate without consideration of coding details (Halang and Kramer, 1992).
There are now many case studies in the published literature based on different 
formal systems, such as Prepositional Logic (Stalmarck and Saflund, 1990), 
Universal Algebra (Gikas and Johnson, 1992) and (Halang and Kramer, 1992), 
Modal Action Logic (Atkinson and Cunningham, 1991), Petri nets (Halang and 
Kramer, 1992), and Process Algebras (Baillie, 1991). Typically the conclusion of 
these case studies is that the approach is feasible and sound, but there are 
methodological difficulties. "For example, we must identify the right safety 
properties to prove, obtain the proper formal representation of each property 
and identify the source of error when a proof fails, since the error may be in 
the specification, the property itself or its formal rendering" (Atkinson and 
Cunningham, 1991, p47). Baillie (1991) found limitations in CCS. His example 
application was a small system, but it was still too large to be analysed as 
a whole due to the proliferation of states quite early on in the analysis. He 
found he could overcome this problem within the language by separating the 
system into smaller communicating subsystems.
It is still necessary for the engineer to have a good grasp of the fundamentals 
of the domain in which he is working. In the case of real time control this 
means an understanding of timing, sampling, and the need to ensure that 
measured values have sufficient resolution and accuracy, for example.
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2.7 FORMAL METHODS AND SAFETY ANALYSES
In this section we consider the emerging relationship between Formal Methods 
and Safety Analyses.
The similarity of intent between formal methods and traditional safety 
techniques is identified by (Byers 1994, p253): "The use of fault-tree analysis, 
for example, formalises parts of the safety argument. A fault tree is a chain 
of assertions that proves that the top-level hazardous event cannot occur if a 
particular combinations of underlying hazardous events are known not to be 
credible or possible. The production of a formal proof is motivated by the 
same needs. However, in the case of formal proof, the complexities of the 
events concerned, and their impact in combination, can be subject to more 
thorough and rigorous analysis."
There are also moves to integrate formal methods with the traditional safety 
analyses: (Bradley et al 1993, pi74) "We believe that in order to  assess the 
safety of requirements presented within a complex specification it is necessary 
to view the specification from a number of different perspectives (e.g. fault 
trees, failure mode/effects and event tree). ... This activity will include 
investigating the relationship between a formal specification and the associated 
dependability viewpoints."
Gorski's work (Gorski, 1994), (Gorski and Wardzinski, 1995) shows another 
relationship between formal methods and traditional safety analyses. 
(Gorski 1994, pl47) "Among the causes of many of the problems with safety 
analysis are impreciseness and ambiguity of the output data delivered by the 
safety analysis techniques and the resulting difficulties with interpretation of 
those data. An approach which can be undertaken to mitigate this problem 
is by providing the safety analysis techniques with more formal semantics. 
This paper aims to investigate this approach in more detail. First we give an 
overview of present pratices during safety analysis. Then some problems with 
interpretation of the output from the presented methods are identified. 
This leads to the motivation to resolve ambiguities by adding more formality 
to the considered methods. The benefits of such an aproach are 
demonstrated by applying the formalism to some examples." Gorski builds
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a single mathematical framework, the Common Safety Description Model 
(CSDM), within which fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and failure 
mode and effect analysis can all be formalised.
2.8 MATHEMATICAL MODELLING
The central work in this study is the use of formal modelling as a safety 
analysis technique. The term "modelling" is used advisedly as there is no 
attempt to produce a complete specification of the control system, and the 
model also includes elements of the real world.
The central concern in this work is with the validity of the results generated 
by the formal modelling. The issue is that bogus safety arguments may be 
accepted because the formal model on which they are based is both plausible 
and self consistent, yet it is refutable as a theory. Alternatively, that the 
apparent certainty of a mathematical proof, particularly when machine checked, 
leads one to  overlook the fact that the model is not valid, or the wrong 
property has been proven. Given the safety motivation for the use of formal 
models, these concerns are serious.
Formal modelling can be seen as just another type of mathematical modelling. 
It may be different from traditional mathematical modelling, such as weather 
forecasting, because of its discrete mathematical basis. Nevertheless, all 
mathematical modelling shares the validity problem so it is worth turning to 
this branch of applied mathematics to see if a solution is already available for use.
Mathematical modelling is not a new topic and so there are many applied 
mathematical textbooks dealing with the subject. (Burghes et al 1982, pi57) 
has this to say about model validation: "At various stages in the process of 
construction and using a mathematical model it is important to check that the 
model behaves as expected and that it reflects adequately the real system 
which is being modelled. This testing of the model is called validation, and 
it can be carried out at the following stages:
a) During model construction
b) On completion of the model
c) On implementation of the model.
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The ultimate validation of a model is clearly carried out at the implementation 
stage, when we ask if the model fulfils the purpose for which it was created."
(Edwards and Hamson 1989, p43) "one of the main purposes of this gaide is 
to teach how mathematical modelling is done in pratice. One of the important 
conclusions from the previous section is that the activity of modelling is a 
process which involves a number of clearly identifiable stages. The most helpful 
way of representing these stages is by means of a modelling flow chart. ... We 
do not claim complete originality for our chart and most books on mathematical 
modelling will have something similar. Experience shows that the flow chart 
does help in developing the right attitudes, leading to successful model building." 
(Burghes et al 1982, pl59) "we must emphasis that Fig. 10.1 [reproduced here as 
Figure 2.4] is provided to give the reader an overall impression of the process 
of applying mathematics to real problems via the mechanism of the mathematical 
models. Figure 10.1 shows key steps in this process, but the impression should 
not be left that these steps are carried out in a neatly ordered way. Even 
for the best orgainsed applied mathematician there will be much retracing of 
steps." The mathematical modelling method based on such a "flow chart" used 
for the DACS example, will be called the "Modelling Cycle" in this report.
Compare with 
reality
Write a 
report
Interpret the 
solution
Set up a modelSpecify the real 
problem
Solve the
mathematical
problem
Formulate the
mathematical
problem
REAL WORLD MATHEMATICAL WORLD
FIGURE 2.4 -  Modelling Flow Chart 
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3 . T E R M IN O L O G Y  A N D  N O T A T IO N S
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a description of the mathematical notation used and a 
definition of the terms employed. It covers the following:
a) Terminology
b) Mathematical Notation
c) Z
d) Schuman-Pitt
3.2 TERMINOLOGY
In this section a definition of certain terms is given, These are terms that 
either have been given a special meaning within this report, or where there 
is no generally accepted meaning of a term in common usage.
Event The name of an element of a trace. The Operations 
resulting from applying schemas to the state at the 
Schuman-Pitt Level result In Events at the Time Stamped 
Trace Level.
Formal Model A validation technique involving construction of a 
mathematical model of a mechanism in order to explore 
its behaviour.
Formal Method Any use of mathematical techniques (usually discrete 
mathematics). Not restricted to software development.
Level Where a mathematical model employs different 
representation techniques at different levels of abstraction 
these are referred to as the model's Levels. In chapter S 
there is a Schuman-Pitt Level defining the meaning of the 
operations on the state, and a Time Stamped Trace Level 
that works only in terms of occurences of these underlying 
events.
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Model Model is used in the same sense as any Mathematical
Model such as that used in weather forecasting.
Modelling Cycle A method for constructing Formal Models. (See 6.8).
Operation There are two types of schema for state based notations,
state schemas and operation schemas. An Operation results 
in reading and/or updating the state as defined by the 
state schema.
3.3 MATHEMATICAL NOTATION
3.3.1 Introduction
The mathematical notation adopted for this document is that used for the Z 
notation (Spivey 1989b). Also the Mathematical Tool Kit given by Spivey is 
adopted. This covers such concepts as Sets, Relations, Functions, and Sequences. 
This notation is adopted even where the Formal Methods System is not Z, 
specifically during the use of both Schuman-Pitt and the Time Stamped Traces.
As an aid to the reader the most significant parts of this Mathematical 
Notation actually used in this document is reproduced below. It covers the 
following:
a) Numbers
b) Logic
c) Sets
d) Relations
e) Functions
f) Sequences
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3.3.2 Numbers
The following sets are defined;
N = {0,1 ,2 ,...}  Natural Numbers
Nj = (1 ,2 ,3 ,...}  Strictly Positive Integers
2 = { ,.. ,-1 ,0 ,1 ,., .}  Integers
R = Real Numbers
a .. b The set of numbers between a and b inclusive.
The following operations take as operands both integers and real numbers:
+, -, * Addition, Subtraction and Multiplication
/  Division x/y; yields a real number
<, >,<,>, = Numerical Comparison:
X < y means x is less than y
X > y means x is greater than y
X < y means x is at most y
X > y means x is at least y
X = y means x equals y
X # y means x differs from y
x^ X to the power of y
■/x square root of x. y  ^ = x
3.3.3 Logic 
B = {true, false}
“lA Negation not A
A A B or A A B Conjunction A and B
AvB or AVB Disjunction A or B
A=>B Implication ( A v B)
A<=> B Equivalence ( A => B) A (B => A)
V X : S I A •  B Universal Quantification. All x of type S satisfying
A also satisfy B.
V X : S •  A Universal Quantification. All x of type S satisfy A
(A special case).
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3 X : s IA •  B Existential Quantification. Some x of type S satisfies
both A and B.
3j X ; SIA •  B Unique Existence.
ri-A  Sequent A can be proved from T (hypothesis H- conclusion)
□ Marks the end of Theorems and Definitions.
3.3.4 Sets
0,{} Empty Set
x€ S Set Membership
x i  S Non Membership (-ix€ S)
ScT  Set Inclusion. S is a subset of T.
S C T Strict Set Inclusion (i.e. S ;e T)
{xi, Xg,. . . ,  x^} Set Enumeration
{x : T I A} Set Comprehension. The set of those x of type T
which satisfy A.
(xj, . . . ,  x„) Ordered n-tuple
S^x Sgx . .. X Sn Cartesian Product = {(xj,. . .  ,x^) | Xj€ S^  a . . .  ax„€ S^}
PS Power Set (set of subsets)
FS Set of finite subsets
SnT  Intersection ={ x :X |x €S  a x€T}
SUT Union = {x:X | x€ S v x€ T}
S \  T Set Difference = {x ; X | x6 S a xf? T}
#S Cardinality of Set S.
3.3.5 Relations
X*+Y Binary relations between X and Y. = P(Xx Y)
xRy X and y are related by R. = (x,y)€ R.
x*-^  y 'Maplet' from x to y. = (x,y)
dom R Domain of R, = {x : X | (3 y : Y •  xRy)}
ran R Range of R. = {y : Y| (3x;X •  xRy)}
Rj o Rg Composition of Relations. = {x : X; 2 : Z 1 (3 y : Y •  x Rg y a y R^  z)}
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3.3.6 Functions
Partial Functions from X to Y,
X -► Y Total Function = (f : X +» Y | dom f = X}
fx  or f(x) Function Application
f $ 6 Functional Overriding. = Vf, g : X + + Y # f $ g  = ((dom g) ^  f) U g
3.3.7 Sequences
#8 Length of Sequence s.
seq X Set of finite Sequences. = (s ++ X | dom s = 1, .#s}
< > Empty Sequence
<Xi,. . ,  x^> Sequence Enumeration = {l Xj,. . ,  n x^}
s^ t Sequence Concatenation
s f A Sequence Filtering. The sequence which contains just those
elements of s which belong to A, in the same order as in s.
3.4 Z
3.4,1 Introduction
The Z notation used in Annex A is defined by Spivey (Spivey 1989b). Parts of 
three aspects of Z are reproduced here:
a) Basic Definitions
b) Schemas
c) States and Operations
The basic definitions like the mathematical notation is used throughout this 
report, not just in Annex A.
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3.4.2 Basic Definitions
Identifier An identifier is a word followed by a decoration, 
which is a possibly empty sequence of ' ,?,or!.
[NAMEl, ..., NAMEn] Basic Type Definition. Introduces one or more 
basic types.
Ident ::= Branch)...| Branch Free Type Definition. This defines a new type
"Ident" as the set of enumerated values.
I Declaration 
or
Declaration
Predicate; ...; Predicate
Axiomatic Description. An axiomatic description 
introduces one or more global variables, and 
optionally specifies a œnstraint on their values.
3.4.3 Schemas
A schema definition in Z takes the following form:
rSchema_Name
Declaration
Predicate; ...; Predicate
The word heading the box becomes associated with the schema which is the 
contents of the box. The Predicates are optional. A Schema definition with 
no predicates would take the form:
rSchema_Name
Declaration
Z parameter passing is achived by decorating the identifiers in the Declaration. 
? is used or input parameters, and ! for output parameters.
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3.4.4 States and Operations
(Spivey, 1989b plSO) "An abstract data type consists of a set of states, called 
the state space, a non-empty set of initial states, and a number of operations. 
Each operation has cetain input and output variables, and is specified by a 
relationship between the input and output variables and a pair of states, one 
representing the state before execution of the operation, and the other 
representing the state after execution.
"In Z, the set of states of an abstract data type is specified by a schema. 
... By convention, none of the components of the state space schema 
has any decoration. ... The set of initial states of an abstract data type is 
specified by another schema with the same signature as the state space 
schema. The abstract data type may start in any one of the initial states; 
often there is only one of them."
(Spivey, 1989b pl31) "The operations of an abstract data type are specified 
by schemas which have all the components of both State and State', where 
State is the schema describing the state space. The state of the abstract 
data type before the operation is modelled by the undashed components 
of its schema, and the state afterwards is modelled by the components 
decorated with a dash." (pl34) "To make it more convenient to declare 
these variables, there is a convention that whenever a schema State is 
introduced as the state space of an abstract data type, the schema 
à  State is implicitly defined as the combination of State and State', 
unless a different definition is made explicitly:
rA 5 ta te ---------------
State 
State'
(pl34) "Many data types have operations which access Information in the state 
without changing the state at all. This fact can be recorded by including the 
equation ÔState = 6State' in the post condition of the operation, but it is 
convenient to have a special schema EState on which these operations can 
be built. Like à  State, the schema EState is implicitly defined whenever a 
schema State is introduced as the state space of a data type:
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-E State--------------
A State
$ State = 6 State'
3.5 SCHUMAN-PITT
3.5.1 Introduction
The Schuman-Pitt notation (Schuman et al. 1989) is superficially similar to  Z 
in that it is possible to convert Z to Schuman-Pitt with only minor syntactic 
changes. However, there are some significant semantic differences between the 
two. For example, Z stays very close to the mathematics being little more 
than a stylised way of using set theory and logic, while Schuman-Pitt has 
computer applications in mind. Hence Schuman-Pitt has explicit support for 
instantiation which Z does not. Schuman-Pitt also has an Object Oriented 
intention and hence Includes notation aimed at inheritance.
In this report the Schuman-Pitt notation is used in straight forward ways so 
many of the differences with Z are not encountered. Consequently, only the 
following topics are covered here:
a) General Form of a Class
b) Parameter Passing
c) State Schemas
d) Operation Schemas
e) Consistency Verification
f) Schema Composition
g) Sub-Cases.
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3.5.2 General Form of a Class
Figure 3.1 shows the general form for the State of a class C and an Operation E 
on class C.
^S *
Pj C***Xq| Vg. . . . ]
Sjjj C***Xç.iVg ...]
— C.E(.,.eg^...-*'...e^...) 
®a *
q j C» ••X ç |V g j,eg^ ,e |^ ..,3
r|j.C»»»X0,Vjg,Vg « 3
FIGURE 3.1 - State and Operation Schemas in Schuman-Pitt
3.5.3 Parameter Passing
Schnman-Pitt adopts the more usual approach of including parameters after 
the schema name, hence no use of the "?" and *’!" decorations is made. 
Parameters prefixed with are output parameters.
3.5.4 State Schemas
For the state schemas the main differences from Z are the ability to pass 
instantiation parameters, and the inclusion of the initialisation condition 
below the double line ’= = = * * .
For the state schema given in Figure 3.1 the following are full definitions of 
the State Invariant inv[C], and Initialisation condition init[C]. The schema is 
just a stylised way of laying out these characteristic predicates.
i n v [ C ] a ( . . . A  a V g€ a . . . ) A ( . . . a p jC -.-x^ .V g ., .]  a . ..)
i n i t [ C ] s  inv^CC] A  ( . . . a s ^ [ . . .X g . ,  Vg, V g \ . . ]  a ...)
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The state invariant is a predicate over the identifiers in the state schema
which, as Its name suggests, mnst always be tme. Hence any operation that
starts with the invariant tm e mnst preserve it on completion. Similarly 
initialisation mnst establish the property. The effect of the state invariant is 
to preclude otherwise possible states from existing.
3.5.5 Operation Schemas
In Schnman-Pitt the state to which an operation applies is given explicitly in 
the schema name. Other than this the most significant difference is that the 
pre and post conditions are explicit in Schnman-Pitt. Hence the area of the 
schema where the predicates are given is divided into two regions by a double 
horizontal line The area above the line is where the pre-condition
is defined, and the area below where the post-condition is defined.
For the schemas given in Figure 3.1 the following are full definitions of the 
pre and post conditions. An operation schema is again just a stylised way of 
laying out the following characteristic predicates:
preCC.E]^ inv[C] A (... a  e^€ T g [ . . . x ^ , V g . . . 3  a . . . )  A ( . . . a  T ^ [ . . . x ^ , V g . . . 3  a . . . )
A ( . . . A  QjC. . .X g i ,V g ,e g , e ^ . . . 3  a » . . )  
post[C.E3= inv^[C3 A ( . . . A  r,^C...x ,^Vg,Vg',eg,e j^...3 a . . . ) .
3.5.6 Consistency Verification
Quoting from Cohen and Pitt (1990b, p2): "Three kinds of proof obligation are 
associated with the presentation of a state-based specfication. These are 
here expressed in the terminology of Schuman and Pitt (1989), but the same 
principles would apply to any state-based technique.
a) Consistency demands that there be at least one assignment of values to 
the state components which both respects their type declarations and satisfies 
the invariant. If this were not so, then the system would not be allowed to 
exist in any state. To discharge this obligation, it suffices to exhibit one such 
assignment.
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b) Applicability demands that, for each event, there be at least one assignment 
to the state components and the event parameters which satisfies their type 
declarations, the invariant and the precondition. If this were not so then the 
event could never occur in any allowable state. Again, exhibition of suitable 
assignments (one for every event) is sufficient to discharge this obligation.
c) Effectiveness demands that the acceptance of an event (execution of an 
operation) always leave the system in an allowable state. If this were not so, 
then such an event would not be allowed to terminate (leaving the system in 
deadlock). The discharge of this obligation is more difficult. The theorems 
(one for each event) to be proved are that: for all component and parameter 
values which satisfy the type declarations, the precondition and the invariant, 
the corresponding postcondition must [be consistent with] the invariant. The 
presence of the universal quantifier dictates that the proof be conducted over 
the symbolic representation of the predicates using, for example, natural 
deduction."
The following are the Schema Consistency Verification conditions for the 
schemas given in Figure 3.1,
a) Consistency: css[C] ê 3...x^,Vg... # inv [C]
b) Applicability: appCC.E]s 3...x^,Vg,eg,e,^...# pre[C.E]
c) Effectiveness: eff[C .E ]s V...x^,Vg,eg,e^...# (pre[C.E]=>3...Vg\..# post[C.E])
d) In addition, a special form of Effectiveness is needed for initialisation:
uii[C] a V...x^,Vg, ...# (inv[C]:» 3...Vg\..# init[C])
3.5.7 Schema Composition 
Given two schemas A and B:
r A — rB
Then these can be composed to form a new schema C:
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r  C 
A 
B
This may be done for both state and operation schemas, and additional 
mutual constraints may also be applied. If there is no overlap between A and 
B then C is simply equivalent to the textual inclusion of A and B. If the 
signatures overlap then they must be consistently defined for the composition 
to be defined. If A and B are operation schemas then the pre-condition 
of C is only true when both the pre- conditions of A and B are true. C only 
completes when both A and B complete.
3.5.8 Sub-Cases
Operations may have sub-cases as shown in Figure 3.2.
C.E (...)----------------------
General Pre-Condition 
rA.F----------------
B.G
General Post-Condition
FIGURE 3.2 - Operation Schema with Sub-Cases
If the General Pre-Condition is true then the General Post-Condition is applied. 
If the General Pre-Condition is true and the pre-condition on A.F is true then 
the post condition on A.F is also applied, and similarly for B.G. The sub-cases 
are linked by disjunction, hence unless their pre-conditions are mutually 
exclusive the result is non-deterministic. Arbitrary numbers of sub-cases may 
be employed, not just two as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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4 . T H E  D A C S  E X A M P L E
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter an informal description of DACS and the generic kind of 
problem that it is being applied to are presented.
The example used in this study is based on SCIDAC (SCIcon's Data Acquisition 
and Control system). The author worked on the development of this product 
during 1981 and 1982 while at Scicon Limited.
4.2 DACS DESCRIPTION
4.2.1 Background on SCIDAC
SCIDAC was intended for industrial Process Control applications. For 
example, to control and monitor the furnaces and production line of a glass bottle 
manufacturer, or a fermentation process of a drugs company.
The control systems for industrial processes typically involve both sensors and 
actuators connected to the plant. These are wired to the computers which provide 
the operator displays and controls. The use of digital technology in this way 
is now common practice, and aspects of the approach have even been patented 
(Patent: US 4114442, Avicon Development Group).
SCIDAC is a set of hardware and software building blocks that can be used to 
build automation and control systems for industry. A SCIDAC system consists 
of a number of DEMOS multi-microprocessor based units (Dowson, 1979). 
Each is configured with a selection of software modules to perform a variety 
of monitoring and control tasks. These units can be linked together and the 
software modules chosen in many different ways, to produce a range of 
systems capable of performing in a wide spectrum of roles.
S3
SCIDAC offers standard facilities for:
a) acquiring and processing plant data
b) performing computations on the plant data to implement closed loop control
c) controlling plant actuators as requested by the operator or according 
to closed loop computations.
In SCIDAC all the data acquisition and control operations required for a 
given process are specified by the user selecting a number of Data Acquisition 
and Control modules, called DAC Modules, and "soft wiring" them together to 
form the required loops. These DAC modules are analogous to hardware 
modules used in conventional control systems, and the DAC module 
interconnection diagram closely resembles its equivalent hardware diagram.
Examples of DAC modules are:
a) Plant Input
b) Plant Output
c) Thermocouple Conversion
d) Totaliser
e) Three Term Control
f) Polynomial
8) Summation
h) Integration
i) Switch
j) Low Pass Filter
k) Product/Ratio
SCIDAC handles Analogue, 1, 2 and 3 bit digital, and pulse count inputs as 
standard. S state alarm (HI HI, HI, SAFE, LO, LO LO), as well as the usual 
three state alarms (HI, SAFE, LO) are provided as standard.
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A variety of display and reporting facilities are available using colour or 
monochrome VDUs and a range of printers. These include:
a) Plant mimics
b) Controller status
c) Alarm lists and alarm history
d) Trends
e) various logs.
4.2.2 The DACS Approach to Process Control
The Data Acquisition and Control Sub system (DACS) was one of many 
subsystems that formed part of SCIDAC. Examples of other sub-systems are 
those for operator displays and input, alarm handling, and historical 
recording of data. Whilst acknowledging these other parts of SCIDAC here, 
they have little part to play in the example, which focuses on the DACS. For 
this reason the example is called the DACS example, and all other aspects 
of SCIDAC have been ignored except alarm annunciation.
Figure 4.1 shows a typical DACS application. Here there are four Plant Input 
modules reading values. The outputs of each of these are then used by 
other modules so that the modules are connected into Directed Acyclic Graphs 
(DAGs). In the figure the DAG is not fully connected, but has two parts. Each 
of these parts is referred to as a "Loop". The top loop ends with a Plant 
Output module and is thus sending signals back to the plant to effect closed 
loop control. The lower loop does not have such output modules, and hence 
is used purely to monitor some sensor values and provide alarms.
The DAC loops are concerned with connectivity and the order in which the 
modules are scanned. The modules are concerned with the algorithms that 
are required to be performed. Both the modules and loops are instantiated 
as required and are configurable. Associated with each module is a process 
variable. This holds the value that resulted from the last scan on the 
module together with other information such as whether the module is in an 
alarm state.
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PLA N T
IN P U T
C O N T R O L
PLA N T
IN P U T
L O W P A S S
FILTER
PLA N T
IN P U T
M O V IN G
A V E R A G E
PLA N T
IN P U T
S U M M A T IO N
FIGURE 4,1 - Typical DACS Application
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The DACS clearly has significant generality. However, the case example 
functions. It is in many ways very similar to a software implementation 
of an analogue computer. This approach to process control systems is very 
much standard industrial practice with many implementations taking this form 
such as Halang and Kramer (1992).
4.3 DACS EXAMPLE
4.3.1 Introduction
The DACS clearly has significant generality. However, the case example 
focuses on a single type of application which is a simple protection system. 
Hence DACS is to detect whether a sensor value is in an unsafe region and 
output a warning signal when this happens. This output signal could be used 
to initiate an emergency shut down system, or simply used to raise an alarm 
to the operators. The actual use made of the output is not of concern, and 
the output will be called "bell" even though some other use of the signal 
might be made. To implement this application using the DACS only requires 
a single Analogue Input module in a single loop.
4.3.2 DACS Specification
An informal specification is available for SCIDAC generally, but for the DACS 
a specification in Z is also available. In fact, as explained in chapter 5, most 
of SCIDAC is not included in the model, and most aspects of DACS that are 
included are given simple abstract formulations. However, in the case of the 
Analogue-Input module itself a full specification is employed and the Z 
specification for this is used as a starting point. This is included in Annex A.
4.3.3 Alarm Limits
The Analogue-Input module supports a three state alarm (lo, safe, hi). To 
divide the range of sensor values into these three regions two alarm limits 
are needed. Values below lo-alarm produce a lo alarm state. Similarly, 
values above hi-alarm give a hi alarm state. Values between these alarm 
limits are safe.
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Analogue-Input can be configured so that it does not provide alarm checking 
by setting the alarm_check-req configuration parameter to false. This will 
clearly disable the main function for which Analogue-Input is being employed. 
Hence for any possible use of Analogue-Input for a protection system as 
described above, then the alarm_check-req parameter must have the value true.
4.3.4 Deadbands
If a sensor value moves very close to an alarm limit, noise in the sensor or 
interface equipment may be sufficient for this to trip the alarm limit causing 
Analogue-Input to register an alarm. The next reading the sensor may be in 
the safe region causing Analogue-Input to register safe. In any situation where 
the measured value is close to an alarm limit it may wander each side of the 
limit causing an apparent series of safe to alarm and alarm to safe transitions, 
for what is actually a single event. Analogue-Input provides the means to 
supress such spurious transitions by requiring that once an alarm is set the 
measured value must return significantly into the safe region for it to  be 
reset. The distance required is configurable and established by setting the 
value of the deadband parameter. Hence in the deadband region the alarm 
value may be safe or unsafe depending on whether the deadband region was 
entered from the safe or the alarm direction.
4.3.5 Interfacing
The DACS has a number of different sensor input modules to cater for digital 
or totaliser inputs as well as analogue inputs. For the case example it is the 
Analogue-Input module that is employed and this restricts the kind of inputs 
that the DACS is being qualified to process.
As its name suggests the Analogue-Input module is intended to be used with 
sensors that output analogue signals such as the 0 to 10 volt or 4 to 20 mA 
standards. Obviously such values need to be converted from an analogue to a 
digital form for processing by the DACS. These Analogue to Digital Convertions 
(ADC) are typically of 8, 12 or 16 bit resolution. These digital values of the 
voltage or current of the sensor's output actually represent a value of the 
process that the sensor is measuring such as a flow or a temperature. DACS 
provides the ability to convert these digital results of the ADC to the
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appropriate engineering units. Two conversion formulae are provided, linear 
and square root extraction which is required for flows. In either case the 
Analogue-Input module has two configuration parameters, xO and xfs, that 
are intended to be the zero and full scale values of the ADC. There are then 
corresponding configuration parameters, pO and pfs, which give the values in 
engineering units that correspond to the xO and xfs values from the ADC 
respectively. Clearly only two values are needed for a linear conversion, for 
example, so the use of four values is just to aid the user in instantiating the 
DACS, and means that there are many ways of achieving the same conversions.
4.4 CONCRETE EXAMPLE
An example application has been chosen to provide a concrete example. In the 
example application the plant consists of a vessel containing a liquid mixture 
which must be kept below 40 degrees centigrade for the process to remain 
safe. In order to accomplish this there is a linear temperature probe inserted 
into the mixture, and a bell that the system sounds if the process goes into 
alarm. This arrangement is shown in Figure 4.2.
b e l lS y s t e m  
a la r m  = 
f ( t e m p )
a la r mt e m p
FIGURE 4.2 - Example Application
DACS must sound the bell no later than 20 seconds after the process enters 
the unsafe region. Note that if the system is to fail safe it must sound the 
bell for sensor failure also, hence the lo alarm limit check is also a safety 
critical function.
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The temperature probe produces an analogue output signal that follows the 4-20 
mA standard. With this standard the minimum sensor value corresponds to 
an output of 4mA, and the maximum sensor value corresponds to 20mA output 
from the device. The chosen range of the temperature probe in the example is 
-10 to +50 degrees. Hence 4mA means -10 degrees, and 20 mA means +50 
degrees. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Values below 4 mA represent sensor failure conditions, which will include the 
sensor not being powered up, or not fitted. It is clearly as important to inform 
the operators of failure of the sensor as it is to warn of high temperatures. 
This leads us to introduce a lo alarm limit of -10 degrees in addition to the hi 
alarm at + 40 degrees.
S e n s o r
2 0 m A
12 B it  A D C  DeR C A la r m s
4  m A  
O m A
4095 - r  T™ 1----------
4050 50 J.JLJL C L J.< : x r  I I I
f
3510 40 Î
s a f e1
810
0
— 10 
-25
Îlo  a la rm
.................................. I
FIGURE 4.3 - Relationship between the Sensor and DACS Values
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The sensor vaine will need an analogue to digital conversion (ADC) performed 
by hardware. It is assumed that there are 20 ADC channels available and that 
the temperature probe is connected to channel 12. Assuming a 12 bit ADC the 
output will be a value in the range 0..409S. In order to allow a full register of 
20 mA, 4050 is chosen to correspond to 20mA not 4095. However, 0 mA is 
represented by a 0 value from the ADC. Figure 4.3 shows all the 
relationships between the sensor, ADC, value in engineering units and the 
required alarm limits.
Referring to the specification of the Analogue Input module given in Annex A 
we can determine most of the configuration parameters:
a) n = 20
b) input-channel = 12
c) sqroot_req = false -  since the sensor is linear.
d) alarm_checlc-req = true
e) lo-alarm = -10.0, hi_alarm = 40.0
f) pO = -10.0, pfs = 50.0
g) xO = 610.0, xfs s= 4050.0
In addition, an_value_at_restart is set somewhat arbitrarily at 15.0.
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5. S A F E T Y  P R O O F  D E V E L O P M E N T
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the model for the DACS example is developed, the property
proofs performed and the results interpreted. The steps in this process are:
1) An informal specification of the problem is prepared
2) The Mathematical Framework is setup
3) The Assumptions and Limitations are considered
4) The problem is formulated
5) The proof is performed
6) The results are interpreted
7) The results are used.
5.2 STEP 1 2 INFORMAL SPECIFICATION
5.2.1 Introduction
The informal specification of the problem is given in the following parts:
a) The Top Level Requirement.
b) The speciftcation of the Safety Property,
c) The specification of the plant and its instrumentation, the Real World part of
the model.
d) The DACS itself.
5.2.2 Tod Level Requirement
The requirement is to  use a pre-existing product (SCIDAC) as a safety 
protection device. The product needs to be able to read sensor values on 
the plant and output a warning signal to sound a bell within a given time, 
if any sensor value leaves the safe region. Where the safe region is defined to 
be between hi and lo thresholds.
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5.2.3 Safety Property
The safety property will be referred to as RTSR, standing for Real Time Safety 
Requirement. An informal definition of the safety property is:
The bell must sound no later than safe_delay seconds after a sensor value 
exceeds the high safety threshold rw-hi, or drops below the low safety 
threshold rw_lo.
If the plant is not in the safe region when DACS starts up then the bell must 
sound no later than safe.delay seconds after the first sensor value reading.
After a first annunciate, the DACS shall continue to monitor the plant and 
provide further alarm annunciation if any sensor value enters an alarm region.
5.2.4 Real World
The plant shall be instrumented with sensors able to read the parameters of 
interest. Where the sensor output is not already in digital form then an 
Analogue to  Digital Conversion (ADC) shall be provided. Each sensor shall 
provide a continuous reading of the value of the parameter of interest and 
hence may be read by DACS at any time.
Included as part of the Real World shall be a bell that shall sound when 
turned on by the DACS.
5.2.5 DACS
The DACS shall be able to input and convert to engineering units the values
output by the plant. Conversion for both linear and square root conversions
shall be possible.
DACS shall provide an output indicating when a sensor value in engineering 
units has left the safe region, also defined In engineering units.
It is the Analogue Input module within DACS that provides this functionality. 
A formal specification for this module written in Z can be found in Annex A.
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S.3 STEP 2 2 th e  MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
5.3.1 Introduction
In this section the Formal Systems used are defined together with their 
inter-relationships. The axioms are established, particularly those relating to 
the Scientific framework within which the DACS is operating. First order 
predicate logic is used for the proof system, except that cases requiring a 
higher order logic will be handled rigorously rather than fully formally.
5.3.2 Choice of Formal Notation
It is clear that the problem is in the domain of discrete mathematics and 
should be using Formal Methods techniques to build the model. The problem 
as posed is to show that a given property is true for the model, for which an 
analytic proof is appropriate. The property, RTSR, has three main elements to it:
a) A functional part involving detection of the region the plant is in and the 
sounding of the bell.
b) A part concerning the relationships between events.
c) A timing part concerning the time relationships between events.
Many Formal Notations are available with differing strengths and weaknesses. 
However, as explained by (McDermid, 1992), none of these have the expressive 
power to deal with all the above aspects without extension. The approach is;
a) To use the Schuman-Pitt notation (Schuman et al. 1989) for the functional
aspects.
b) Viewed in time the operations on the state schema of the Schuman-Pitt 
specification form a sequence. This sequence starts at 1 with initialisation, and 
is called a trace. For the use here the operations in a trace include selected 
parameters that make visible values of the Schuman-Pitt identifiers that are 
significant at the trace level.
c) Time can then be handled by enriching the traces with time stamps.
This results in a two level mathematical framework, with the Time Stamped 
Trace level having an underlying Schuman-Pitt level formulation.
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5,3.3 Time Stamped Trace Level
First the part of the mathematical framework based on Time Stamped Traces 
is constructed. The framework comprises:
[F] -  a set of events.
[TIME] - A numeric, and hence totally ordered set.
| s  : Fx TIME - S is the type of time stamped events.
IG : PseqS - is the set of all traces of time stamped events. The property of 
interest, RTST, defines a sub set of G where the traces comply with the property. 
The safety proof is then to show that the system of interest only generates 
traces in this subset.
The trace of events can be retrieved using the tr  function; 
t r  ; seq S seq F
V 8 ; seq S a  i ; l..#s a  x  : F a  y : TIME # s(i) = (x,y) => tr(s)(i) = x
The time stamp of an event can be retrieved using a time-stamp function. 
Note that it is just a simple function that takes a time stamped event and 
returns the time. However, it is defined in terms of a sequence since that 
is the way it is invariably used.
time-stamp ; S-^TIME
V s : seq S a  i : 1 .#s a  x :F  a  y : TIME # s(i) = (x,y) => tirae_stamp(s(i)) = y
An axiom that results from the scientific framework within which the problem 
is posed is monotonistic time. Hence the time stamps must reflect the fact 
that the observer's time keeps advancing. So seq S is constrained to have 
strictly monotonie increasing time stamps:
Axioms.1 â |s :s e q  S | (Vu,v # time_stamp(s(u)) < time_stamp(s(v)) <=> u<v)}.
-  65 -
5.3.4 Schuman-Pitt Level
In addition to exploring the time relationships between the events we also wish 
to explore the causal relationships. The mathematical framework will therefore 
have two levels so that there is a Schuman-Pitt level underlying the Time 
Stamped Trace level. The Schuman-Pitt level comprises:
[C] - a state schema
[E] - a set of operations on C.
5.3.5 Level Linkage
The causal relationships at the Time Stamped Trace level result from the 
values of the identifiers and the pre-conditions of the operations in the 
Schuman-Pitt level. Thus the linkage between the two levels needs to be 
established. This linkage covers;
a) The relationship between F and E,
b) Convention for trace sequence numbers.
c) Link Axioms.
The set F is based on the set E. However, each different value of a parameter 
of E is considered a different event in F. For the DACS example, Sample takes 
a parameter of type ALARM with values (lo, safe, hi}. Hence in F there will be 
three events generated by Sample: Sample(lo), Sample(safe), and Sample(hi). 
The convention is adopted that the subset of F that includes all the events 
based on the same operation in E is named by the operation name in E. Hence 
for the example above Sample = (Sample(lo), Sample(safe), Sample(hi)}.
The proofs involve reasoning over a number of events taken from the trace tr(s). 
To accommodate this a Schuman-Pitt identifier will be suffixed with its 
sequence number if there is any ambiguity about which event it refers to. 
Hence alarmj is the value of alarm for event tr(s)(i). A similar convention is 
adopted for expressions, so the pre-condition of event e = tr(s)(i) is pre|[e].
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There are two Axioms that are a natural consequence of the semantics of S 
given that there is a Schuman-Pitt level underlying it. The first is that a 
dashed identifier of event tr(s)(i) is equal to the same identifier undashed 
for event i+i;
AxiomS.2 è {s : seq S | V i ;l..#tr(s)-l # tr(s)(l) => C .V j'=  C .V |^. J
The second is that if an event appears in the trace then clearly its
pre-condition must have been true before the event and similarly its post condition 
must be true after the event;
Axioms.3 s  {s : seq S | V i:l,.# tr(s) # prej[tr(s)(i)] A postj[tr(s)(i)]}
5.3.6 Sample Axiom
The mathematical framework thus far is very general, and hence applicable to 
a wide variety of situations. With the introduction of the Sample Axiom the 
framework is being focused on sampling systems.
To be safe DACS must detect all transitions from the safe region to the 
unsafe regions which can occur a t any time. Although DACS is a sampling 
system it can detect such transitions by seeing that a Sample resulting in 
alarm 's safe is followed by a Sample resulting in alarm 'ÿ safe. However, 
an excursion out of the safe region does not necessarily imply that it will be 
detected by the change of alarm state between successive Samples because
the process may go into, and back out of an unsafe region too quickly.
The assumption that DACS will detect every transition relies on the
process being slow compared to the Sample rate.
There is a considerable body of theory and practice in regard to the slowest 
rate at which sampling system can operate. Of particular significance is the 
"Fundamental Sampling Theorem" which states (Foster, 1982):
"If the highest frequency present in the input signal is 0, then in
order to be able to reconstruct that signal, you must take at least
2*0 samples per second".
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This is a fundamental property on which the valid use of DACS is based and 
is therefore an Axiom. This is now formalised:
The set H is assumed to have a distinquished operation called Sample, so: 
Sample E E.
ALARM ::ss lo | safe | hi
region : ALARM - a parameter of Sample. Hence:
{Sample(lo), Sample(safe), Sample(hi)} c F.
sample.delay : R - the maximum time permitted between Samples.
For any two samples that occur within the sample-delay and have the same 
region, then any sample between them will have the same value for region:
Axioms.4 ê {s : seq S | V i,j, k : l..#s a  i <j <k •  tr(s)(i) € Sample 
A tr(s)(j) 6  Sample a  tr(s)(k) € Sample 
A region^ = regionj^
A time_stamp(s(k)) -  time_stamp(s(i)) < sample-delay 
=» regiouj = region^}
5.3.7 Durations
The Schuman-Pitt operations have finite durations. Since there is only a single 
state schema the operations are mutually exclusive and interleaving and hence 
the earliest start time of an event is the time stamp of the proceeding event 
plus its duration:
duration ; F -*• R
V e ; F •  duration(e) > 0
AxiomS.5 6 {s : seq S | V i : l..#s -1 # time_stamp(s(i +1)) > time_stamp(s(i))
+ duration(tr( s)(i))}
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SA  STEP 3 2 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
5.4.1 Introduction
In the previous section the mathematical framework was introduced. The 
intent is to formulate the DACS problem within this framework. The next 
step is to consider the assumptions and limitations of the model, and to 
justify why these are valid for the DACS situation. The assumptions concern:
a) SCIDAC Functionality
b) DACS Timing
c) Single State Schema
d) Discrete Event Model
e) DACS Configuration
f) Plant and Sensors
g) Sample Axiom,
5.4.2 SCIDAC Functionalitv
The key intent is to establish whether the DACS has the necessary functionality 
for the generic situation. As discussed in chapter 4 SCIDAC has a lot of 
functionality such as the operator interface and data logging that are of no 
direct interest. The vast majority of SCIDAC is therefore left out. The 
assumption made is that these other areas of functionality in SCIDAC do not 
interfere with the DACS.
The only aspect for which a specification is retained is the Analogue Input 
Module. The rest of the DACS formulation, the scheduling and alarm 
annunciation, are both simplified. The assumption is that these abstractions 
do exhibit the correct behaviour as it affects the safety requirement.
The effect of these assumptions is a major simplification of the DACS model 
with a consequent increase in clarity.
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5.4.3 DACS Timing
It is necessary to consider how the processing times for events is represented. 
Also, given that the vast majority of the functionality has been left out then 
the impact on the timing of the remaining operations in the model needs to 
be considered. In fact a very simple approach can be adopted. DACS is run on 
a regular timed basis with most of the rest of the SCIDAC functionality running 
in the background. Hence, by modelling the Scan event durations as the time 
between scans and assuming zero duration between events the actual situation 
is modelled quite closely.
Whenever Annunciate runs it will initially take time from these background 
processes, and may not delay the next scan at all. However, it is possible 
that an Annunciate will delay the next Scan, so a duration for Annuciates 
is sensible. If for the actual artifact Annunciate never delays Scan, zero can 
be used for Annunciate duration.
5.4.4 Single State Schema
The mathematical framework allows for only a single state schema at the 
Schuman-Pitt level. This would appear to be a serious limitation as it will 
only permit a single concurrent thread in the traces. The mWn reason why this 
is adequate for the DACS example is the Sample Axiom.
Both the DACS and the Real World will be modelled using Schuman-Pitt. 
Although this would seem to result in two state schemas these will be 
combined into a single composite state schema and the Time Stamped Trace 
level will be based on the events defined for this single composite state 
schema. Combining the Real World with the control system in this way is 
justifiable for a sampling system because either the control system is fast 
enough to track the real world or it is not. If it is not, it is unsafe. If it is, 
then the control system's view of the world is adequate. Hence the only 
knowledge of the real world is the measurements the DACS makes.
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5.4.5 Discrete Event Model
The mathematical framework only supports a single concurrent thread, and the 
events have finite durations. Hence the framework represents a Discrete Event 
Model and we may assume that the number of events which occur between 
any two events is finite.
5.4.6 DACS Configuration
The assumption is made that the DACS is configured with up to n 
Analogue-Input modules instantiated, where "n” is the number of sensors the 
Real World is able to support. As explained in the Top Level Requirement the 
only use that is being made of the system is to  monitor sensors and 
sound the bell as necessary. The safety proof is therefore qualifying DACS 
for this single purpose.
For DACS to be applicable to this generic class of problems the alarm checking 
in the Analogue Input module must be enabled.
5.4.7 Plant and Sensors
The assumption is made that the sensors and their interfacing circuitry Is 
properly designed, installed and maintained. This assumption is made as 
there seems little value in including these issues in the model. Specifically 
the following assumptions are made:
a) That the ADC resolution is sufficient.
b) That the sensors are exact.
c) That any lag in the sensors or the interfacing circuitry is negligable.
d) That the sensors and interfacing circuitry are properly calibrated.
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The behaviour of the plant is not being modelled, and hence the schemas 
describing how the plant values change with time are omitted and this includes 
the initial values for sensors, Hence each time a sensor is read a different 
value may be returned, but we have no information on how these may 
change from reading to reading. It is to be understood that the sensors 
provide continuous outputs which may be sampled at any time, The 
sensors therefore provide an accurate reflection of the state of the plant at 
the time they are read.
5.4.8 Sample Axiom
The sampling has been built into the mathematical framework as an axiom. 
However, it is worth noting that the axiom represents a limitation on the 
applicability of the DACS to any given situation.
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5.5 STEP 4 - PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem is now formulated in the mathematical framework. There are 
three elements to this:
a) DACS
b) The Real World
c) Safety Requirement.
The process that is undertaken to formulate the model, and the relationships 
between the three elements are shown in Figure 5.1 and discussed below.
Z Specification •1
Schuman-Pitt
Specification
Consistency
Verificationi
Strengthening 
the Invarianti
Specialisation
Pre-Emption
Real Worldi
Region
Composite SystemV Safety Requirementy
Safety Proof
FIGURE 5.1 - Problem Formulation
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As discussed in chapter 4, the DACS model is constructed by starting with 
an available specification of the Analogue Input module in the Z notation (Spivey 
1989b). This is converted to the Schuman-Pitt notation (Schuman et. al, 1989) 
and the Consistency Verifications defined for the notation are applied. The 
specification is then studied to see if the state invariant can be strengthened. 
Both the Consistency Verification and Stronger Invariant investigations result 
in changes to the specification of Analogue Input while preserving the actual 
behavioural properties of the module. The resulting schemas are then specialised 
by fixing the alarm_check^req parameter with the value "true” in order to 
ensure that the alarm checking provided by the module is switched on. Whereas 
the Analogue Input module employs the actual specification, other aspects of 
DACS are only modelled. In particular the pre-emptive scheduling aspects are 
introduced simply by including a new variable and pre conditions based on this.
A simple model of the Real World is constructed that allows reading of the 
plant sensors. The region that the sensor of interest is in is then added to the 
output parameters solely to  support the formulation of the Safety Requirement.
The issue is whether the plant together with the control system exhibit behaviour 
that complies with the Safety Requirement. It is therefore necessary to compose 
the Real World model with the DACS model, producing a Composite Model.
Finally the Real Time Safety Requirement (RTSR) is constructed.
5.6 DACS SPECIFICATION IN SCHUMAN-PITT
5,6.1 Introduction
The initial specification for Analogue_Input was in the Z notation (Spivey 1989b) 
and is given in Annex A. This is converted into the Schuman-Pitt notation 
(Schuman et. al, 1989) so that the proofs of internal consistency can be 
performed. This specification uses the same basic definitions as the Z version;
[ANALOGUE] - this is the type of identifiers with continuous values resulting 
from sensors with 0 to 10 Volt or 4 to 20mA interfaces, for example,
N - positive integers (0, 1, 2, ...).
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B ::= true | false -  Boolean values
ALARM :;= lo | safe | hi - the set of alarm states
The state for Analogue Input comprises a set of configuration parameters and 
a run time state. The configuration state is first defined, and then the run 
time state defined and intialised in the context of the configuration. The 
operation schemas are then defined.
5.6.2 Configuration State
^ Analogue_Inputl_Conf ( n, an_value_at_restart, input_channel, sqroot^req,
alarm_check_req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo_alarm, 
pfs, Pq, xfs, Xq )-------------------------------------------------
n : N
an_value_at_restart : ANALOGUE 
input-channel : l..n 
sqroot_req : B 
alarm_check_req : B 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
hi.alarm, 
lo_alarm : ANALOGUE 
pfs, Pq, xfs, Xq : ANALOGUE 
deadband > 0.0
alarm_check_req = true => (deadband + lo_alarm < hi_alarm - deadband)
xfs^i Xg
5.6.3 Run Time State and Initialisation
 ^Analogue_Inputl ( n, an_value_at_restart, lnput_channel, sqroot_req,
alarm_check_req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo^alarm,
pfs, pg ,  xfs, X g)----------------------------------------------------------------------
Analogue_Inputl_Conf (n, an_value_at_restart, input.channel, sqroot_req, 
alarm_oheck_req, deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm,
p f s ,  Pg, x f s ,  X g )
an.value : ANALOGUE 
alarm ; ALARM
an.value' = an_value_ a t .  restart 
alarm' = safe
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S.6.4 Operation Schemas
. Analogue.Inputl .Scan(an.piant_input) 
an_plant_inp«t : l..n ANALOGUE
sqroot_req = true =>
I_valne' = (pfs-po)* /  an_pIanC l^u tW nt-cha«nelL:Xo /  + p^an.
sqroot.req = false =>
an.value' = - p») * (an.plant_input( input.channel) - X p ) ^ \
x f s  -  X g  J
(alarm.check.req = true =>
(alarm' = lo <=>
((an.value' < lo.alarm) v (alarm = lo A an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband)))
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an.value' > hi.alarm) v (alarm = hi a  an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband))) 
A (alarm' = safe <=>
((lo.alarm + deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm - deadband)
V ((alarm = safe) a (lo.alarm < an.value' < hi.alarm)))) )
(alarm.check.req = false => (alarm' = safe))
 ^Analogue.Inputl .Annunciate(-^waming), 
warning ; ALARM
warning = alarm
5.6.5 Observations
The Schuman-Pitt notation supports instantiation directly via the parameters 
to state schemas. In addition, by handling initialisation as part of the state 
schema further reductions in the amount of text needed is acheived, Schuman 
-Pitt is a more concise notation than Z,
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5.7 CONSISTENCY VERIFICATION OF ANALOGUE INPUTl
5.7.1 Introduction
The Consistency Verifications defined for the "Schuman-Pitt" notation (Schuman 
et al. 1989) are given in chapter 3. Their application to the Analogue.Inputl 
specification is given in Annex B.
5.7.2 Results
For all the schemas except Analogue.Inputl.Scan the Consistency Verifications 
showed that the schemas were well formed. However, for Analogue.Inputl.Scan 
it was clear by inspection that the schema was not effective. Assuming 
ANALOGUE = R so that there is closure under division and •/, then the 
situations where a value for an.value' is not determined are:
a) xfs = Xq
an_plant_input(input_channel) - Xg
b )  sqroot_req = true a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- <  0 , 0
x f s  -  X g
Note that only a) is excluded by the pre condition, and hence it is not strong 
enough for effectiveness to hold. Situations where a value for alarm' is not 
determined are:
c) any situation in which an.value' is not determined
d) alarm.check.req = true
A alarm = lo a  hi.alarm - deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm
e) alarm.check.req = true
A alarm = hi a  lo.alarm < an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband
So again the operation is not effective in this case because of an error in the 
post condition rather than the pre condition being too weak. Both d) and e) 
should have given alarm' = safe so the correct version of the formula for alarm' 
should have been as in the following revised version of Scan:
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. Analogue.Inpiit2.Scaii(an_plant_inpnt)___________________ —
an.plant.input : l..n -► ANALOGUE
sqroot_req = true ,  ?"^Bl^"L-.jnp"t(lnpnt-channel) -   ^ ^.oxfs - X q
sqroot_req = true =>
an_value' = (pfs-po>* /  a n _ p la n t- l^ n t(y -C h a n n e lhiXo /  + p.
sqroot-req = false =>
an value' = ~ Pq) * (an_plant.input( input.channel) - Xq) ^
x f s  -  X g  °
(alarm.check.req = true =>
(alarm' = lo <=>
((an.value' < lo.alarm) v (alarm = lo a  an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband))) 
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an.value' > hi.alarm) v (alarm = hi a  an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband))) 
A (alarm' = safe <=>
(((alarm = lo) a  (lo.alarm + deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm))
V  ((alarm = hi) a  (lo.alarm < an.value' < hi.alarm - deadband))
V  (((alarm = safe) a  (lo.alarm < an.value' < hi.alarm))))) )
(alarm.check.req = false ^  (alarm' = safe))
In this second version of the DACS specification Analogue.input2, the 
configuration, state and Annunciate schemas are the same as for 
Analogue.Inputl,
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5.8 STRENGTHENING THE INVARIANT
5.8.1 Introduction
An examination of the state schema for Analogue.Input2 shows that only 
the instantiation parameters are constrained by the state invariant. The state 
invariant is therefore telling us that the two run time state variables, an.value 
and alarm, are completely independent of each other and of the instantiation 
parameters. This is clearly not the intent. For example, if alarm.check.req is 
false then alarm is always to be safe, so alarm is dependent on an instantiation 
parameter in this case. Another example is when alarm.check.req is true. In 
this case, except within the deadbands, the value of alarm depends on the 
value of an.value. It is therefore possible to exhibit examples of unintended 
states that are permitted by the state invariant:
a) alarm.check.req = false a  alarm = hi
b) alarm.check.req = true a  hi.alarm = 40.0 a  an.value = 50.0 a  alarm = safe.
So Analogue_Input2 permits unintended states, but this result does not seem
satisfactory because Analogue„Input2 seems to be doing exactly what is required 
of it. So the question posed is: are any of these unintended states reachable?
5.8.2 Strengthening the Invariant
In Annex C it is shown that for Analogue.Input2.Scan it is possible to split 
the part of the post condition dealing with alarm into the conjunction of two 
expressions, one of which contains only dashed variables and constants:
split[Analogue_Input2] a (alarm.check.req = true =>
(((an.value < lo.alarm) =» (alarm = lo))
A ((an.value > hi.alarm) => (alarm = hi))
A ((lo.alarm + deadband < an.value < hi.alarm - deadband)
=> (alarm = safe))))
A (alarm.check.req = false => (alarm = safe)) Q
Before this is simply included as part of the state invariant it is necessary to 
justify why this will not affect behaviour.
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S.8.3 justification 
Consider a general post condition;
post[C.E] A  inv'[C] A ( , . . A r j ^ [ . . . v ' g ,  v ^ ,  V g . . . ]  a . . . )
In the case of the DACS example it has been shown to have the form: 
post[C.E] ê inv'CC] A r^[...v'g...] A rzC- v'g.Vg, Vg,...]
So it is clear that if we remove rj from E and define a new invariant: 
new.inv[C] A inv[C] A rjC—Vg...] 
then the expression for post[C.E] will be unchanged.
Strengthening the invariant in this way will change the applicability of the 
operation, but this will only exclude unreachable states and hence not affect 
behaviour. The justification for these states being unreachable is that there 
is only a single operation that writes to the state and this operation never 
establishes one of these states as shown above.
It is also necessary to consider initialisation which must establish a state 
that is consistent with the invariant. There is immediately a problem since 
initialisation fixes alarm to the value safe while split[Analogue_Input2] requires 
values of lo and hi in some cases.
If one were developing a specification then it would be possible to change 
the initialiation in ways such as:
a) removal of alarm' = safe from initialisation so that the value of alarm was 
established by the invariant.
b) impose a new constraint on an_value_at_restart that it lie between the 
deadband s. This would ensure that an . value' was consistent with alarm' = safe.
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Since the DACS example is of qualifying a pre-existing artifact, then the 
option of changing the specification is not open assuming the artifact does 
in fact behave as specified. The only option is removal of the parts of 
split[Analogue.Input2] that are inconsistent with initialisation. This yields split2:
split2[Analogue_lnput2] A alarm.check.req = true =»
((hi_alarm - deadband > an.value > lo.alarm + deadband) => alarm = safe)
A (alarm.check.req = false => (alarm = safe))
5.8.4 Post Condition Comolexitv
The residue left once split[Analogue.Input2] had been separated out from the 
rest of the post condition is:
left[Analogue_Input2] A alarm.check.req = true => (
[((alarm' = lo) => (an.value' < lo.alarm))
V  ((alarm' = lo) => (alarm = lo a  (an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband)))]
A [(alarm = lo a  an.value' < lo.alarm  + deadband) => (alarm' = lo)]
A [((alarm' = hi) => (an.value' > hi.alarm))
V  ((alarm' = hi) =» (alarm = hi a  (an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband)))]
A [(alarm = hi a  an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband) =» (alcum' = hi)]
A [((alarm' = safe) =» (lo.alarm + deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm - deadband)) 
V {(alarm' = safe) =>
(((alarm = lo v alarm = safe) a  (hi.alarm - deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe) a  (lo.alarm < an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband)))]] 
A [{((alarm = lo v alarm = safe) a  (hi.alarm - deadband < an.value' < hi.alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe) a  (lo.alarm < an.value' < lo.alarm + deadband))}
=> (alarm' = safe)]) Q
This is rather a daunting formula and will be difficult to work with later. It 
leads one to question the merit of moving bits of the post condition to the 
state invariant. However, close observation of split£Analogue.Input2] shows 
that it is dealing with three cases: above hi.alarm, below lo.alarm and 
between the dead bands. From this the expectation is that left[Analogue.Input2] 
should only be dealing with the cases within the deadbands, but this does not 
seem to be true.
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The post condition for Analogue„Input2 handles alarm' by output cases, whereas 
split[Analogue.Input2] works in terms of input cases. This suggests rewritting 
the Analogue_Input2 post condition using input cases. There are seven of these:
a) above the hi.alarm
b) within the hi deadband with alarm = hi
c) within the hi deadband with alarm ^ hi
d) between the deadbands
e) within the lo deadband with alarm lo
f) within the lo deadband with alarm = lo
g) below the lo.alarm.
Hence the alarm part of the post condition could always have been written as:
(alarm.check.req = true =>
((an.value' > hi.alarm) => alarm' = hi)
A ((hi.alarm > an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm = hi) => alarm' = hi)
A ((hi.alarm > an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm ^ hi) => alarm' = safe)
A ((hi.alarm - deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm + deadband) => alarm' = safe)
A ((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm ^ lo) => alarm' = safe)
A ((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm = lo) =» alarm' = lo)
A ((lo.alarm > an.value') => alarm' = lo)
A (alarm.check.req = false => alarm = safe) ^
Using this formulation it is readily apparent that both split[Analogue.Input2] 
and split2[Analogue.Input2] can be extracted, and that what is left is still 
simple.
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5.8,5 Stronger Invariant
If we ask if the new state invariant based on split2[Analogae_Inpnt2] is the 
strongest possible the answer is clearly no. So far the only constraints 
considered are the alarm ontside the alarm limits, and between the deadbands. 
Although there is no single value determined in the deadband areas one of 
the alarm values is always excluded as can be seen from the post condition 
formulation given above. Hence an additional expression for the deadband 
areas, db.inv, can be added to the state invariant since it is consistent 
with the Initialisation requirement for alarm' = safe;
db_inv[Analogue_Input2] s  alarm.check.req = true 
((hi-alarm > an.value > hi.alarm -  deadband)
=> (alarm = safe v alarm = hi))
A ((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value > lo.alarm)
=> (alarm = safe v alarm = lo))
Since all values in the range of an.value have now been considered one feels 
intuitively that;
inv[Analogue.Input2] A split2[Analogue.Input2] A db.inv[Analogue_Input2]
probably represents the best candidate for the state invariant for 
Analogue.InputZ.
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5,8,6 Updated Specification
Making these changes to Analogue_lnpnt2 yields a new specification 
Analogue_Input3;
Analogne.Inpnt3.Conf is unchanged from version 2.
_ Analogue_Inpnt3 (n, an.value_at_restart, input.channel, sqroot.req,
alarm.check.req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo.alarm,
p f s ,  Pg, x f s ,  Xg )------------------------------------------------------------------
Analogne.Inpnt3.Conf (n, an_value.at.restart, input.channel, sqrooL_req, 
alarm.check.req, deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm,
p f s ,  pg , x f s ,  X g)
an.value : ANALOGUE 
alarm : ALARM 
alarm.check.req = true => [
((hi.alarm - deadband > an.value > lo.alarm + deadband) => alarm = safe) 
A ((hi_alarm > an.value > hi.alarm - deadband)
=> (alarm = safe v alarm = hi))
A ((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value  ^ lo.alarm)
=> (alarm = safe v alarm = lo))] 
alarm.check.req = false => (alarm = safe)
an.value' = an .value.a t.restart 
alarm' = safe
Annunciate is unchanged from version 2:
p. Analogue.Inputs.Annunciate(-»-warning)_ 
warning : ALARM
warning = alarm
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p. Analogue_Input3.Scan(aii_plant.inpnt)___________________
an.plant.inp«t : l,.n -► ANALOGUE
sqroot_req = true =» a“ .pla"t-»npnt(lnpat_channel) - x . ^ ^xfs - Xg
sqroot.req = true =>
an_valac' = (pfs-po)* /  an-plant_i^ntanpnt_chaimelL x o  /  +
sqroot_req = false =>
_ (pfs - Pn) * (an-plant-lnput (input.chatmel) - x») . ^ \  an.value -  xfs - Xg /
(alarm.check.req = true =*
((an.value' > hi.alarm) =» alarm' = hi)
A ((hi.alarm ) an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm = hi) => alarm' = hi)
A ((hi.alarm > an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm * hi) => alarm' = safe
A {(lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm ^ lo) => alarm' = safe]
A ((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm = lo) => alarm' = lo)
A ((lo.alarm > an.value') alarm' = lo))
5.8.7 Observations
Not only has the specification been put into a better form, with invariant 
properties now manifest, but the whole formulation of the post condition for 
Scan has been simplified. This will have a benefit on the rest of the Safety 
Proof,
The importance of initialisation for the state invariant is demonstrated. 
Analogue.Input2 can be initialised into states which cannot be reached in any 
other way. But for initialisation, split rather than split2 could have been part 
of the invariant.
5.8.8 Consistency Verification of Analogue_Inout3
The consistency verifications were applied to Analogue_Input3 and the 
specification shown to be consistent. See Annex D for details.
-  85 -
5.9 SAFETY SPECIALISATION
5.9.1 Introduction
The specification given for Analogue.Inpntd is still in its unconfigured state 
which permits all possible behaviours. However, the class of safety requirements 
of interest require that alarms are generated. Therefore, the behaviours 
where the alarm is permanently safe need to be eliminated which requires that 
the configuration parameter alarm.check.req is true. So, Analogue.InputS is 
now configured with this value to produce a version specialised to this 
class of safety requirements. The other parameters are left free.
5.9.2 Updated Configuration State
^ Analogue.Input3.Conf ( n, an .value, a t .  restart, input.channel, sqroot.req,
true, deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm,
p f s ,  Pg, x f s ,  X g)----------------------------------------------------------------------
n ; N
an.value.a t.restart ; ANALOGUE 
input.channel : l..n 
sqroot_req ; B 
alarm.check.req : B 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
hi.alarm, 
lo.alarm : ANALOGUE 
pfs, pg, xfs, Xg : ANALOGUE 
deadband^ 0.0
true = true => (deadband + lo.alarm < hi.alarm - deadband)
XfS?i Xg
86 -
This simplifies to;
 ^Analogue_Input4.Conf (n, an_valne.at_restart, input.chaiwiel, sqroot_req,
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm. pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg)------------
n : N
an_value_at.restart : ANALOGUE 
inpnt.channel ; l..n 
sqroot_req : B 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
hi.alarm, 
lo.alarm ; ANALOGUE 
pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg : ANALOGUE 
deadband > 0,0
(deadband + lo.alarm < hi.alarm - deadband) 
xfs?! X g
5.9.3 Updated State Schema
Passing alarm.check.req = true and simplifying yields:
. Analogue.Input4 (n, an . val u e . a t .  res ta rt, input.channel, sqroot.req,
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg)--------------
Analogue.Input4.Conf ( n, an .value.a t.restart, input.channel, sqroot.req, 
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, p g, xfs, Xg) 
an.value ; ANALOGUE 
alarm : ALARM
((hi.alarm - deadband > an.value > lo.alarm + deadband) => alarm = safe) 
((hi_alarm > an.value > hi.alarm - deadband) => (alarm = safe v alarm = hi)^  
((lo.alarm + deadband > an.value  ^ lo.alarm) ^  (alarm = safe v alarm = lo)
an.value' = an .value.a t.restart 
alarm' = safe
5.9.4 Updated Operation Schemas
Annunciate is unchanged from version 3:
 ^Analogue_Input4 .Annunciate(->warning). 
warning : ALARM
warning = alarm
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Analogue.Input4.Scan(an.plant_inpnt)--------------------------------
an_plant_input ; l.,n ANALOGUE
sqroot_req = true => - Xfl.  ^ ^ ^^ ^ xfs - Xg
sqroot.req = true =>
an-value' = (pfs-po)* / 4B_B bntU m #W nt_phannell 2 Xo /  + p^
sqroot.req = false =>
an value' = (Pfs - Pn) * (an_plant_inpnt (Inpnt.channel) - Xp)  ^ \xfs - Xg ^ j
((an.value' > hi.alarm) => alarm' = hi)
(hi.alarm > an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm = hi) => alarm' = hi)
[(hi.alarm > an.value' > hi.alarm - deadband a  alarm # hi) =» alarm' = safe
(lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm lo) => alarm' = safe)
(lo.alarm + deadband > an.value' > lo.alarm a  alarm = lo) alarm' = lo)
(lo.alarm > an_value') => alarm' = lo)
5.9.5 Observations
The resulting specialised schemas are both shorter and simpler than the 
unspecialised versions. This will have a beneficial effect on the rest of the 
safety proof.
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5,10 PRE-EMPTION
5.10.1 Introduction
In the original system the detection of an alarm was a significant event which 
caused the pre-emptive scheduling of Annunciate, This aspect of the DACS 
behaviour is modelled by introducing a set of Pre.emptl schemas based on 
Analogue_Input4.
5.10.2 Pre-empt Specification
Pre-emptl adds a single Boolean variable to the state that records whether 
the alarm state has changed last Scan. Pre-conditions are then added to Scan 
and Annunciate to force Annunciate to run if Scan changed the alarm state, 
and Scan to run otherwise. The effect is that a Scan that results in a change 
of alarm state must be followed by a single Annunciate.
i_ Pre.emptlC n, an_ val ue . a t .  restart, input_channel, sqroot_req,
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg)--------
Analogue_Input4 (n, an_value_at_restart, input.channel, sqroot_req, 
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, p g ,  xfs, X g )  
alarm.unchanged ; BOOLEAN
alarm.unchanged' = true
—Pre.emptl Scan (an.plant.input)------
Analogue.Input4.Scan(an_plant.input) 
alarm.unchanged = true
alarm.unchanged' = true <=> (alarm = alarm')
p*Pre.emptl .Annunciate (-»• warning)-------
Analogue_Input4 .Annunciate (-► warning) 
alarm.unchanged = false
alarm.unchanged' = true
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5.10.3 Consistency Verification of Pre.em ptl
The consistency verifications for Pre.emptl are given in Annex D. These show 
that the specification is consistent.
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5.11 REAL WORLD
5.11.1 Introduction
For the model the real world comprises a plant and an alarm bell. The bell 
is modelled using a BOOLEAN with false meaning off. There are potentially 
many sensors on the plant, however for the example only the analogue ones are 
of interest. The plant is therefore modelled with sensors numbered from 1 to n.
5.11.2 Real World Specification
The Measurement schema uses a function that performs an Analogue to 
Digital Conversion (ADC). This needs a conversion factor (conv.fact) to take 
account of the electrical units of the sensor and the number of bits resulting 
from the conversion.
[ELECTRICAL.UNITS]
ADC : ELECTRICAL.UNITS x ANLOGUE ANALOGUE
Vx: ELECTRICAL^UNITS, y : ANALOGUE # ADC(x,y) = x*y
pReal.Worldl (n, œ nv.fact)---------------
n : N
conv-fact : ANALOGUE
sensors : l..nELECTRICAL.UNITS
bell : BOOLEAN
bell' = false
f-Real-Worldl .Measurement (-*- an.plant.input)- 
an.plant_input : l..n-►ANALOGUE
V i ; l..n # an_plant.input(i) = ADC(sensors'(i) * conv.fact)
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There are operations to  turn the bell on and off:
■Real. Worldl.Bell rReal_Worldl.Bell.Off-
bell' = true bell' = false
5.11.3 Observations
Note that there is nothing in the Real World model that will ensure the bell 
sounds within safe.delay seconds of the sensor leaving the safe region. Indeed, 
there is no linkage between measurement and bell at all as specified.
5.11.4 Consistency Verification of Real.Worldl
The consistency verifications for Real.Worldl are given in Annex D. These 
show that the specification is consistent.
5.12 REAL WORLD AND THE SAFETY REQUIREMENT
5,12.1 Introduction
The safety requirement is a real world property. In order to ensure that it is 
expressible it will be helpful to modify Real.Worldl to indicate whether the 
sensor is in a safe or unsafe region. The state schema is therefore specialised 
to Include an input parameter "input.channel" and the Measurement schema 
an output parameter that indicates which region an.plant.input(input.channel) 
is in. The value of region depends on the value of the Real World safety 
thresholds rw .hi and rw .lo.
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5.12.2 Real-World 2 Specification
pReal_World2 (n, conv.fact, input-channel, rw_hi, rw_lo) 
inpnt.channel : l..n 
rw .hi, rw .lo  : ANALOGUE 
rw .lo  < rw .hi 
Real.Worldl (n, conv.fact)
rReal.World2.Measurement (-+ an.plant_inpat, region)- 
region : ALARM
an.plant.inpnt(input.channel) < rw .lo 
region = lo
an.plant.inputdnput.channel) > rw .hi 
region = hi
rw .lo  < an . pi an t. inpnt( input, channel ) < rw .hi 
region = safe
Real_Worldl.Measurement(->an_plant.input)
In this second version of the Real World model the Bell and Bell.Off schemas 
are the same as those for Real.Worldl.
5.12.3 Consistency Verification of Real_World2
The consistency verifications for Real.World2 are given in Annex D. These 
show that the specification is consistent.
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5.13. COMPOSITE SYSTEM
5.13.1 Introduction
Safety requires linkage between the process region and the bell, yet no such 
linkage exists in the Real_World2 specification. It is the role of the control 
system to provide this linkage. Any proof of safety must therefore be 
over the combination of process and control system. As discussed under 
Assumptions and Limitations, the Sample Axiom enables the Pre.emptl and 
Real_World2 specifications to be composed, despite them apparently needing 
to be independent concurrent processes.
5.13.2 Specification
^ ComposedlC n, conv.fact, rw .hi, rw .lo, an .value.at.restart, input_channel, 
sqroot.req, deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg) 
Real.World2 (n, conv.fact, input.channel, rw.hi, rw.lo)
Pre.emptl ( n, an.value_at_restart, input_channel, sqroot.req,
deadband, hi.alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg )
■Composedl .Sample (-► region)——-------------------------
Real.World2.Measurement (-► an.plant.input, region) 
Pre.emptl.Scan (an_plant.input)
r  Composedl .Alert warning)------
Pre.emptl .Annunciate (-► warning)
warning t  safe 
Real.World2.Bell
-Composedl.Bell.Off - 
Real.World2.Bell_Off
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5.13.4 justification of use of Warning
The trace level parameter included in Composedl.Alert is warning not bell. 
This means that we are working in terms of the control system and not the 
real world in this case. This has been done deliberately, warning = safe does 
not mean that the bell is off. Muting or acknowledging an alarm is an operator 
action not under the control of DACS, and not modelled. The schema establishes 
that if warning * safe then the Bell schema is actioned, and hence warning 
provides the best view of when the bell is being turned on by the DACS.
5.13.5 Consistency Verification of Composed 1
The consistency verifications for Composed are given in Annex D. These 
show that the specification is consistent.
5.14 MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK COMPONENT DEFINITIONS
Thus far a specification for DACS and for the Real World has been constructed, 
and these two composed. It is now possible to provide the definitions of the 
sets C, E and F that are components of the mathematical framework. Since 
the DACS is not involved with the bell being turned off the composite 
schema for this real world event is not of further interest, and is excluded 
from the sets.
C = {Composedl}
E = {Initialisation, Sample, Alert}
F = {Initialisation, Saraple(lo), Sample(safe), Sample(hi), Alert(Io),
Alert(safe), Alert(hi)}.
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5.1S REAL TIME SAFETY REQUIREMENT
5.15.1 Introduction
With the set F defined it is possible to formalise the informal definition of 
the Safety Requirement:
RTSR: The bell must sound no later than safe.delay seconds after the 
process enters an unsafe region.
5.15.2 Specification
RTSR is specified as a subset of G = {s : seq S}, the set of all traces of time 
stamped events. The lo case is similar to the hi case so RTSR is constructed 
for the hi case only:
RTSR. hi = {s ; seq S | Vi,j, k # ( l < i < j <k<#s
A ((tKs)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
A ->(3pA i<p<j  a  tr(s)(p) e Sample)
A tr(s)(k) e Sample)
=> (3 1 : j..k •  tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)
A time_stamp(s(l)) + duration(tr(s)(l)) - time_stamp(s(i)) < safe.delay))}
5.15.3 justification of RTSR.hi
The following is an explanation of how RTSR.hi was formed:
a) For the detection of a transition to the hi region a Sample(safe) or 
Sample(lo) followed by a Sample(hi) is needed:
(tr{s)(i)= Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
b) Knowing that tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe) or Sample(lo) and tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi) 
means there is at least one transition between them. However, i and j could 
be an arbitrary distance apart and hence there could be many transitions. To 
preclude this we require that tr{s)(j) is the next Sample after tr(s)(i):
-I (3  p # i<p<j  A tr(s)(p) € Sample).
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c) It is now necessary to extend the trace far enough to include the Alert. 
We know that the Alert will occur before the next Sample, so the trace only 
need be extended to a Sample:
{s : seq S | Vi, j, k # ( l <i < j <k<#s
A ((tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) ~ Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
A -I (3p e i<p<j  A tr(s)(p)€ Sample)
A tKs)(k) € Sample)
=» (3 1  : j..k # tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)))}
d) DACS cannot know the exact time of the transition, but it is between the 
times of the tr(s)(i) and Sample(hi). In particular, it is always later than the 
tr(s)(i), but in the worst case it could be arbitrarily close. The time stamp 
associated with the tr(s)(i) is therefore also taken as the beginning of the 
safe.delay period during which the bell must sound. Hence tr(s)(l) plus the 
duration of the Alert must be within safe.delay seconds of tr(s)(i) giving the 
time aspects:
time.stamp(s(l)) + duration(tr(s)(l)) -  time.stampt(s(i)) < safe.delay
5.15.3 Observations
The actual transition by the plant will have occurred somewhere between the 
Sample(safe) or Sample(lo) and Sample(hi). The formulation of RTSR has made 
the worst case assumption that it is immediately after the Sample(safe) or 
Sample(lo). In fact, if the transition occured just before the Sample(hi) then 
the bell could sound duration(tr(s)(i)) seconds later and still meet the intent 
of the safety requirement. Nevertheless, the formulation of RTSR is correct for 
the design of the DACS, which is a sampling system. If DACS were interrupted 
on transitions then a different formulation would be appropriate.
RTSR.hi includes traces where no Sample(hi) events occurred and traces with 
false alarms such as <Alert(hi), Alert(hi), Alert(hi)> which are both safe.
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S.16 STEP S - SAFETY PROOF
The next step in the DACS Safety Proof Development is the actual proof itself. 
The proof is performed in four Stages:
a) Stage 1 - Schuman-Pitt Level
b) Stage 2 - Level Linkage
c) Stage 3 - Trace Structure
d) Stage 4 - Timing Properties.
Stage 1 is the Schuman-Pitt Level Safety Proof. For this it is necessary to show 
that DACS can correctly track the region that the plant is in.
During Stage 2 the link between the Schuman-Pitt Level and Time Stamped 
Trace Level of the mathematical framework is established. The stage involves 
establishing three Lemmas concerning liveness and some basic trace 
properties of Composedl. These Lemmas represent the causality relationships 
between the events at the Timed Stamped Trace Level that result from the 
Schuman-Pitt Level formulation.
Stage 3 is the Trace Structure Safety Proof. This is the first part of the 
Time Stamped Trace Level Safety Proof, and involves showing that the trace 
structure results in traces that are all compliant with RTSR.
The Timing aspects are considered during Stage 4. This is the rest of the 
Time Stamped Trace Level Safety Proof. It takes the worst case trace 
sequences of interest, and establishes their minimum combined duration.
- 98 -
5,17 STAGE 1 - SCHUMAN-PITT LEVEL
The first Stage of the Safety Proof establishes the relationship between the 
configuration parameters necessary to ensure for any Sample event that 
regionj= alarmj'. This proof Stage is at the Schuman-Pitt level of the model,
V n, conv_fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an_value_at_restart, inpnt_channel,
sqroot_req, deadband, hi_alarm, Io_alarm, pfs, Pq, xfs, Xg 
•  Composedl I- {s:seq S | V i :l..#tr(8) # tr(s)(i) € Sample => regionj = alarmj'}
PROOF:
tr(s)(i)€ Sample => prejCComposedl.Sample] A postjCComposedl.Sample]
- Axiom 5,3
= pre^[Real _World2.Measurement] a  prej[Pre_emptl .Scan]
A postjCReal_World2.Measurement] a  postj[Pre_emptl.Scan]
= prej[ReaI_World2.Measurement] a  prej[Pre_emptl Scan]
A [postj [Real^Worldl.Measurement]
A (an_plant_input|(input_channel) < rw_lo =* region^ = lo)
A (an_plant_inputi(input_channel) > rw_hi => region^ = hi)
A (rw_lo < an_plaut_input^(input_channel) < rw_hi =» region^ = safe)]
A [ invj ' [Anal ogue_Inputs]
A ( sqroot_req = true
an_value,' = (pfs-po)* J  gn-P»aPt..,»^^M inp«t-chanM k x o /  + p^
A ^sqroot_req = false =»
ati vAlnA f - Po) * (an_plant_input| ( input„channel) -  Xn) . ^ \an_vaiuej -  xfs - Xq /
A ((an-valuej' > hi_alarm) => alarmj' = hi)
A ((hi_alarm > an^valucj' > hi^alarm - deadband a  alarm^ = hi) => alarmj' = hi)
A ((hi_alarm > an_valuej' > hi_alarm - deadband a  alarm^ hi) => alarm|' = safe)
A ((lo_alarm + deadband > an_value^' > lo_alarm a  alarm^ t  lo) =» alarmj' = safe)
A ((lo_alarm + deadband > an_valuej^ > lo_alarm a  alarm^ = lo) =» alarmj' = lo)
A ((lo„alarm > an_value|0 => alarm^' = lo)
A (alarm_unchanged|' = true <=> (alarm^ = alarm*'))]
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=> [(an_plant_inputj(input_channel) < rw_lo => region* = lo)
A (an_plant_input*(input_channel) > rw_hi => region* = hi)
A (rw_lo < an_plant_input*(inpnt_channel) < rw_hi => region* = safe)]
A [deadband > 0.0 a  (deadband + lo^alarm < hi_alarm - deadband) a  xfsÿ Xg
A ((hi_alarm - deadband > an_value*' > lo_alarm + deadband) => alarm*' = safe)
A ^ sqroot_req = true =>
an_val«ei' = (p fs -p „ ) . /  an-plant-i^atj(lnp«t_channel) ^ j
A fsqroot_req = false »
an value ' = - p») $ (an_plant_input* ( input,channel) - Xn) + \
1 x f s  ~ Xq j
A ((an_value*' > hi_alarm) => alarm*' = hi)
A ({hi_alarm > an_value*' > hi_alarm - deadband a  alarm* = hi) => alarm*' = hi)
A ((hi_alarm > an_value*' > hi_alarm - deadband a  alarm* ÿ hi) => alarm*' = safe)
A ((lo_alarm + deadband > an_value*' > lo_alarm a  alarm* ÿ lo) => alarm*' = safe)
A (do_alarm + deadband > an_value*' > lo_alarm a  alarm* = lo) =» alarm*' = lo)
A (do_alarm > an_value*') => alarm*' = lo)]
We know that the Safety Requirement divides the sensor input range into
three regions, lo, safe and hi. If alarm*' is to track these regions then the
values of lo_alarm and hi_alarm must correspond to rw-lo and rw_hi 
respectively. Hence, when an_plant_input*(input_ channel) = rw_lo then 
an_value* = lo^alarm, and similarly for the hi case:
^ sqroot_req = true => lo_alarm = (pfs - pg) * J  ^ Po j
A ^sqroot_req = false =» lo_alarm = + Poj
Although the Safety Requirement only has three regions, Analogue_Input has 
five because of the deadbands. Since there is nothing in the Safety Requirement 
that corresponds to these they must be turned off. Hence deadband = 0.
With the above values detemined for lo_alarm, hLalarm and deadband, then 
by construction region* = alarm*'g
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S.18 STAGE 2 ~ LEVEL LINKAGE
5.18.1 Introduction
In this section the following properties of Composedl are established:
Lemma 1: If a Sample results in a change in alarm state then there must 
be an Alert before there can be another Sample.
Lemma 2: An Alert cannot be followed by another Alert.
Lemma 3: Liveness of Composedl, that is that there is always at least one event 
able to proceed.
5.18.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1: If a Sample results in a change in alarm state then there must 
be an Alert before there can be another Sample.
V n, conv_fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an-value„at_restart, input-channel,
sqroot_req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo_alarm, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg 
•  Composedl I- {s:seq S | V i, j : l..#tr(s)
# tKs)(i) € Sample a  tr(s)(j) € Sample a  i < j 
A -1 3 p : i..j ♦ tr(s)(p)€ Sample 
A alarm*# alarm*'
=> 3 k : i..j # tr(s)(k) = Alert(alarm*')}
PROOF;
alarm* # alarm*' - hypothesis
=> alarm^unchanged*' = false - Scan post condition 
=> alarm-unchanged* 1 = false - Axiom 5.2
=» pre* [Composedl Alert] A pre* ^  ^ [Composedl Sample] -  Axiom 5.3
tr(s)(j) € Sample
=> prejEComposedl.Sample] - Axiom 5.3
=> 3 k : i..j # tr(s)(k) = A!ert(alarm*') g - Since Real World events do not
change Pre-empt variables
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5.18.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2: An Alert cannot be followed by another Alert.
V n, conv-fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an_value_at_restart, inp«t_channel,
sqroot_req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo-alarm, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg
# Composedl {s:seq S | V1, j : l..#tr(s)
# tr(s)(i)€ Alert A tr(s)(j)€ Sample a  i<j A -i 3p :l.,j •  tr(s)(p)€ Sample 
=> -1 3 k : i..j •  tr(s)(k) € Alert}
PROOF: 
tr(s)(i) € Alert
=> postjCtr(s)(i)] -  Axiom 5.3
=> alarm_unchanged*' = true
=» alarm_unchanged* +  ^ = true - Axiom 5.2
=> pre* ^jCComposedl.Sample] A pre* + ^[Composedl.Alert] - Axiom 5.3
tr(s)(j)€ Sample a  i< j A ->3p:i..j# tr(s)(p)6 Sample
=> -1 3 k : i..j # tr(s)(k) € Alert □ - Since Real World events do not
change Pre-empt variables
5.18.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: Liveness of Composedl, that is that there is always at least one event 
able to proceed.
V n, conv-fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an_value_at_restart, input_channel,
sqroot_req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo_alarm, pfs, p g ,  xfs, X g
# Composedl 1- {s:seq S | Vi: l..#s
# pre*[Composedl.Sample] V pre*[Composedl.Alert]}
PROOF:
pre[Composedl.Sample] V pre[Composedl.Alert]
= (pre[Real-World2.Measurement] a  pre[Pre_emptl.Scan])
V (pre[Pre_emptl.Annunciate] a  warning# safe => pre[Real_World2.Bell])
= (true A pre[Pre_emptl .Scan])
V (pre[Pre-emptl.Annunciate] a  warning# safe => true)
= pre[Pre__emptl .Scan] V pre[Pre_emptl .Annunciate]
= (alarm_unchanged = true) V (alarm_unchanged = false) □
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S.19 STAGE 3 % TRACE STRUCTURE
The proof that the trace structure of Composedl does comply with RTSR will 
be performed for the hi case only since the proof for lo is so similar. The 
assumption is made that the constraints established for lo-alarm, hi_alarm 
and deadband during Stage 1 of the proof apply.
V n, conv_fact, rw-hi, rw_lo, an„value_at_restart, input.channel, 
sqroot_req, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg 
# Composedl I- {s ; seq S | Vi,j, k # ( l <i <j <k<#s
A ((tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i)= Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
A (3p # i<p<j  A tr(s)(p)€ Sample)
A tr(s)(k) € Sample)
=> 3 I : j..k •  tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)}
PROOF:
tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo) - Hypothesis
=> alarm*' = safe v alarm*' = lo - Stage 1
=> alarm*' # hi
=> alarm*+ i # hi - Axiom 5.2
alarm*4.1 # hi A (3p # i <p<j  a  tr(s)(p)€ Sample)
=> alanuj # hi - Since only Sample changes alarm
tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
=> alarm j' = hi - Stage 1
=> alarmj # alarmj'
=>- 3 1 : j..k # tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)g - Lemma 1 with i replaced with j,
j with k, and k with 1.
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5.20 STAGE 4 % TIMING PROPERTIES
Lemma 3 has shown that Composedl has the Hveness property and so it is 
sensible to work with zero durations between events and worst case trace 
lengths. This will enable the constraints on the duration of events to be 
determined. Providing these constraints are met then there is nothing preventing 
the trace occuring within the time constraint of RTSR.
V n, conv_fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an-value_at_restart, input-channel, 
sqroot-req, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg 
# Composedl I- {s:seq S | Vi,j,k # ( l <i <j <k<#s
A ((tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
A -»(3p# i <p <j A tKs)(p)€ Sample)
A tr(s)(k) € Sample)
=> (3 1 : j..k •  tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)
A time_stamp(s(l)) + duration(tr(s)(l)) - time_stamp(s(i))  ^ safe_delay))}
PROOF:
The Stage 3 proof established the form of the trace to be:
Sample(safe), Sam ple(hi),A lert(hi),... 
or Sample(lo), ..,Sample(hi),.., Alert(hi),...
Lemma 2 shows that an Alert cannot be followed by another Alert, and hence 
between the start of one Sample and the next there can only be one Alert. So 
using Lemma 2, and the fact that there is no Sample between i and j the 
worst case trace is;
Sample(safe), Alert(safe), Sample(hi), Alert(hi) 
or Sample(lo), Alert(lo), Sample(hi), Alert(hi)
It is assumed that the bell starts to sound at the end of the Alert operation, 
and hence the full duration of the Alert(hi) is included. Composedl will therefore 
be safe if:
duration(Sample(safe)) + dnration(A!ert(safe)) + duration(Sample(hi)) 
+ duration(Alert(hi)) < safe-delay 
A duration(Sample(lo)) + duration(Alert(lo)) + duratlon(Sample(hi))
+ duration(Alert(hi)) < safe-delayg
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5.21 STEP 6 2 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Having completed the Safety Proof it is necessary to consider the implications 
of the results for the application of DACS to this kind of problem. The first 
question to ask is whether the complete problem has been addressed, that is 
to verify the model back against the original Informal Specification. Looking 
back to Step 1 it can be seen immediately that there are a number of safety 
scenarios and the safety proof has not directly addressed all of these. 
Specifically, the process not being in the safe region when DACS starts up, 
and detection of subsequent alarms. It is therefore necessary to  see if the 
results of the safety proof are applicable to these cases.
The Safety Proof has identified a number of constraints that were not 
included in the orginal list of assumptions or limitations. Since these were 
not expected it is worth asking whether these results are valid.
The combined list of verification and validation topics is:
a) Initialisation
b) Subsequent Alarms
c) Configuration Constraints
d) Deadbands
e) Timing Constraints.
Each of these is considered in turn in the sections that follow.
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5.22 INITIALISATION
5.22.1 Introduction
The Safety Property defined at Step 1 includes the following initialisation 
requirement:
If the plant is not in the safe region when DACS starts up then the 
bell must sound no later than safe_delay seconds after the first 
value reading.
The aim is to see whether the safety proof already performed covers this case, 
or if it must be treated specially.
5.22.2 Initial Situation
When initialised Pre_emptl establishes the state variables with the following 
values:
a) an_value/ = an_value_at_restart
b) alarm / = safe
c) alarm-unchanged/ = true
Using Axiom 5.2 alarm-unchanged^' = true => alarm_unchanged2 = true, which 
is the pre-condition for Scan but not for Annunciate. Hence the first event 
after initialisation will be a Sample. This Sample will be a Sample(lo) or a 
Sample(hi) by hypothesis, but we continue just to deal with the hi case. So 
the expected trace is:
Initialisation, Sample(hi), Alert(hi), ...
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5.22.3 Reuse of Safety Proof
If we consider the initialisation a pseudo Sample(safe) then the safety proof 
can be reused for the initialisation case by substituting i = 1 and j = 2 in Lemma 
1, and the Stage 3 and 4 proofs. In particular, the timing relationship is:
time_stamp(s(l)) + duration(tr(s)(l)) - time_stamp(s(l))  ^ safe_delay.
Now, on the assumption that the timing constraint can be met for the normal 
case then this is less challenging for two reasons. Firstly the safety requirement 
is that the time can be measured from the first Sample yet the formula 
above is from initialisation. Secondly, the general case must allow for an 
Alert between the two Samples, but the analysis above shows that it is not 
possible to have an Alert between initialisation and the first Sample.
5.22.4 Conclusion
The conclusion is that by considering initialisation as a pseudo Sample the 
Safety Proof can be reused. This shows that the timing constraint is less 
challenging in this case, and hence that DACS should be able to comply with 
the initialisation part of the safety requirement.
107 -
s.23 SUBSEQUENT ALARMS
5.23.1 Introduction
The Safety Property defined at Step 1 includes the following requirement 
on subsequent alarms;
After a first annunciate, the DACS shall continue to monitor the 
plant and provide further alarm annunciation if any sensor value 
enters an alarm region.
The aim is to see whether the safety proof already performed covers this case, 
or if it must be treated specially.
5.23.2 Reuse of Safety Proof
Firstly, using Lemma 3 it is clear that DACS does not halt on detection of 
an alarm, and that given the other two Lemmas, that DACS will continue 
monitoring the plant.
Trivially, RTSR„hi is "for any i,j,k", and so if a trace contains a,b,c that satisfy 
RTSR_hi and x,y,z that also satisfies RTSR_hi then DACS will behave as required 
in both these cases. However, it is possible for the trace sequence from a to c 
to overlap with that from x to z. The question is whether DACS will still behave 
as required when the transitions to an unsafe region are as close as possible.
There are two cases:
a) A hi alarm is followed as quickly as possible by another hi alarm.
b) The process jumps from the lo to the hi region without a Sample(safe) 
intervening.
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5.23.3 hi to  M Case
The Sample Axiom enables ns to say that there must be at least one 
Sample(safe) between the two Sample(hi)s if the second one is to be separate 
alarm condition. Hence the trace including only Samples would be;
< .... 8ample(safe)\ Sample(hi)^, Sample(safe)®, Sample(hi)^, ... >
The question is will DACS generate Alert(hi)s within safe_delay of the 
time_stamps of the two Sample(safe)s. By choosing: 
tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe)^ 
tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)^ 
tr(s)(k) = Sample(safe)^
Then the safety proof tells us that DACS will generate the Alert(hi) between 
Sample(hi)^ and Sample(safe)®. Similarly, by choosing: 
tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe)® 
tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)^ 
and tr(s)(k) to be the next Sample then DACS will again generate an Alert(hi) 
after the Sample(hi)*g
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5.23.4 lo to 111 Case
In the case of jumping from lo to hi the shortest possible trace using only 
Samples will be;
< .., Sample(safe)\ Sample(lo)^, Sample(hi)®, ... )>
The question is will DACS generate an Alert(lo) within safe-delay of the
time_stamp of the Sample(safe)\ and an Alert(hi) within safe-delay of the
timc-stamp of Sample(lo)®. By choosing: 
tr(s)(i) = Sample(safe)^ 
tr(s)(j) = Sample(lo)^ 
tr(s)(k) = Sample(hi)®
Then the safety proof tells us that DACS will generate the Alert(lo) between 
Sample(lo)^ and Sample(hi)^. Similarly, by choosing: 
tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo)^ 
tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)^ 
and tf(s)(k) to be the next Sample then DACS will generate an Alert(hi) after 
the Sample(hi)®g
5.23.5 Conclusion
The arguments have been constructed for the hi case, but the lo case is again 
very similar and hence not provided.
The cases considered above show that even with the alarm transitions as 
close together as possible the RTSR_hi conditions are met and hence DACS 
will generate the appropriate Alerts. Hence it has been verified that subsequent 
alarms are covered by the general case.
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5.24 CONFIGURATION CONSTRAINTS
Stage 1 of the Safety Proof established that for the alarm limits of 
Analogue-Input to correspond to those in the Real World, relationships between 
hi.alarm and rw_hi, and between lo_alarm and rw_lo are needed. This result 
is expected as it is clear that the alarm limits in Analogue-Input cannot be 
free but must be tied in some way to the safety requirement RTSR. The Stage 
1 proof has established what these relationships are, and hence it is possible 
to prepare an updated version of Composed which includes these relationships.
The updated Composed2 specification is;
r  Composed2( n, conv_fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, an-value_at-restart,
input-channel, sqroot_req, deadband, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg)- 
Real-World2 (n, conv-fact, input-channel, rw-hi, rw-lo)
Pre-emptl(n, an-value_at_restart, input.channel, sqroot.req,
deadband, hi-alarm, lo.alarm, pfs, pg, xfs, Xg)
^ sqroot-req = true lo.alarm = (pfs - pg) * ^  ^  + Po
A hi-alarm = (pfs-pg) + Po
^sqroot-req = false lo.alarm = - + Po
A hi-alarm = ■ (Rfs-Po)Mrw_hi-Xg)xfs - X g Po
Composed2.Sample and Composed2.Alert are unchanged from Composedl. 
The Consistency Verification of Composed2 is in Annex D.
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5.25 DEADBANDS
5.25.1 Introduction
When Analogue.Input was specialised for the generic problem only the 
alarm_check_req parameter was seen as needing to be fixed. The Safety Proof 
has shown that deadband also needed to be fixed. This dlscrepency between 
expectations and the results of the mathematics needs explanation.
5.25.2 Analysis of Discreoencv
There is a possible problem, which is that the measurements are not exact. 
Returning to the concrete example, and Figure 4.3 specifically we see that 
integer values from the ADC (Analogue to Digital Conversion) between 0 
and 4050 correspond to temperatures in the range -25® to +50°, that is a 
range of 75°. Thus each integer value returned from the ADC is not an exact 
value, but represents a interval of length 75 /  4050. In addition to this 
digitisation effect there is a further issue, and that is that the input may be 
noisy. If we make the assumption that the combined effect of the digitisation 
and noise has a maximum magnitude of e then for each measured value the 
actual value will be somewhere between + e as shown in Figure 5.2.
T#1
Te
■ j "ei
# Actual Value 
Measured Value
FIGURE 5.2 - Relationship between Measured and Actual Values
The introduction of intervals rather than exact values brings with it a number 
of problems. If the process gets close to an alarm limit then it is possible for 
the system to miss alarms. For example, once the measured value is within e 
of the hi alarm limit then the actual value may be in alarm, but the system 
will not register this. This problem can be overcome by reducing the alarm 
limit by e as shown in Figure 5.3.
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hi-alarm — 
hi-alarm - e
Process could be in alarm
-------------- r Measured value below hi.alarm
FIGURE 5,3 - The Missed Alarm Solution
The main problem which deadbands aim to address is the measured value 
"wandering around the alarm limit". Suppose the actual value rises to just 
above hi-alarm and stays there as shown in Figure 5.4.
hi-alarm
FIGURE 5.4 - Actual Values
A possible set of measured values and associated intervals are shown in 
Figure 5.5.
hi-alarm
T T T
T- -  
».
i
X : 1 1 : I
1 1
FIGURE S.5 - Actual Values and Measured Values
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Since the actual value can be anywhere within e of the measured value 
it is possible for the measured values to be each side of the alarm limit 
provided that the actual value is within e of the alarm limit. Looking at 
Figure 5.5 there are six safe to hi transitions indicated for the measured 
value, yet there is only a single actual safe to hi transition. The noisy 
signal therefore results in a series of spurious alarm annunciations. The
deadband mechanism will suppress such spurious alarm annunciations. It 
does this by keeping the same value for the alarm as it had last time 
while the measurement is within the deadband region. For the example 
the deadband will need to be at least of size e if it is to be effective.
5.25.3 Revision to Model
At 5.4.7 item b) the assumption was made that the sensor inputs are
exact. This assumption is both unnecessary, and probably not valid for 
the DACS kind of application. The DACS already embodies the Deadband 
mechanism to accommodate this problem, so the intention is to go round 
the modelling cycle again with this assumption removed. This is performed 
in Annex E, with what follows providing an overview.
STEP 1 - INFORMAL SPECIFICATION
The specification of the Real World is modified to Include the statement that 
the sensor value is noisy, and that for each sensor reading the actual value 
will be somewhere between + e of the measured value.
STEP 2 - MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
No change to the Mathematical Framework is necessary.
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STEP 3 - ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Although the assumption at S.4.7,b can be removed it needs to be replaced 
with a limitation. It is already expected that the configuration parameter 
"deadband" will need the value e, and it has already been established that 
the alarm limits need to  be reduced by e if alarms are not to be missed. 
The new limitation is on the maximum size of the interval, giving:
a) deadband = e
b) hi_alarm - lo_alarm > 4e > 0
STEP 4 - PROBLEM FORMULATION
The change to the Real World specification needs to be reflected in a revised 
version of Real_World2. Real .W orld 3 is therefore defined which is similar to 
Real_World2, but has e as an input parameter and has seven output cases just 
like Analogue-Input.
As before, we need to compose Real_World3 with Pre.emptl to produce a 
composite system. However, the new version of Composed needs to inherit 
the contraints established for Composed2. It also needs to embody the constraint 
that deadband = e.
STEP 5 - SAFETY PROOF
The revised form of Real-World means it is necessary to reconsider the 
Safety Proof. Stage 1 of the proof, the Schuman-Pitt level, is clearly affected 
so it will be necessary to re-establsh that region* = alarm/. It will not be 
necessary to rework any of the subsequent stages of the proof, since they 
only rely on this one result.
5.25.4 Conclusion
Within the new limitations, the DACS can cope with inexact sensor values, 
covering both digitisation effects and noisy inputs. Hence the assumption of 
exact inputs need not be imposed.
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5.26 TIMING CONSTRAINTS
The Safety Proof has established that there is nothing preventing DACS from 
meeting the hi alarm part of the real time safety requirement RTSR provided:
duration(Sample(safe)) + duration(Alert(Safe)) + duration(SampIe(hi))
+ duration(Alert(hi)) < safe.delay 
A duration(Sampledo)) + duration(Alert(lo)) + duration(Sample(hi))
+ duration (Alert(hi)) < safe, del ay
More generally, if sam .dur is the worst case Sample duration and alt_dur the 
worst case Alert duration then this can be written more simply and includes 
the lo alarm case:
2 * (alt-dur + sam_dur) < safe.delay
Lemma 2 shows that an Alert cannot be followed by another Alert, and hence 
between the start of one Sample and the next there can only be one Alert. So 
the sample_delay criteria required by the Sample Axiom (Axiom 5.4) can be 
met if:
a lt-dur + sam_dur  ^ sample_delay
Hence the Safety Proof indicates that if safe.delay < 2 * sample.delay 
then safety will impose the upper bound on the gap between scans. This does 
seem to be a perfectly sensible interpretation of the results of the Safety 
Proof. It shows that the expectation as to the timing constraints on DACS 
had built in the assumption that the sampling requirements would always 
take precedence over the safety timing requirements, which is now 
shown not necessarily to be the case.
/
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5.27 MODELLING RESULTS
5.27.1 Introduction
The following list of verification and validation topics has now been 
considered in the previous sections:
a) Initialisation
b) Subsequent Alarms
c) Configuration Constraints
d) Deadbands
e) Timing Constraints.
5.27.2 Results
The Safety Proof is shown to accommodate the extra verification cases.
The validation required rework of the entire model from Step 1. This results in 
a model with:
a) A number of additional constriants:
- alarm-hi is linked to rw_hi
- alarm_lo is linked to re_lo
- deadband = e
- hi-alarm - lo.alarm > 4e > 0
b) The assumption of exact measurements is removed.
c) A previously unidentified relationship between safe.delay and sample.delay 
is established.
5.27.3 Conclusion
The reworked model and associated results are accepted as valid.
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5.28 STEP 7 2 USE OP RESULTS
5.28.1 Introduction
In the last step the results from the safety proof were interpreted for the 
case under consideration, and after some rework it was accepted that they 
were valid. In this section the results are used in two ways:
a) Generically
b) For the concrete case.
5.28.2 Generic Considerations
The Safety Proof has established that there is nothing preventing DACS from 
meeting the real time safety requirement RTSR provided all the assumptions 
and limitations, including the constraints are met. If it is not possible to 
establish that in the worst case an actual control system satisfies these 
requirements then it is not a realisation of the model. This does not mean 
that the DACS model is not good, it is just a model. Neither does it mean 
the actual control system is necessarily unsafe. All it means is that the 
DACS model is irrelevant to the given case. This clearly illustrates the need 
to perform experiments in the real world to establish, for example, the actual 
values of the durations of events, or compliance with the Pre.empt scheduling 
model. This experimental data is part of the evidence needed to qualify the 
control system for the intended use.
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5.28.3 Concrete Example
In section 4.4 an example application was given. It is now possible to check 
that the configuration parameters identified meet the criteria. The configuration 
parameters were:
a) n s  20
b) input.channei = 12
c) sqroot_req = false - since the sensor is linear.
d) lo.alarm = -10,0, hi-alarm = 40.0
e) pO = -10.0, pfs = 50.0
f) xO = 810.0, xfs = 4050.0
g) an_value-at-restart = 15.0
These are the values used in the Consistency Verification, except that 
deadband is free rather than fixed at 0.0.
Instantiating Analogue-Input4 with these values yields Analogue.InputS:
r  Analogue-Inpat5_Conf (deadband)-----------------------------------------
Analogue_Input4_Conf (20, 15.0, 12, false, deadband, 40.0, -10.0,
50.0, -10.0 , 4050.0, 810.0)
Which expanded and simplified is;
r  Analogue_Input5-Conf (deadband)- 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
25 > deadband >0 .0
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p Analogue-lnputS (deadband)---------------------------------------------------------
Analogwe_InpwtS_Conf ( deadband) 
an_valne ; ANALOGUE 
alarm : ALARM
((4*0,0 - deadband > an_value > deadband - 10.0) => alarm = safe) 
((4*0.0 > an_value > 40.0 - deadband) => (alarm = safe v alarm = hi)) 
[(deadband - 10.0 > an_value > - 10.0) => (alarm = safe v alarm = lo))
an_value' = 15.0 
alarm' = safe
Annunciate is unchanged from version 3:
 ^Analogue_Input5 .Annunciate(-»waming)_ 
warning : ALARM
warning = alarm
. Analogue_Input5,Scan(an_plant-input) 
an_plant_input : 1..20 -► ANALOGUE
an value' -  (pfs - pn) * (an-plant-tnput ( input,channel) ~ Xg)  ^an_va ue -  xfs - Xg
((an_value' > 40.0) => alarm' = hi)
(40.0 > an_value' > 40.0 - deadband a  alarm = hi) => alarm' = hi) 
(40.0  ^ an_value' > 40.0 - deadband a  alarm # hi) => alarm' = safe) 
(deadband - 10.0 > an_value' > -10.0 a  alarm # lo) alarm' = safe) 
(deadband - 10.0 > an_value' > -10.0 a  alarm = lo) => alarm' = lo) 
(-10.0 > an_value') =» alarm' = lo)
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It is also necessary to check the constraints on the alarm limits:
Io_aIann = + p,xfs - X g  "
A hl.alann = (p ^  - Pol^ Ory.-hl -  a ,L  +
Using the relationship between sensor and DACS values in Figure 4.3: 
rw_lo = 810.0 A re_hi = 3510.0
Substituting these values and those for pfs, pg, xfs and Xg in the right hand 
sides gives:
(pfs - Pn) * (rw_lo - Xn) 60.0 * (810.0 - 810,0)
xfs - Xo = 3240.0 ■ ‘ "
=  -  10.0 
= lo_alarmo
(pfs - Pn) * (rw_hi -  Xo) 60.0 ♦ (3510.0 - 810.0) ^
xfs - Xg = 3240.0 '
= 40.0 
= hi-alarmg
Given the various assumptions and limitations already stated, this confirms 
that this specific example falls within the range of values verified by the proof 
as meeting the safety requirement.
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6 . F O R M A L  M O D E L L IN G  M E T H O D
6.1 FORMAL MODELLING ISSUES
6 .1.1 Objective
Chapter 5 has demonstrated the nse of Formal Modelling as a Safety 
Analysis technique. The objective of this chapter is to provide a definition 
of the general method employed. This is structured around the Modelling 
Cycle with the Formal methods techniques incorporated as appropriate.
In this section the issues surrounding Formal Modelling are discussed. These 
are:
a) The nature of Formal Modelling
b) Validity
c) Relationship between the Formal Modelling Method and Safety.
6.1.2 The Nature of Formal Modelling
In Formal Modelling there are two domains, the Problem Domain and the 
Mathematical Domain. The intent is to establish results, or increase the 
confidence in expected results, concerning the problem domain. This is to be 
achieved by formulating the problem within a mathematical system, solving 
the mathematical problem, and then interpreting the results back into the 
Problem Domain. This is shown in Figure 6.1.
Result
Interpretation
Problem
Formulation
PROBLEM
DOMAIN
MATHEMATICAL
DOMAIN
FIGURE 6.1 -  Modelling Domains
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6.1.3 Validity
The purpose of Formal Modelling within an engineering context is to establish 
new results, or to confirm already known results thus increasing the confidence 
in them, From this perspective, if the results of Formal Modelling are not valid 
then the whole modelling process has been worthless. Worse, invalid results 
may be accepted as valid and acted upon. Hence validity is the critical concern 
for the application of Formal Modelling to safety.
There are a number of ways that a mathematical model might fail to  yield 
valid results for the Problem Domain. Examples are:
a) The model is in some way too simplistic. This may be because some aspect 
of the problem has been omitted that is necessary for validity. An aspect may 
be included, but has been over simplified, that is, made too abstract.
b) Limitations or constraints have not been identified or are incorrect.
c) Incorrect interpretation of the results. The interpretation of the results is 
not always immediate, or not direct. For example, we have seen that it is 
not possible to prove that DACS meets its timing requirements. It is possible 
to prove that if the artifact can meet a timing constriant then there is 
nothing preventing it from meeting the timing requirement. A result in this 
form is useful and probably close enough to be an answer to the problem 
posed, but it is not a direct answer.
The message here is not to focus excessively on the construction of the model 
and its mathematical manipulation. The links between the problem domain and 
the mathematical domain are crucial steps in ensuring the validity of any results.
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6.1.4 Relationship with Safety
The Formal Modelling Method has wide applicability, and is not restricted to 
Safety. However, since with the DACS example it was applied to a real time 
safety situation it is worth considering whether any results of general value 
have been generated.
It is clear that in dealing with the DACS case it has been necessary to 
address a number of application domain problems. While these were all 
encountered in the DACS example, they are commonly occurring. They are 
examples of the kind of problem that needs to be dealt with which the purest 
view of formal methods would not have lead one to expect. Examples are 
Time, Sampling, Schedulers and Initialisation. These are particularly relevant 
to real time monitoring and control situations, and give the work its 
safety emphasis. The text covers the particular problems they pose, and 
how they can be treated. The application domain problems are given in the 
next few sections as they provide concrete examples that can be used during 
the rest of the chapter.
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6.2 TIME
6.2.1 Introduction
Time is a frequently occuring aspect of problems. It is special in that if the 
property of interest has an element of timing, this imposes a constraint on 
the trace behaviour of the model in a vyay quite unlike most other real 
world values such as temperature for example. This is the case with the 
DACS example, where it is not sufficient that the correct relationship between 
inputs and outputs are established, this needs to happen within a given time, 
safe-delay. If the events have durations this will impose a limit on the number 
of events that can occur before the system delivers its output.
The DACS illustrates one of the more obvious solutions to handling time 
which is time stamped traces together with the property of monotonicity of 
time stamps. It also illustrates the main problem which is that it is not 
possible to prove that a system will meet a timing constraint, only that there 
is nothing preventing it from doing so.
6.2.2 Justification
The need to include time will usually be clear. Certainly if the requirement is 
for monitoring or control then time is relevant.
It will normally be worth including time as part of the mathematical framework 
itself under step 2, rather than as an application specific formulation under 
step 4. This recognises the fundamental role of time to the model as part of 
the scientific framework within which the model is being formulated.
Time is a numeric quantity and its main property is monotonicity. Time is a 
well understood scientific concept and little justification for its inclusion or 
formulation should be necessary.
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6.2.3 Formulation
The outline generic formulation given below assumes the model is one of 
traces of events. The elements of the formulation are:
a) Set
b) Time Stamps
c) Time Axiom
d) Duration.
[TIME] a numeric and hence totally ordered set.
Each event in the set of events F should have an associated time stamp that 
given the event retrieves the time of the event.
The main property of time is that it keeps advancing. Within the model this 
means that events later in a trace must occur later in time and vice versa. 
A time axiom can therefore be included that captures this property as was 
done for DACS. Note that it is not the only approach, and Gorski (1994) used 
causality as the basis of his time axiom. That is, that if event A causes event 
B then A must occur before B in time.
Some real world events may be transitions and hence instantaneous, but many, 
such as the DACS operations, will have finite durations. Where interleaved 
semantics can be employed, as for DACS, then duration can be modelled 
directly as a duration function that given an event type returns the duration. 
We require:
V e € F •  duration(e) > 0
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If a process algebra such as CSP (Hoare, 1985) or CCS (Milner, 1989) is 
employed then an event with duration is modelled with start and end 
transitions. In this case the duration of the event is:
V e € F •  duration(e) = time_stamp(tç) - time_stamp(tg)  ^ 0
where tg is the start transistion and t^ is the end transition. As in the 
interleaved case, this duration must be greater than or equal to zero.
6.2.4 Proof and Interpretation
If the behavioural property of interest is a timing relationship then this needs 
to be handled with care. In the DACS case the constraints that needed to be 
met in order that there would be nothing preventing DACS from meeting the 
real time aspects of RTSR were established. However, it was not possible to 
prove that DACS would meet the timing constraints because the maximum 
time the DACS may take is unbounded. Logically this arises because the 
semantics are only that events may happen, not that they must happen. 
Practically the reason could be that the DACS system has broken down.
The inability to prove timing relationships is not specific to the DACS case 
but is general to this type of model. Thus it is necessary to recognise the 
nature of the proof that can be performed. Essentially one is trying to prove 
that the constraints on the duration of the control system operations do 
cater for the worst case scenario. These are the terms that the problem 
needs to be posed in.
6.2.5 Recommendations
In summary, the recommedations for how to handle time are:
a) Include time as part of the mathematical framework at step 2 of the 
modelling cycle.
b) The essential axiom is that of monotonicity of time.
c) Formalute any time aspects of behavioural properties in terms of the 
constraints that must be meet.
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6,3 SAMPLING
6.3.1 Introduction
When computers are used to observe the world around them the best they 
can do is to take occasional "samples" of the sensor values available. If 
the world is changing slowly and the computer sampling rapidly then the 
computer can find out all there is to know from its samples, and perhaps
by interpolating values between samples if necessary. However, there are two
problems with sampling systems:
a) transient events
b) aliasing.
Suppose that Just after the computer has taken a sample some brief transient 
event occurs in the real world, but by the time the next sample is taken all 
traces of the event have disappeared. Then the computer would have missed 
that event completely.
A more complicated and potentially more dangerous situation can arise 
because of the stroboscopic effect of taking samples. A phenomenon that 
is actually taking place at one rate can appear to be happening at another 
rate, called "aliasing".
There is a considerable body of theory and practice in regard to the slowest 
rate at which sampling system can operate. Of pcuticular significance is the 
"Fundamental Sampling Theorem" which states (Foster, 1982):
"If the highest frequency present in the input signal is 6, then in 
order to be able to reconstruct that signal, you must take at least 
2*6 samples per second".
The question as to whether a system based on sampling is sampling often 
enough is fundamental to its valid use in an application.
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6.3.2 Tusification and Formulation
The nature of the system will usually be clear. If it is a sampling system 
then inclusion of statement that the system is sampling often enough will 
normally be appropriate. This could be given as an assumption under step 3 
thereby establishing one of the limitations on validity. However, a Sample 
Axiom could be included as part of the mathematical framework under step 2. 
This recognises the fundamental role of sampling to the model. This could 
be particularly worthwhile where the behavioural property of interest includes 
timing relationships, as for the DACS example.
There are many possible formulations for the sample axiom. The one chosen 
for the DACS example focuses on the transient event problem. A different 
formulation would be needed to address the aliasing problem.
6.3.3 Effect of the Sample Axiom
The mathematical framework used for DACS was based on the traces of 
events generated by a process. The framework was then enriched by adding 
time stamps to the occurrences of each event, and the relationships between 
the events and the timing of these is derived from an underlying Schuman 
-Pitt level. It is possible to consider the model complete at this point, 
and formulate the problem within it and attempt the proof the safety 
property. However, the approach adopted was to include a further axiom, 
the Sample Axiom, in the model. This section considers the effect this had.
The DACS and Real World are given as state based specifications with 
the traces being formed from the operation schema names. This approach 
gives a state beised model a process algebra interpretation.
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The DACS and the plant are concurrent processes so it is possible for the 
plant to make a transition from the safe region to an unsafe region while 
a DACS operation is in progress. So there is a need for the mathematical 
framework to support concurrent processes, and currently there are two 
approaches to this:
a) Instantaneous Events
b) Non-interleaved Semantics
Process algebras such as CSP (Hoare, 1985) require that the events be 
instantaneous which is unrealistic as Analogue-Input.Scan must have a finite 
duration for example. The process algebra approach would be to have 
instantaneous events at the start and end of Analogue_Input.Scan, and 
perhaps an intermediate event to synchronise with the plant to read a value. 
This is the approach adopted by Gorski (1994), Given that one is coming 
from a state based notation this seems very unnatural. It will involve 
introducing extra operations with the necessary pre-conditions to ensure 
that once DACS starts a Scan all it can do is end It for example, and it cannot 
arbitrarily perform starts and ends of different operations. For these reasons 
the standard process algebra approach does not look attractive.
The alternative is to adopt a model employing events with finite durations. 
However, this must allow for a non-interleaving semantics where the events 
of concurrent process can start and terminate at any time relative to the events 
of other processes. This is very much the state of the art, and hence currently 
is not an attractive option.
Instead of taking the view of an absolute observer with complete objectivity, 
the Sample Axiom allows the model to be based on the view of the world as 
seen from the DACS point of view. As explained above this is justifiable 
for a sampling system because either the control system is fast enough to 
track the real world or it is not. If it is, then the control system's view 
of the world is adequate. In the composite model the only knowledge of 
the real world is the me<isurements the DACS makes.
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Thus the Sample Axiom allows the trace alphabet to be restricted to events 
that only a single process engages in. This has a number of effects:
a) Single State Schema
b) Elimination of Concurrency
b) Events with Duration and Interleaved Semantics
Given that the trace alphabet is restricted to  the events that a single process 
engages in then only a single state schema and associated operations is needed. 
If aspects of the plant being sampled must also be included then this can 
be achieved by composing the plant being sampled with the control system. 
This is illustrated by DACS where Pre-empt and Real_World were composed 
into a single specification.
With the events in the trace alphabet restricted to those that a single 
process engages in, then the trace must be sequential in nature. Thus all 
aspects of concurrency have been eliminated.
Ordinarily a model based on events with duration and interleaved semantics 
would result in the absurd situation of events in the real world being
unable to occur because a DACS event is still in progress, for example.
The effect of eliminating concurrency is that the model can be based on
events with durations and an interleaved semantics.
It is important to note that if the Real World view is needed independent of 
DACS then these two views, the Real World and the DACS, cannot be composed 
into a single model unless non-interleaved semantics are adopted. This is because 
the assumption that concurrency can be ignored would no longer be valid, 
and hence the model would have to allow for the autonomy of the processes.
As we have seen, the Sample Axiom means that the mathematical framework 
need only support a single concurrent thread, and the events have finite 
durations. Hence the framework is a Discrete Event Model and we may 
assume that the number of events which occur between any two events is 
finite. This is because the axiom effectively says that there is a maximum, 
and hence finite, rate at which anything of interest can happen.
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6.3.4 Conclusion
Earlier the question of whether Sampling should be an axiom or just an 
assumption was briefly discussed. Given the discussion above on the effect 
of treating sampling as an axiom it is clecir it has had a major impact. 
In the case of DACS the general mathematical system is multiple 
concurrent traces and events with durations. The introduction of the Sample 
Axiom results in a much more specialised system of a single trace with 
interleaved semantics: a significantly more tractable mathematical system. This 
is a powerful point. The inclusion of sampling as an axiom has resulted in a 
model that is both simpler and more tractable.
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6.4 PARAMETRIC PRODUCTS
6.4.1 Introduction
A parametric product is intended for use in a wide variety of situations 
rather than being special purpose. To achieve this generality the product is 
configurable both in terms of the algorithms it implements and the constants 
used by those algorithms. In the case of the Analogue Input Module of the 
DACS it is possible to select between linear and square root conversion laws, 
and to enable or disable the alarm checking. There are then a number of 
constants that establish the exact algorithm provided. There may be other 
parameters also such as timing and number of inputs. Given that parametric 
products are very much industrial practice it is worth understanding how to 
treat them formally.
In addition to considering the approach to Parametric Products some of the 
implication are also discussed. Namely, the way safety interacts with both the 
parameters and functionality, the implications of the product pre-existing and 
the different types of state variables. Hence the topics covered in the section 
are:
a) Approach to Parametric Products
b) Unsafe, Safety Critical and Non Critical
c) Pre-existence
d) Runtime and Configuration States
6.4.2 Approach to Parametric Products
An informal analysis should be conducted to determine whether it will be 
possible to use a product for a given safety application. This analysis should 
establish the safe range of each configuration parameter, and in particular 
that non critical parameters are identified and left free. This approach will 
ensure that the parameters are not unnecessarily constrained. Such parameters 
are then available for adjustment as circumstances require without the need 
to re-qualify the product for safe use. The use of a proof, as illustrated by 
the DACS example, can then be used to confirm these informal analysis results.
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The method of addressing parameteric products employed for DACS would 
seem to be quite general:
a) Informally decide on any specialisation of the product.
b) Leaving all the other parameters free, set up a Formal Model and attempt 
the safety proof,
c) Via the Formal Modelling and associated safety proof, or otherwise, 
establish the full set of limitations on use of the product and all the 
constraints on the configuration parameters,
d) One can then show that the values needed for a concrete case satisfy all 
the restrictions.
The DACS is a very general product that could have been used in a wide variety 
of different applications. In the DACS example a specific type of application, 
monitoring safety critical sensors, was chosen and although treated in a general 
way, is itself a specialisation. This application has employed the Analogue Input 
model amoung all the available DAC Modules, and fixed some the parameters. 
Hence one has a classification of the configuration:
a) Must be fixed for the whole generic class of applications.
b) Parameters with constraints on their range for the generic class of 
applications.
c) Parameters are still free.
Given that the type of DAC module and some configuration parameters are 
determined by the choice of the application this information can be used to 
specialise the DACS at an early stage. Some of the earlier proof attempts 
carried the unspecialised formulae until parameter substitution was necessary 
to make further progress. Having performed the proof both ways there is 
no doubt that early specialisation simplifies the proof even if this is only 
because the formulae are simpler and more concrete.
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It would, of course, be possible to perform the entire DACS Modelling with 
the concrete example rather than deal with the generic case. However, it is 
not that much more difficult to do a parametric model rather than just the 
concerte case. It is necessary to carry the parameters through ail the stages, 
but usually that is just more text. In terms of actual work some kind of symbol 
is needed, so it might as well be hi-alarm rather than 40.0, for instance.
The real value of parametric products is that their applicability to a wide 
class of applications can be established. The whole point of them is reuse 
and the maximum return on investment. A parametric safety proof exploits 
this potential for generality and reuse.
6.4.3 Unsafe. Safety Critical and Non-Critical
When attempting the safety proof one is forced to fix the value of parameters 
in order to eliminate unsafe formulae. For example, while alarm_check_req 
is free then the alarm checking could be turned off resulting in alarm' 
always being set to safe, which is unsafe. The alarm_check_req parameter is 
clearly safety critical and once set to "true" the part of the program 
realising the formula:
alarm„check_req = false => alarm' = safe
is unsafe dead code.
The safety requirement divides the functionality into sets. Functionality 
needed to satisfy safety is safety critical, whilst other functionality is non- 
critical. There may also be unsafe functionality, but unless this can be disabled 
or bypassed then the program is unsafe, and hence not fit for purpose.
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A parameter is safety critical if there are values in its range that are unsafe. 
It is non critical if all values are safe, and unsafe if there are no safe values. 
In the DACS example the safety requirement has divided the parameters into 
two sets: parameters that are safety critical and those that are non-critical. 
All the parameters of Analogue-Input are safety critical except 
an_value_at_restart which is non critical. Note that amoung parameters that 
are in some sense safety critical, some such as alarm-check-req are 
fundamental to ensuring the product has the needed functionality, while 
others are just a matter of numeric accuracy.
A Safety Requirement therefore classifies the parameters and functionality of 
a parametric system as either safe, unsafe or not critical. A safe program will 
not have unsafe parameters, and any unsafe functionality must be disabled.
Switchable functionality is undesirable from a safety point of view as it adds 
to the complexity, expands the safety critical parameters and results in unsafe 
dead code. Both the safety critical parameter and the unsafe dead code would 
be eliminated by "hard coding" the actual required parameter values and 
formulae.
Some means to prevent accidental and even malicious changes to critical 
parameters would seem to be essential for the use of parameteric products in 
safety critical applications. The product must therefore provide access controls 
and an audit trail of operator actions.
6.4.4 Pre-existence
One can be conducting safety analyses as part of a development process, that 
is, before the system exists, or to qualify a pre-existing system. When 
employing parametric products then the product will normally be pre-existing. 
In which case, one can either show that there is a set of values of the 
configuration parameters that meets the safety requirement whilst still allowing 
beneficial operation, or one must reject the product. In the case of a bespoke 
development one has another option, which is to change the specification of 
the system.
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During the work on improving the DACS specification a situation was 
encountered where ideally a change to the specification would be desirable. 
This was in the Stronger Invariant work where it was desirable to change 
the initialisation condition so that alarm' was not set to the fixed value safe 
but allowed to be determined by the configuration and the intial value for 
an-value. However, since the DACS was pre-existing its behaviour is fixed 
and the specification must reflect actual behaviour. Hence although one can 
restructure the specification one must not alter its behaviour.
6.4.5 Runtime and Configuration State
This section has naturally focused on the configuration state. The runtime 
state is very important to the operation of the actual system, but it is the 
configuration state that is the central issue during Formal Modelling of 
parametric products. Establishing all the constraints on the parameters is one 
of the key outputs form the modelling process.
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6.5 DEADBANDS
6.5.1 Introduction
The problem of noisy input signals and their effect on the generation of 
alarms is again a common problem. The use of dead bands is standard 
industrial practice, and DACS is not unusual in supporting this mechanism. 
The DACS example illustrates how dead bands specifically, and noisy input 
generally can be handled by the Formal Modelling method.
6.5.2 Justification
The justification for associating deadbands with alarm limits is the 
suppression of spurious alarms resulting from noisy inputs. These issues 
are discussed in section 4.3.3 and in greater depth at 5.25.
There are other mechanisms that will deal with noisy inputs. Moving averages 
and a first order filter are two common examples. The characteristics of 
these are different in important ways from those of deadbands:
a) Moving averages and first order filters both introduce a lag between the 
sensor crossing an alarm threshold and the alarm being triggered. Deadbands 
do not introduce a lag.
b) Moving averages and first order filters may miss alarms. This will happen 
if there is a single sensor value that crosses the threshold, but prior and 
subsequent values are below the threshold. In these cases the single value 
may not have enough "weight" by itself for the smoothed value to reach the 
threshold. As has been shown in section 5.25, deadbands need not miss alarms.
c) Moving averages and first order filters tend to be conservative in that if 
the alarm limit is tripped there it is very likely to be a real alarm. By contrast, 
deadbands may well generate false alarms since the alarm will sound as soon 
as the top of the interval crosses the threshold, yet the actual sensor value 
is not likely to have actual reach the alarm limit.
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It is clearly highly application dependent as to the characteristics needed 
from the alarm system. However, the absence of a lag, and the ability to 
avoid missing alarms favour deadbands for safety critical applications, even 
if the price is a number of false alarms.
6.5.3 Formulation
Two forms of formulation of deadbands for the two alarm limit (hi, lo) 
case are provided by the DACS example. Analogue_Input2.Scan provides a 
formulation of alarm limits with deadbands based on output cases (lo, safe 
hi). Section 5,8.4 considers the formulation of the same requirement in terms 
of input cases. Although this second formulation is considerably longer, it 
has been found the more tractable to work with.
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6.6 SCHEDULING
6.6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter it was shown that for the DACS example Analogue Input 
can be configured so that it does embody the constraints imposed by the 
safety requirement. Since Analogue_Input has two operations defined on it, 
the picture of the traces it can produce is shown in Figure 6.2.
annunciatescan
scanscan
annunciate
annunciate
FIGURE 6.2 - Initial Trace Picture for Analogue„Input
It is clear from the picture that Analogue_Input could produce traces of scans 
with no annunciates, or annunciates with no scans. The effect of either of these 
is to leave the warning output in the safe state no matter what happens to the 
plant. Hence despite the proof that Analogue-Input has all the Safety Critical 
functionality it needs, it can still exhibit unsafe behaviour. So any application 
that employs Analogue-Input must ensure it is used in a way that does 
not exhibit unsafe behaviour. Clearly the scheduler is safety critical and has a 
major impact on the trace behaviour of the system.
6.6.2 Instification
Scheduling of processes by a computer control system may rely on complex 
standard operating system at one extreme, or be a small dedicated function 
at the other. If it is very small and dedicated it may be worth using its 
formal specification as its formulation. If it is complex then the formulation
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probably needs to be more abstract. In the case of the DACS the operating 
system was like MASCOT II (MASCOT Suppliers Association, 1980) in nature, 
yet the scheduling algorithm introduced by Pre-empt just used a single 
boolean variable and simple pre-conditions. This demonstrates that the 
level of abstraction possible can be dramatic.
Given that the abstraction of the scheduler formulation can be dramatic as 
in the DACS case, then it will be necessary to justify the abstraction. The 
central issue here is that the formulation preserves the correct relationship 
between the operations, and between the operations and the real world 
events that cause them to be scheduled. In the case of the DACS this 
included an argument as to why the scheduling of any of the many other 
tasks performed by SCIDAC need not be included in the formulation.
6.6.3 Interpretation
Where an abstract formulation of the scheduler has been used then the results 
generated concerning the trace behaviour of the formulation should be checked 
to ensure they correspond to the behaviour the actual scheduler would exhibit,
6.6.4 Conclusions
It is possible for the system to have all the functionality it needs to meet the 
safety requirement, and yet still exhibit unsafe behaviour resulting from the 
scheduling of the operations. The scheduler is clearly critical to the trace 
behaviour of the system.
The safety proof for DACS was also conducted using a scheduler that forced 
strict alternation of scans and annunciates, as well as the version given in 
chapter S that correctly modelled the pre-emptive nature of the alarm 
processing. The insight here is that there is not necessarily one correct 
scheduling algorithm, as both these version were proved safe. However, validity 
of the results depends not on showing that the system safe, but on having an 
accurate, even if abstract, formulation of the scheduler. Thus work is needed 
on the assumptions regarding the abstraction of the scheduler, and in the 
interpretation of any trace properties that result from the safety proof.
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6.7 INITIALISATION
6.7.1 Introduction
Initialisation is another generic problem that is often encountered. In the case 
of DACS the process may already be in alarm when DACS starts up, but a 
bell is still required after safe-delay seconds. In the DACS case this happened 
anyway, but for other cases special functionality may be needed.
6.7.2 Specification. Formulation and Interpretation
The informal specificaion of the problem should explicitly consider 
initialisation. Even if there are no special requirements, a statement to that 
effect gives confidence that the matter has been addressed.
For the DACS all the formulation of initialisation was at the Schuman-Pitt 
level, and comprised definition of the initialisation part of the state schema. 
It is interesting to note the way the choice of initialisation values, particularly 
of alarm, results in the required initialisation behaviour emerging. It is not the 
case that the initialisation operation on the state schema actually implements 
the initialisation requirement directly.
The fact that in the DACS case the initialisation requirements are not directly 
implemented underlines the need to consider them at the interpretation step. 
Hence the belief that the required initialisation properties are emergent 
behaviour will be verified.
6.7.3 Conclusions
Where initialisation requirements need to be directly implemented then this 
aspect would probabaly be handled adequately during the modelling process. 
However, where the initialisation requrements are not implemented directly 
then the possibility of overlooking them exists. For this reason it is 
recommended that initialisation is included on standard checklists as an 
issue that needs to be addressed.
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6.8 FORMAL MODELLING METHOD DEFINITION
6.8.1 Introduction
The main objective of the rest of this chapter is to extract, and generalise 
where appropriate, the method adopted for DACS. The resulting Formal 
Modelling Method has a wide applicability.
One approach to ensuring that the results of Formal Modelling are valid 
is to adopt a method that ensures all aspects of the modelling process are 
appropriately addressed. The approach proposed is the Modelling Cycle that 
comprises a number of steps that can be iterated as necessary.
The modelling techniques deal with the tactics that can be deployed at the 
various steps of the Modelling Cycle. Hence these cover such issues as 
whether to introduce some aspect of the problem as an axiom of the model, 
or give it a problem specific formulation.
6.8.2 justification for Formal Modelling
Before embarking on a Formal Modelling exercise it is worth considering why 
it is being undertaken. Perhaps this is required by the regulatory regime, in 
which case that may be reason enough. However, it is still worth considering 
the value that the modelling is expected to yield, as this will focus the modelling 
in appropriate ways.
Formal Modelling can usually be justified where a high degree of confidence 
in a system is required due to the consequences of deploying an inadequate 
one. Formal Modelling is particularly helpful when there are a very large 
number of possible cases to consider, and the system must work correctly 
for all of these. While techniques such as prototyping and trials can find 
errors, mathematical proof has the potential to show the absence of errors 
in all the situations of interest.
Formal Modelling can therefore be seen as a technique for validation. It is 
one way to gain confidence that a system or specification embodies the 
behavioural properties needed for safety.
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Forma! Modelling is a technique to use along side the other safety techniques. The 
idea of using Fault Tree Analysis to identify the most critical aspects of a system 
which may then be the best candidates for modelling is an example (Bradley 1993).
6.8.3 The Modelling Cvcle
One way to address the problem of Formal Modelling is to adopt a method that 
breaks the process down into a series of steps, where each step is addressing 
one aspect of the modelling process. This will help ensure that each step is 
given sufficient consideration and hence the validity issue is being addressed.
The approach adopted for DACS was the Modelling Cycle. This approach is 
typical of mathematical modelling generally, and is not restricted to Formal 
Methods. It breaks the modelling process down into the following steps:
1) An informal specification of the problem is prepared.
2) The Mathematical Framework is set up
3) The Assumptions made are considered
4) The problem is formulated
5) The mathematical problem is solved
6) The results are interpreted
7) The results are used.
The steps have been presented as a linear sequence. However, it is unlikely that 
the process will proceed so neatly. For example, decisions on the level of 
abstraction made at step 4 may introduce new assumptions or limitations. The 
process also has a built in check which is step 6, the interpretation of the 
results. The results may not agree with known test cases, proofs may fail 
and so on. Where the results are not acceptable then the process needs to 
be iterated rather than move on to step 7 and use the results. Hence the 
name of the method "Modelling Cycle".
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6.8.4 Step 1 - Informal Specification
The problem needs to be properly defined and scoped, resulting in an informal 
specification for the model. This step is entirely in the Problem Domain.
6.8.5 Step 2 - The Mathematical Framework
During this step the mathematical system within which the problem will be 
formulated is chosen. Once this has been done the other task is to select 
the Axioms for the Model. In this step the first part of the transition from 
the Problem Domain to the Mathematical Domain is made.
The following additional topics are discussed under this step;
a) Mathematical Framework Structure
b) Causality and Trace Properties
c) Axioms.
6.8.6 Step 3 - Assumptions and Limitations
The identification and justification of the model assumptions is a critical step. 
Any assumption necessarily places a limitation on the applicability of the results 
to those cases where the assumption is true. Any other limitations also need 
to be identified.
6.8.7 Step 4 - Problem Formulation
The informal specification of the problem can now be used to formulate it 
within the mathematical framework defined. This step is within the Mathematical 
Domain,
The following Formal Methods techiques that can be employed at this step 
are discussed;
a) Consistency Verification
b) Stronger Invariant
c) Structure and Style.
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6.8.8 Step 5 - Solve the Mathematical Problem
In this step the mathematical form of the problem is solved. This step is "just" 
a matter of symbol manipulation and is entirely in the Mathematical Domain.
6.8.9 Step 6 - Interpret Results
In this step the transition from the mathematical domain back to the problem 
domain is made. One needs to look at the results of solving the mathematical 
problem and see what they mean in the problem domain. If the results do not 
make sense in the problem domain then the model probably is in error, and 
modifications are needed to it. Hence one needs to return to earlier steps and 
iterate the modelling process, Alternatively, the results may be generally valid, 
but indicate that additional assumptions or limitations need to be imposed to 
achieve general validity.
6.8.10 Step 7 ~ Use Results
Assuming that any interpretation problems have been resolved then one 
has new information or insights about the problem domain. One also has 
greater confidence in the understanding of the problem domain. The results 
of Formal Modelling can therefore be used to make their contribution to the 
over all safety of the system. This step is entirely in the Problem Domain.
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6.9 STEP 1 - INFORMAL SPECIFICATION
The problem needs to be properly defined and scoped, resulting in an informal 
specification for the model. This will form the contract between the person 
with the problem and the modeller. This step is entirely in the Problem Domain.
The preparation of the informal specification is going to encounter all the 
usual problems with specification generally and particularly those relating to 
informal specification. Typically these will be problems of completeness, precision 
and ambiguity. The modelling process itself will help over come many of these.
The problem needs to be properly defined and scoped, resulting in an informal 
specification for the model. For the DACS the specification covered three main 
areas:
a) The Control System
b) The Plant
c) The Safety Requirement.
This would seem to be a good starting point for any control or monitoring 
application. In addition, application domain problems such as initialisation and 
scheduling are worth consideration for inclusion.
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6.10 STEP 2 - THE MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
6.10.1 Introduction
During this step the mathematical system within which the problem will be 
formulated is chosen. Once this has been done the other task is to select 
the Axioms for the Model. In this step the first part of the transition from 
the Problem Domain to the Mathematical Domain is made.
6.10.2 Choice of Mathematical System
The choice of mathematical system within which the problem will be formulated 
is a significant decision. It is a choice of the expressive, analytic and cognitive 
power of the framework within which one must work. It may also affect the 
tractabllity of the solution of the mathematical problem. There are issues of 
familiarity to staff, of training and tools.
There are now many Formal Notations and Formal Systems that can be used 
for modelling of this type. Some of these have tool support providing 
anything from simple syntax and type checking to proof assistence. None of 
this precludes the use of any branch of mathematics if appropriate.
Real time monitoring and control applications tend to involve a number of 
concurrent processes which engage in various events and intercommunicate. 
This tends to suggest the use of a trace based model such as a process 
algebra. This will need to be enriched with time. As for the DACS, the 
definition of the various processes may be provided in the form of state 
based specifications, resulting in a two level model and the need to link 
the levels. However, there are potentially many approaches (Bradley 93), 
which may prove better.
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6.10.3 Axioms
Once the Formal Notation or mathematical system has been choosen the next 
consideration is the Axioms of the Model. Some axioms are needed to ensure 
that the model is the intended mathematical structure. For DACS Axioms 5.2 
and 5.3 were of this kind, Other axioms are derived from the problem domain 
and these are worth spending time to collect. These may well be Laws from 
the Scientific framework within which the problem is set.
6.10.4 Modelling Techniques
A more detailed discussion of mathematical framework structure, the 
representation of causality in the model, and of the Axioms can be found in 
the three section that follow.
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6.11 MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK STRUCTURE
6.11.1 Introduction
The mathematical framework in which the DACS problem was formulated was 
very specialised. It is worth considering how this framework might be 
generalised to enable a wider class of safety problems to be addressed.
In this section Gorski's framework (Gorski, 1994) and (Gorski and Wardzinski, 
1995) is presented and its relationship to the DACS framework considered. 
Gorski calls his framework the "Common Safety Description Model" (CSDM). 
Gorski developed CSDM in order to formalise many standard safety analyses 
such as Fault Tree Analysis within a common framework. Being targetted at 
safety it incorporates such basic safety concepts as process, event, causality 
and time, and hence should have wide applicability.
6.11.2 Gorski'8 Mathematical Framework
In addition to modelling processes and their events, causality and time, 
Gorski's framework (Gorski, 1994) includes further constructs needed for his 
specific use. In the definition that follows only a subset of the framework is 
presented that excludes these further constructs. The subset comprises:
E - a set of events, and its elements to be denoted by X, Y, Z.
L - a set of labels which are used to uniquely identify event occurrences, with 
Individual labels denoted by l,n,m.
A - a set of actions which are labelled events plus a distinguished silent 
action 1 .  A = (L x  E) U l ;  individual actions to be denoted by x,y,z.
T -  a set of transitions with its elements denoted by w. A transition is 
essentially an action name with a subscript s or e. T is related to A in the 
following sense T = {xg | x€ A} U {xg | x€ A}. Intuitively, for an action x, Xg 
denotes the start transition and x^ denotes the end transition of x.
<o ~ a causa/ity relation on (T x T), a partial order that is irreflexive and transitive.
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R - the set of real nambers, and its elements denoted by r.
Time (€ T ^ R ) a partial function which assigns real time to transistions. Time 
can also be interpreted as a set of pairs ((l,X),r) where r€ R and (1,X)€ T, and 
Time((l.X)) = r.
Start(€ A'-^R) a partial function that, given x, returns r  if (Xg,r)e Time, 
otherwise Start(x) is undefined.
End(£A~~*'R) a partial function that, given x, returns r  if (Xg,r)€ Time, 
otherwise End(x) is undefined.
6.11.3 DACS and Gorski
The relationship between the DACS framework and the subset of Gorski's 
framework is now considered. The following are the correspondences:
a) In DACS the set F would be the same as Gorski's set E provided the s
and e subscripts were added to the events in F.
b) The unique labels in DACS that would correspond to the set L in Gorski
would be formed by the trace index plus a subscript.
c) The set F in DACS is the set of actions A in Gorski provided the silent 
action is included in F.
d) The set T in Gorski's framework can be constructed for the DACS though 
no direct equivalent had actually been defined. The relationship between T and 
A would hold were T constructed for DACS.
e) [TIME] in the DACS framework must be R.
f) The set S in DACS can be constructed in Gorski. It corresponds to the set 
of pairs ((l,X),r), where r€ R and (1,X)€T.
g) time_stamp in DACS is Start in Gorski. End in Gorski corresponds to 
time_stamp + duration in DACS.
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h) Time in Gorski's framework can be derived from the equivalences of 
Start and End. Hence Time is time_stamp if the suffix is "s" and is 
time-Stamp + duration if the suffix is "e".
From the above it is clear that the two mathematical frameworks are closely 
related. The DACS problem could have been formulated within the subset of 
the Gorski model defined above. For DACS the model could be specialised 
with Axiom 5.1, Monotonistic Time.
The main difference is that the DACS framework has events with duration 
and interleaved semantics, while the Gorski framework takes the more ususal 
approach of instantaneous events, with actions needing start and end transitions. 
This use of instantaneous events also permits the adoption of interleaved 
semantics. The DACS framework allows for only a single trace of events. The 
Gorski framework therefore has considerably greater expressive power since 
multiple concurrent traces of events are permitted. Conversely, the DACS 
approach of a single trace, events with duration and interleaved semantics, 
results in a simpler and more tractable mathematical system.
In the DACS framework all events form a single trace. This gives a particularly 
simple form to the Time Axiom (Axiom 5.1). In the Gorski framework there are 
many concurrent traces and hence no simple relationship between (1,X) and 
[TIME]. One can see it is this reduced expressive power of the DACS 
framework that enables this extra structure to be supported.
6.11.4 Conclusions and Recomendations
Broadly, the DACS type of mathematical framework is a specialisation of the 
Gorski type of framework, and fundamentally this is their relationship. The 
Gorski framework has greater expressive power and hence is more widely 
applicable. The DACS framework is more tractable and supports more 
structure such as the Time Axiom. Specialisation of the mathematical 
framework has both costs and benefits.
The subset of the Gorski Common Safety Description Model considered here 
would seem to be applicable to a large class of safety problems, and should 
therefore be considered a starting point to which structure (axioms) are added.
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6.12 CAUSALITY AND TRACE PROPERTIES
6.12.1 Introduction
The subset of the Gorski framework considered in the last section covered 
processes and their associated events or actions, and time. If anything can 
happen at any time then the system is unconstrained and there is little that 
can be said about it. For safety we expect relationships between events and 
hence structure in the traces. So, the other fundamental aspect of safety 
analyses is causality which is considered here.
6.12.2 DACS and Causality
In Gorski's framework causality is defined as a relation on T x T that is 
irreflexive and transitive. It is a matter of observation that the DACS framework 
does not include an explicit causality relation on the events in this way. 
The DACS framework has a Schuman-Pitt model underlying it so that causality 
is an emergent property of this under^dng model, Gorski does not have 
such an underlying model and hence must introduce causality explicitly.
For the DACS framework it is the two Axioms 5.2 (that the dashed state 
variable for event i is the undashed state variable for event 1 + 1) and 5.3 (that 
the pre and post condition of an event that occured must both be true) that 
provide the link between the Schuman-Pitt and Time Stamped Trace levels. 
Within the DACS model it is Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 that establish the inter 
relationships between events. These Lemmas enable us to hide the Schuman- 
Pitt level and work at the the Time Stamped Traces level.
The safety proof showed that there are four traces that result in an Alert(hi):
1) Sample(safe), Sample(hi), Alert(hi)
2) Sample(safe), Alert(safe), Sample(hl), Alert(hi)
3) Sample(lo), Sample(hi), Alert(hi)
4) Sample(lo), Alert(lo), Sample(hi), Alert(hi)
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Clearly there is structure in the traces. However, it is not possible to say 
that Sample(hi) causes Alert(hi), as it is the Sample(safe) to Sample(hi) 
transition that actually causes the Alert(hi) in case 1) above. Hence there 
does not seem to be any causal relationships between the events defined for 
the DACS model, but rather a situation where for certain trace sequences 
the next event is determined.
It is an interesting question as to whether the DACS problem could have been 
formulated in such a way that the causal relationship can be expressed only 
in terms of a relation on events as adopted in the Gorski framework. The 
safety proof results can be restated as a Sample with alarms alarmj' causes 
the next event to be an Alert(alarmjO- This suggests that the set F in the 
DACS model could have been based on Sample with two parameters, alarmj 
and alarmj':
F = {Sample(lo,lo), Sample(lo, safe), Sample(lo, hi),
Sample(safe.lo), Sample(safe,safe), Sample(safe,hi),
Sample(hi,lo), Sample(hi,safe), Sample(hi,hi),
Alert(lo), Alert(safe), Alert(hi)}
The causality relation < c  is then:
_ < c _  : F F
V a, b ; ALARM •  a b Sample(a,b) < c  Alert(b)
Note that this is Lemma 1 of the safety proof, and is not the only causal 
relationship between events, and Lemma 2, that an Alert must be followed 
by a Sample is another.
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6.12.3 Differences between DACS and Gorski
The following differences between the two approaches are discussed;
a) Treatment
b) Input or output of the model
c) Density of causal relationships
d) Representation
e) Teleology.
The DACS Model has a Schuman-Pitt Level underlying the Time Stamped 
Traces. This underlying Level, together with the link axioms (5.2 and 5.3) 
give rise to the trace behaviour that the model exhibits. The Gorski framework 
does not have an underlying Level that provides behaviour, and so includes 
causality explicitly at the Time Stamped Trace level. These are two quite 
different approaches to the treatment of causality.
Viewing the DACS safety proof in causal terms we can see that the entire proof 
is directed towards establishing the causal relationships. Lemmas 1 and 2 
certainly have this intent, and RTSR itself is essentially asking if the DACS will 
cause the bell to sound when DACS detects an unsafe transition in plant region. 
For DACS, causality is an output of the safety proof, not an input to it.
For DACS, while the process stays in one region then there will be a series 
of Samples all of the same type. There are no causal relationships between 
these. An assumption in the DACS case is the notion that Samples occur at regular 
timed intervals, but the mechanism causing this is not modelled. A safety 
proof therefore seems to be different to the analyses that Gorski is trying 
to model. In a Fault Tree for example, events are only included becasue they 
contribute (cause) other events higher in the tree. By definition then, the 
situations that Gorski intended to model have causal relationships between 
all the events. The DACS illustrates that this is not necessarily the case for 
Formal Modelling.
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Given the underlying Schuman-Pitt Level, the DACS problem is essentially 
about the trace properties. Gorski by contrast uses a definition of causality 
based on a simple relationship between transitions. It would be a simple 
matter to turn a Gorski causality relation into a set of trace properties. 
However, it will not usually be possible to do the reverse. If the trace 
properties are over more than two events then these cannot be represented 
as a causality relation. We have seen that the DACS formulation does not 
immediately correspond to the Gorski definition, though it may be possible 
to achieve this by redefining the DACS events. The conclusion is that a trace 
property is a more expressive form in which to capture the inter relationships 
between events than a single relation on transitions.
The use of trace structure or trace properties to represent the inter­
relationships between events in the model is free from teleological implications 
that the concept of causality brings. Hence one can establish that after a 
Sample(safe), Sample(hi) sequence the next event (if it occurs!) will be an 
Alert(hi). While this behaviour is necessarily the case, there is‘ no sense in 
which one must argue that the Sample(lo) and Sample(hi) caused the Alert(hi).
6,12,4 Recommendations
Gorski has defined a mathematical framework in order to formalise certain 
safety analyses. Although the subset dealing with processes, events, actions 
and time look useful in providing a general framework for Formal Modelling, 
Gorski'5 definition of causality appears too restrictive. It is recommeded that 
safety proofs continue with the more general trace behaviour based approach 
adopted for the DACS.
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6.13 AXIOMS
6.13.1 Introduction
Once the Formal Notation or mathematical system has been chosen the next 
consideration is the Axioms. Some axioms are needed to ensure that the model 
is the intended mathematical structure. For DACS Axioms 5.2 and 5.3 were of 
this kind. Other axioms are derived from the problem domain and these are 
worth spending time to collect. It is the treatment of the application domain 
axioms that is the topic of this section.
6.13.2 Effects of Axioms
It is well worth identifying any additional model axioms such as the Time 
and Sample Axioms, These provide more to work with when constructing a 
model, and may assist in any proofs. However, the real power comes from the 
fact that this may enable you to move from working in a general mathematical 
system to a more specialised one, in which it may be both easier to formulate 
the problem and solve it. In the case of DACS the general mathematical system 
is multiple concurrent traces and events with durations. As discussed in section
6.3 the introduction of the Sample Axiom results in a much more specialised 
system of a single trace with interleaved semantics: a significantly more 
tractable mathematical system.
The fact that an axiom may have such a significant impact on the mathematical 
framework is another clear indicator of when an aspect should be an axiom. If 
sampling were not an axiom then it would have been treated as a limitation on 
the applicability of the results, and hence not given a formulation within the 
model at all. Only as an Axiom does it adopt its proper role within the model.
6.13.3 Axiom or Formulation
Apparantly one has a choice. For each aspect of the application domain problem 
one can either give it a formulation at step 4, or include it as an axiom at step 
2. The issue is the criteria to use in making this decision.
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The main basis for the decision is whether the aspect is a fundamental 
property of the scientific framework within which the application domain 
problem is being formulated, or something specific to the particular problem. 
Time is a good example of the point. It is difficult to envisage a model of 
a monitoring or control situation without the concept of time, and time is 
applicable to a still larger class of problems. Further, time is not part of 
the DACS, Real World or the Safety Requirement, but part of the Newtonian 
scientific system within which all are set.
Based on the above ideas, criteria for deciding if an aspect is an axiom are:
a) The aspect is fundamental to the model not specific to the case.
b) The aspect captures a scientific law or property of the scientific framework 
within which one needs to work.
c) Difficulty is experienced during formulation of the aspect at step 4 because 
the aspect seems to be pervasive not specific to part of the problem.
d) The aspect would not be given a formulation at step 4, but introduced as 
an assumption or limitation at step 3, and hence not included in the model.
Conversely, an aspect is unlikely to be a good axiom if it cannot be expressed 
until some problem specific definitions are available.
6.13.4 Recommendations
Axioms are of two kinds. In addition to those needed to ensure that the 
mathematical framework is the intended structure there are axioms that result 
from the application domain, and in particular the scientific framework within 
which the model is cast. It is well worth identifying these application domain 
axioms. Once identified an axiom's effect should be considered to determine 
if it results in a significantly more tractable mathematical system. If so this 
is worth exploiting.
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6.14 STEP 3 - ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
6.14.1 Introduction
The reason for making assumptions is that it is impracticable to include all 
aspects of the problem domain in the model. This is usually highly undesirable 
in any case as the amount of work, and clarity of the results tend to relate 
to the complexity of the model. Although it is necssary to get the balance 
between obscuring detail and a simplistic model right, this is largely a matter 
of experience and judgement.
The identification and justification of the model assumptions is a critical step. 
Any assumption necessarily places a limitation on the applicability of the results 
to those cases where the assumption is true. Any other limitations also need 
to be identified.
6.14.2 Identification and Justification of Assumptions
Identifying the model assumptions is a difficult step that needs insight in to 
the model building process and the specifics of the problem. It is particularly 
difficult to ensure that all the assumptions have been identified.
Each assumption made needs some justification as to why this will not affect 
the validity of the results. Alternatively, the justification can be that the 
assumption causes a limitation on the applicability of the results, but this 
limitation is acceptable for the intended purpose.
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6.14.3 Kinds of Assumptions
The assumptions that we will want to make are of two kinds:
a) Omission
b) Abstraction.
We may wish to exclude some aspect of the problem domain altogether. For 
the DACS the whole issue of the bell being turned off, and of the operators 
muting or acknowledging the alarm were all omitted. Typically it will be such 
issues as the installation, operation and maintenance that will be omitted.
In some cases complete omission of some aspect may not be appropriate, 
so it is included in a simplified form rather than with all its complexity. In the 
DACS model the scheduler is a good example of an aspect that must be 
included (see section 6.6) but is given a very much simplified formulation.
6.14.4 Errors in Assumptions
Errors in assumptions will be of two kinds. Failure of identification and 
Incorrect assumptions.
Work on later steps in the modelling process may identify errors in the 
assumptions. For the DACS, the assumption was made that the inputs were 
accurate, but a full specification was being employed for Analogue Input. This 
resulted in a conflict between the assumption that deadbands could be 
omitted and the formulation which included them. During the proof it was found 
that this resulted in the deadband being fixed to the value zero. This lead 
the the questioning of the assumption, its removal, and hence the generalisation 
to noisy input data.
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6.14.5 Limitations
Each assumption places a limitation on the results of the model since they 
are only valid in those situations where the assumptions are true. Not all 
limitations need arise from this source however. For example, the whole 
mathematical framework used for DACS is limited to control systems based 
on sampling because of the Sampling Axiom. The results should not be 
applied to control system built of analogue components that operate 
continuously, nor for systems that are event (interrupt) driven.
It is important not to impose unnecessary limitations, and hence to maximise 
the value of the modelling work. In the case of the DACS example as many 
of the configuration parameters as possible were kept free, and the minimum 
number of constraints imposed on those there were not completely free. The 
model and the associated proof work are therefore applicable in many more 
cases than the concrete application described in chapter 4.
6.14.6 Conclusions
In this step where the assumptions and limitations are considered the balance 
is being struck between applicability and simplicity. The main problem is that 
failure to identify or otherwise address the issue can impact on the validity 
of the results. The step is open ended, and so necessarily relies on judgement 
and experience. Nevertheless, the list of assumptions and limitations produced 
for DACS in chapter 5 should be a helpful checklist.
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6.15 STEP 4 - PROBLEM FORMULATION
6.15.1 Introduction
The informal specification of the problem can now be used to formulate it 
within the mathematical framework defined. This step is within the 
Mathematical Domain.
6.15.2 Form
There are techniques available to help ensure that the model is well formed. 
For the Analogue Input Module there was an existing Formal Specification, and 
the decision was made to include all this detail. However, the specification 
was not used in this initial form, but was revised. The basis of this revision 
was the Consistency Verification and Stronger Invariant methods, and the end 
result was both better formed mathematically and simpler to work with.
6.15.3 Structure
Another significant issue is how the model is structured. The ideas of 
keeping run time and configuration variables separate, of early specialisation, 
and being able to deal with the trace properties independent of the time 
properties are all illustrated by the DACS example.
6.15.4 Real World Properties
In the case of the DACS a very simple Real World Model was prepared and
composed with the control system. The reason for doing this is that the 
properties of interest will, in the first instance, be a properties about the 
real world not the computer system. In the case of DACS one can see that in 
the Real World Model temperature and bell are free and hence there is nothing 
ensuring the required behaviour. Once DACS is introduced the possibility of
ensuring the desired relationship between these Real World values exists.
- 162 -
6.15.5 Choice of Variables
As for any modelling exercise, the choice of variables is important. Also the 
link between these mathematical variables and their real world equivalents must 
be made. This was not a significant issue for DACS since it is itself making 
real world measurements, and hence the choice of variables is pre-determined.
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6.16 CONSISTENCY VERIFICATION
6.16.1 Introduction
Once a Formal Specification has been prepared it is pertinent to ask if it is 
potentially meaningful and internally consistent. This is addressed by discharging 
a set of standard Consistency Verification Proofs as defined in Chapter 3.
6.16.2 Nature of DACS Findings
The DACS work in Annex B shows that the Consistency Verifications are able 
to detect significant errors in the schemas. The kinds of errors found were:
a) Pre-condition being too weak
b) The post condition failing to determine a value for alarm in all cases.
These are the kinds of error the Consistency Verification was expected to 
detect. However, in the case of b) above the failure of the verification was 
not just the result of a slip or oversight, but a genuine error in capturing 
the intent by the post-condition.
6.16.3 Power of the Verifications
The Consistency Verifications have much in common with syntax and type 
checking. They are wider in scope since they deal with whole schemas at a 
time, but like syntax and type checking, they are verifications of internal 
consistency. Success in establishing the Consistency Verifications, like sucess 
of syntax or type checking is of no great interest. It is expected, and one 
simply moves on to consider the real issues for which the notation is being 
employed. Nevertheless, the Consistency Verifications are of value. A failure 
of one of the Consistency Verifications is of interest, and may reveal wider 
semantic problems. They have been defined in a completely general way, and 
hence are always appropriate. In exactly the same way as for syntax or type 
checks, knowing that a Specification has had these Consistency Verifications 
discharged gives confidence in it, and is the only sensible basis for further 
work, such as safety proofs or design refinements, to be based upon it.
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6.16.4 Use of the Technique
The Consistency Verifications css and app both only require that a model is 
exhibited that satisfies the criteria. It is simple to construct such models and 
so these proof obligations are particularly easy to discharge, uii and eff both 
involve proofs, but no great problems should be experienced with these. What 
one should expect if the Consistency Verifications are preformed manually, is 
a great deal of tedium. It is the author's view that this is an aspect of Formal 
Methods that would benefit significantly from being tool supported.
6.16.5 Manual Method
If one does not have tool support available then use of the Consistency 
Verifications is still recommended. However, a pragmatic approach should be 
adopted so that one reaps most of the benefits for the minimum effort. The 
approach suggested is to check the various aspects of the Consistency 
Verifications by inspection rather than by performing the proof. The conclusions 
should be documented together with an informal argument as to why the 
schema is believed to be consistent. That is, to adopt the approach illustrated 
by the DACS example in Annex D, rather than Annex B, Obviously this kind 
of approach cannot give the same confidence as a full proof, particularly where 
that is machine checked. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile. For example, the 
requirement that rw_hi > rw_lo in Real-World 2 was found in exactly this way.
Other ways to minimise the work are:
a) Making careful choice of Model to exhibit.
b) Using a simplified form of the Consistency Verifications if appropriate.
c) Reusing Consistency Verifications when schemas are reused.
These are discussed in greater detail in the sub-sections that follow.
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6.16.6 Careful Choice of Model
Choose a model that is relevant to the real world application. In the case of 
the DACS the Concrete Example in chapter 4 was use as the basis of the 
model. Academics may be convinced by an arbitrary model, but engineers will 
be more comfortable if the case of interest is used, and it seems wasteful to 
invest time and energy in a case that is of no particular significance. There 
may be other advantages. For example, the case of interest should be 
reachable, so it is unlikely that a new model must be found after applying 
the Stronger Invariant technique.
Use the same model for all the schemas. This saves work since it is only 
necessary to show the model satisfies the state Invariant once, and then reuse 
this fact in the other verifications.
6.16.7 Use of Simplified Forms
State Schemas with no state variables only require css to be proven. 
Such state schemas occur whenever the instantiation parameters are defined 
with their own schema in order to keep configuration and run time 
variables separate. This was the approach adopted for the DACS with 
Analogue_Input_Conf being the configuration state schema with no state 
variables, and Analogue-Input defining the run time state within the 
context of the configuration state.
For State Schemas with no invariant predicate (no pj in Figure 3.1) the 
Consistency Verificiations simplify just to showing that the initialisation 
predicate is well defined for any values of the identifiers within their types.
For Operation Schemas with no pre-condition predicate (no qj in Figure 3.1) 
app does not need to be verified. This is because app simplifies to exhibiting 
a model that satisfies the invariant, which has already been done for css. This 
just leaves choosing values for the parameters that are within the range of 
their types which should be trivial.
- 166 -
For Operations that do not alter the state the post condition is just the 
invariant. Since no values are changed, the invariant after the operation must 
be satisfied if it were true before the operation. Hence pre automatically 
ensures post and there is no point in actually proving eff.
6.16.8 Reuse of Consistency Verifications
A common situation is where a new schema C is to be defined as the composition 
of schemas A and B where these are already verified. In this case all one needs 
to show is that any mutual constraints between A and B do not invalidate the 
consistency of the whole. In the special case where A and B have independent 
signatures there is nothing to prove. Reuse of Consistency Verifications in this 
way is illustrated in Annex D for Composed 1.
6.16.9 Recommendation
The Consistency Verifications are worthwhile and it is recommended that the 
technique is employed. If machine support is not available then a pragmatic 
approach of verification by inspection can be adopted. The conclusions should 
be documented together with an informal argument as to why the schema is 
believed to be consistent as was done for the DACS in Annex D. Such an 
approach gains most of the benefits for the minimum of effort.
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6.17 STRONGER INVARIANT
6.17.1 Introduction
One of the conclusions we can draw from the DACS example is that the 
Analogue_Input2 specification was in some sense malformed. It may be 
syntactically and type correct, and it may satisfy all its consistency 
verifications, but it did not constrain the state, via the invariant, to those 
values that are reachable. This suggests a new consistency verification, that 
a Functional Specification has the strongest possible state invariant.
The difficulty with the Strongest Invariant consistency verification concept is that 
it is higher order. To determine all reachable states it is necessry to consider the 
closure of all operations applied to the state from initialisation. This requires 
quantification over operations, for which a higher order logic is needed. {Strongest 
Invariant cannot be formulated in a first order predicate logic therefore.
6.17.2 Stronger Invariant Method Definition
The fact that a Strongest Invariant Consistency Verification cannot be 
formulated does not mean that the concept has no value or validity. It 
does mean that exploiting the potential of the concept requires greater depth 
of understanding of the particular problem.
The Stronger Invariant concept can be exploited as a method. The practitioner 
needs to:
a) conduct an Informal analysis of the specification to identify unintended 
or potentially unreachable states.
b) formulate possible candidate clauses for addition to the state invariant.
c) Prepare a proof that the revised specification exhibits the same behaviour 
as the original where behaviour must be preserved.
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6.17.3 Identification of Unintended States
Unintended states arise because there are relationships between the identifiers 
in the state schema. These relationships mean that the identifiers are not 
completely independent, and hence only a subset of the values in their cross 
product are possible. Identification of unintended states can therefore be 
effected by working through the identifiers in the state schema systematically, 
and considering any intended relationships.
There is no necessity for relationships between state variables to exist. For 
Real_WorIdl no link between state variables is intended, and hence 
consideration of strengthening the invariant is pointless in this case.
In the case of DACS, alarm-check„req = false fixed the value of alarm to 
safe, but left alarm and an_value independent. However, with alarm_check_req 
= true alarm was dependent on an_value. This illustrates that it is 
important to consider the full range of each identifier when trying to identify 
unintended states.
6.17.4 Formulation of Invaraint Candidates
The DACS example illustrates two approaches to the formulation of possible 
candidate clauses for addition to the state invariant:
a) Directly.
b) By moving clauses from the post condition.
Having found a relationship between identifiers it may be readily apparant 
how this should be formulated. In the case of DACS db_inv[Analogue_Input2] 
was formulated directly by writing out the intended relationship.
The candidate clause for addition to  the state invariant, split2[Analogue_Input2], 
was identified as being an expression in the post condition that could be moved 
to the state invariant. Such an approach is only possible where the same 
expression appears in all operation post conditions, a situation fulfilled by the 
special case of only a single operation that changes the state. If the specification 
has such an expression rj ,^ then it can be moved to the state invariant if:
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a) it is connected by conjunction
b) it contains only dashed variables and constants
c) it is established by initialisation.
The justification for moving a clause from the post condition to the invariant 
provided for split[Analogue__Input2] is general.
6.17.5 Behaviour Proof
During the preparation of a specification from scratch there is no requirement 
to prove that behaviour is unchanged. One simply uses the Stronger Invariant 
method to ensure that the state Invariant is strong during the production of 
the initial specification. Nor is a proof required where the Stronger Invariant 
method has identified an error in the specification, since different behaviour 
is then needed.
When dealing with a pre-existing product, behaviour is fixed. Assuming that 
the behaviour of the starting specification is representative of the product 
then any modification of the specification must preserve behaviour and a 
proof is required.
6.17.6 Scope
It was not the intention to scope the possible techniques that can be used 
to exploit the Stronger Invariant concept. It is accepted that while the DACS 
example may have been very good at illustrating many of the ideas, the 
techniques may be highly specific to the case.
6.17.7 Effect of Strongest Invariant
The use of the Stronger Invariant method results in an improvement in the 
form of the specification since it manifests properties that are invariant, 
hence providing a deeper insight into the behaviour of the specification.
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A stronger invariant is a property of a specification as a whole, not of a 
schema in isolation. This arises beacuse changing, adding or removing an 
operation may affect the set of reachable states and hence the invariant. So 
while syntax and type checking is dealing with individual expressions, and 
the consistency verifications with individual schemas, stronger invariants is 
addressing the specification as a whole.
6.17.8 Conclusions
During the preparation of a specification there will be states that are not 
reachable though permitted. Often this is not a coincidence, the unreachable 
states are unintended states. In these cases there is a strong justification 
for seeing if the invariant can be strengthened to eliminate these unintended 
states. The benefits offered by this technique are:
a) Strengthenting the State Invariant is a general purpose technique like type 
checking and the standard consistency verifications, and can be applied to any 
situation where there are unintended states.
b) Establishing that a specification has a property is particularly simple if 
the property is expressed as a State Invariant, This is because proof of its 
preservation is automatic on discharge of the standard consistency verifications.
c) The investigation of unintended states provides insight into the actual trace 
behaviour of a specification.
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6.18 STRUCTURE AND STYLE
6.18.1 Introduction
The notations allow great flexibility in how a specification is constructed 
which gives the specifier freedom of approach. However, some approaches will 
prove more ammenable to the subsequent intended use of the specification, 
such as a behavioural property proof. In this section the ideas of separation 
of concerns and building the model to support the proof are investigated by 
considering the cases that arise in the DACS example. These are:
a) Configuration and Runtime Data
b) Specialisation
c) Functionality and trace Properties
d) Trace Properties and Timing Relationships
e) Safety Proof Layering.
6.18.2 Configuration and Runtime Data
The separation of the quickly changing and slowly changing data in a 
system is a generally accepted idea. This has been done for DACS with the 
Analogue_Inputl_Conf schema providing the configuration state and the 
Analogue_Inputl schema defining the runtime state in the context of the 
configuration state.
One of the key outputs from the modelling exercise for DACS is a complete 
set of constraints on the configuration parameters. Which ones are completely 
free within their type, which constrained, and which fixed in value. The 
configuration parameters are the focus of the DACS modelling. By contrast, 
the runtime state is only of passing interest to the Safety Proof, though it 
is of course critical to the operation of the system.
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6.18.3 Specialisation
Once Analogue-Input was given its final form it was specialised for the 
application before use was made of it. The effect of fixing alarm_check_req 
was a reduction in both the size and complexity of the resulting schemas 
which has an impact on all subsequent use of these.
DACS also illustrates the effect of not making appropriate specialisations. The 
part of the safety proof dealing with the correspondence between region and 
alarm fails, and one is forced to introduce the needed constraints to continue.
6.18.4 Functional and Trace Properties
The mathematical framework for DACS has two levels, the Time Stamped
Traces and the Schuman-Pitt specifications. This would lead one to expect
two parts to the safety proof, with each part addressing one of these levels. 
This is what we find, with stage 1, the Proof of Correspondence, being at 
the Schuman-Pitt level. This stage of the proof is essentially answering the 
question as to the constraints on the configuration parameters that are needed 
to ensure Analogue Input has the correct functionality for the application.
The Schuman-Pitt level has all the algorithm complexity of the two conversion
formulae and those for the derivation of alarm. None of this complexity is 
visible once we start working at the Time Stamped Trace level. So, the 
structuring pays off.
6.18.5 Trace Properties and Timing Relationships
The safety requirement RTSR has elements of both trace behaviour and of time. 
The trace property is that after a transition into an unsafe region the next 
operation will be an Alert. The timing part of RTSR then places an additional 
relationship on this trace behaviour. For the DACS the proof that the trace 
properties will be met is handled in stage 3 of the proof. Notice that it is 
performed completely independently of the timing aspects which are treated 
in stage 4 of the proof.
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Handling trace behaviour independently of timing relationships is clearly a 
useful separation of concerns. It did not happen by accident. The Alert(hi) 
is allowed to occur up to safe_delay seconds beyond the tr(s)(i) 
occurrence, so the trace could be extended for at least that period of 
time. In fact the impact of Pre_empt on the trace structure has been exploited 
in the formulation of RTSR, which results in the trace only needing to be 
extended to the next Sample. There may be alternative scheduling algorithms 
that do not meet RTSR yet are still safe. These would have to satisfy the more 
general formulation which would replace the tr(s)(k) = Sample with an event 
tr(s)(k) at least safe_delay seconds after tr(s)(i):
{s : seq S | V i, j, k •  (l < i < j < k < #s
A ((tKs)(i) = Sample(safe) v tr(s)(i) = Sample(lo)) a  tr(s)(j) = Sample(hi)
A -1 (3 p # i <p<j  A tr(s)(p)€ Sample)
A time„stamp(s(k)) - time_stamp(s(i)) > safe_delay)
=» (3 1 : j..k •  tr(s)(l) = Alert(hi)
A time_stamp(s(l)) + duration(tr(s)(l)) -  time_stampt(s(i)) < safe_delay))}
In this version time is not completely separated from the trace behaviour. The 
version of RTSR used was carefully crafted in order to gain separation. It is 
an example of building the model to support the proof.
6.18.6 Safety Proof Layering
The DACS safety proof is performed in a number of layers rather than all 
in one go. The objective is to undertake the various parts of the proof in 
such a way as to simplify the whole proof. The layers are:
a) Specialisation
b) Functional layer
c) Link between levels of mathematical framework established
d) Trace layer
e) Timing layer
-  174 -
The DACS is first specialised to the application in order to reduce the 
complexity that is carried through the proof. The Schuman-Pitt level proof is 
then performed. This is stage 1 of the proof, and deals with the functional 
aspects. Axioms 5.2 and 5.3 provide the links between the two levels in the 
mathematical framework. This is not a sufficient linkage for the safety proof, 
and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 were needed to establish how the Schuman-Pitt level 
model impacts the Time Stamped Trace level model. The Lemmas focus on 
the scheduling aspects of the DACS operations. Given the Lemmas it is then 
possible to address the Trace properties at stage 3 before considering the 
timing aspects at stage 4,
In summary, it is helpful if the proof can be performed in stages where a 
single concern is being addressed. DACS demonstrates the feasibility of this 
for the case example.
6.18.7 Conclusion
We have seen how, for the DACS example, the ideas of separation of concerns 
and building the model to support the proof add structure to the formulation. 
The structuring aids the clarity of the formulation, and simplifies the proof.
Structuring can clearly help in the use of formal models, but the practitioner 
should ask where the structuring pays off when he decides to introduce some. 
If the structuring does not pay off, then it is just style.
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6.19 STEP 5 - SOLVE THE MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM
6.19.1 Introduction
In this step the mathematical form of the problem is solved. This step is "just" 
a matter of symbol manipulation and is entirely in the Mathematical Domain.
There are a number of insights that can be gained from the DACS example:
a) The problems with Time
b) The value of structuring
c) Linking the Mathematical Framework levels
d) E3q>Icitation of symmetry.
Time was discussed in section 6.2 and structuring in 6.18.
6.19.2 Linking Levels
The mathematical system has two levels, the Schuman-Pitt level and the Time 
Stamped Trace level. Axioms 5.2 and 5.3 provide the linkage between these 
levels as part of the mathematical framework. Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 provide the 
causal linkage between the levels for the case specific model, and the safety 
proof is based upon these.
Real_Worldl is the model of the real world. Real-World 2 was not produced 
as an improvement in the form of Real-World 1 as had been done for the 
DACS. Rather, Real_World2 captures the functional part of the safety 
requirement dealing with the detection of the region. In that sense the extra 
mechanisms in Real_World2 are part of the specification of the safety 
requirement. It is like a test point, and is not really part of the real world. Thus 
RTSR has a formulation at both levels.
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Another aspect of the linkage between the levels is achieved via parameter 
passing. Both Sample and Alert have output parameters, but neither of these 
have any use at the Schuman-Pitt level. They are there to make needed values 
available to the Time Stamped Trace level. Indeed, so critical is this to the 
success of the entire model that it is built into the mathematical framework. 
It is the reason that the set of events is F and not E.
6,19.3 Exploitation of Symmetry
For the DACS example, the symmetry between the hi and lo cases is worth 
noting. This has been exploited so that only a formulation for the hi case is 
given. The lo case can then be formed by substituting "lo" for "hi", and vice versa.
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6.20 STEP 6 - INTERPRET RESULTS
6.20.1 Introduction
In this step the transition from the mathematical domain back to the problem 
domain is made. One needs to look at the results of solving the mathematical 
problem and see what they mean in the problem domain. If the results do not 
make sence in the problem domain then the model probably is in error, and 
modifications are needed to it. Hence one needs to return to earlier steps and 
iterate the modelling process. Alternatively, the results may be generally valid, 
but indicate that additional assumptions or limitations need to be imposed to 
achieve general validity.
6.20.2 Model Validation
Considerable effort should have been investigated during steps 2 and 3 to 
ensure that the model is valid. However, the actual validation of the model 
is only possible once it has been constructed and is generating results.
Validation is necessarily informal. The model is a mathematical theory about 
the behaviour of the system, and hence all one is able to do is refute the 
hypothesis that it correctly models the behaviour of the real world system. 
Validation could be effected by a variety of means including animation of 
the model, but the main technique will be the use of test cases. Often the 
way to generate test cases is to perform experiments in the real world to 
provide data on the actual performance to compare with the model.
6.20.3 Model Verification
It is necessary to return to the informal specification and verify that all the 
problem has been addressed. For DACS there is nothing explicitly in either the 
formulation or the proof that deals with initialisation, yet this is an explicit 
situation in the informal specification of the problem. Hence, part of the 
process of interpreting the results is to check that this special case is also 
covered by the general result.
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6.20.4 Model Acceptability
The key output of this step is the decision whether to accept the model and 
the results it produces, or to rework the model by iterating the earlier steps.
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6.21 STEP 7 - RESULTS
6.21.1 Introduction
Assuming that any proof or interpretation problems has been resolved then 
one has new information or insights about the problem domain. One also has 
greater confidence in the understanding of the problem domain, The results 
of modelling can therefore be used to make their contribution to the overall 
safety of the system. This step is entirely within the Problem Domain.
6.21.2 Proof Feedback
In addition to the required results, that were the reason that the modelling 
exercise was undertaken, other results may be generated. We have already 
seen the ability of the Consistency Verification to find errors in a specification, 
and how the Stronger Invariant ideas provide greater insight into the behaviour 
of the system. Here we consider the nature of the feedback that the safety 
proof itself yields.
The stage 1 of the proof stalls, and requires extra constraints between 
configuration parameters. There were also problem with the deadbands which 
were discussed in section 5.25. Finally, a relationship between safe_delay and 
sample_delay was discovered. Hence the feedback took the following forms:
a) An additional constriant is identified
b) A conflict between the assumptions and formulation is identified, resulting 
in the removal of an unnecessary limitation.
c) A previously unidentified relationship is discovered.
It is natural, when thinking about a system to focus on typical or interesting 
cases. By contrast, formal modelling covers all the cases. This results in the 
identification of required constraints and relationships that were not part of 
ones original intuition. A significant output from the modelling process are 
these previously unidentified constraints and relationships. So, although one 
may feel dismay when a proof fails or stalls because another obstruction has 
appeared, it is a potentially valuable insight that needs further investigation. 
Ultimately these are why the modelling is undertaken.
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6.22 PRAGMATIC DIFFICULTIES
6.22.1 Introduction
So far this chapter has been considering the feasibility and tractability of 
Formal Modelling. The main theme of the chapter has been how adopting the
modelling cycle method can aid the process, In order to ensure a balanced view
the chapter is concluded from a different perspective. In this section the 
difficulties and challenge of adopting Formal Modelling is considered. These are:
a) Training and Tools
b) Validity
c) Mastering the Mathematics
d) Mastering the Techniques
e) Application Domain Problems
f) Case Specific Challenges.
6.22.2 Training and Tools
There are now many Formal Notations and Formal Systems that can be 
employed to support Safety Critical Systems in a variety of ways. Much effort 
has been invested to develop Formal Methods and to demonstrate that 
the mathematics is tractable. Practice has focused on the preparation of 
specifications and proof. The practical difficulties are much cited (see chapter 
2) such as the need for training and the lack of tool support.
6.22.3 Validity
The focus here has been on the use of Formal Methods for requirements 
validation. Whilst acknowledging the challenge of mastering Formal Methods, 
and the effort needed to employ them without tool support the main area of 
difficulty encountered was in identifying and addressing the assumptions and 
limitations of the model. This aspect of Formal Modelling does not seem to 
be one that the literature or standards Initiatives have addressed. This seems 
to be because the emphasis of Formal Methods has been on their use as a 
software development method. That is in identification of errors in the 
development of the software, rather than in the starting specification.
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6.22.4 Mastering the Mathematics
Some of the problems of limitations of the model originate in the 
mathematics. The practitioner mnst master such fundamentals as the 
expressive power limitations of the notations. Only then can the limitations 
such as the inability to define F the set of events, formulate the strongest 
invariant, or the relationship between concurrency and interleaved semantics 
be understood. There are issues of the level of abstraction that need to be 
addressed. Specifically whether a full specification is to be used or a more 
abstract, and hence less detailed, model developed.
6.22.5 Mastering the Techniques
The following is the list of Formal Methods Techniques employed for the 
DACS example:
a) Two state based notations, Schuman-Pitt and Z
b) Time Stamped Traces
c) First Order Logic and Proof
d) Composition of Schemas
e) Linking state based and trace level notations
f) Interleaved Semantics
g) Consistency Verification
h) Stronger Invariant
i) Parametric Specifications and Specialisation 
j) Reachable and Unreachable States
k) Mathematical Modelling and the Modelling Cycle 
1) Axioms
m) Formal Specification 
n) Abstraction 
o) Trace Properties 
p) Time Properties 
q) Property Proofs
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AU of these were deployed formally within a single mathematical framework 
to solve a single problem. In some ways it demonstrates the power, scope 
and applicability of Formal Methods. It also shows that the Formal Methods 
techniques span a considerable range which must be mastered.
6.22.6 Application Domain Problems
When preparing a model the work here has shown that one encouters 
application domain problems such as deadbands, sampling and timing 
relationships, Although familiar to the practitioner, their formal treatment 
is unfamiliar. Traditionally the practitioner will identify such problems as 
technical risks, know the rules of thumb and general practice for their 
solution, and will typically plan extensive testing, trials and proving as part 
of the risk management approach. What the practitioner probably does not 
have is a fundamental, theoretic understanding of these problems, but that is 
what their Formal treatment will necessitate. In the long term this is good 
because of the improved understanding and insight that formalisation brings. 
In the short term handling these problems is both challenging and time 
consuming, and hence has a significant impact on the developement of a model.
6.22.7 Case Specific Challenges
It is worth pointing out that the DACS example is not large, and not complex 
in some ways, yet still presented considerable challenges.
The effort involved in improving the form of the original Analogue-Input 
specification in Z was non trivial. Improvements resulting from the Consistency 
verification were crucial in that the original Z specification was shown to be 
malformed. The Z specification defined the alarm derivation in terms of the 
three output cases lo, safe and hi. The Stronger Invariant work showed that 
input cases would be considerably more tractable.
The timing property was quite simple, yet handling time was non trivial.
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No single notation could handle the DACS case. Hence the Mathematical 
Framework employs a combination of two notations to solve the single problem. 
It is quite typical to need a state based notation and a Time Stamped Trace 
notation. Alot of work is needed to build the links between these two levels.
6.22.8 Conclusions
Formal Methods are powerful and have wide applicability. The main drawback 
is the breadth of what must be mastered, and the technical depth of its 
mathematical basis. Before employing Formal Modelling to address a problem, 
one therefore needs to answer the question: "what is the value that Formal 
Modelling offers?" Fundamentally, Formal Modelling should be reducing, not 
increasing programme risk.
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7. B A C K G R O U N D  R E F L E C T IO N
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we return to the broad Issues of the relationship of Formal 
Methods to Safety. Two issues are considered:
a) The relationship between the Formal Modelling technique as demonstrated 
in chapter S and the traditional safety analyses.
b) The nature of the role that Formal Methods in general can play within 
the Safety discipline.
However, we start by returning to some of the ideas considered in chapter 2 
to see how the work performed in this study contributes.
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7.2 INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH BACKGROUND
7.2.1 Introduction
Whilst not particularly the goal of this study, the work has resulted in 
some insight to a number of topics covered in the chapter on Research 
Background. The topics are:
a) Engineering Judgement
b) Separation of Concerns
c) Mathematics, Science and Safety
d) Mathematical Modelling and Formal Modelling.
7.2.2 Engineering Judgement
In chapter 2 of this report the impact of the human designer on system 
dependability was considered. (Littlewood, 1993) made his point that expert 
engineering judgement tended to be biased to be too optomistic unless aided 
by a framework that checked for such errors.
For Formal Modelling the concern is that the apparant certainty of mathematical 
proofs, particularly when machine checked, will belie the relevance and validity 
of the results to the real world situation. The significance of the work 
undertaken is that it demonstrates use of such a framework, the Modelling 
Cycle, which can be used to counteract these problems.
7.2.3 Separation of Concerns
It has been argued (Canning 1994), (Malcolm 1992) that a parametric product 
offers a form of abstraction or separation of concerns by allowing the generic 
product to be considered independently of any application specific configuration 
(see chapter 2). Viewing the DACS Modelling as dealing with the generic case, 
and the concrete example as the application specific configuration then the 
DACS example illustrates this separation. However, during the DACS Modelling 
and Safety Proof no separation between the generic product and the 
parameterisation was observed. On the contrary, parameterisation and
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functionality are intimately entwined. Separation of concerns was possible during 
the Modelling, for example the deadbands were considered independently of 
any other aspect of the DACS. However, in considering deadbands both 
the functionality and parameterisation are treated together. So, it is clear that 
one needs to be careful about making claims for separation of the consideration 
of the generic product from its parameterisation.
7.2.4 Mathematics. Science and Safety
In section 6.13 of this report axioms were considered, and this included the 
possible relationship between Mathematics, Science and Safety in Formal 
Modelling. Mathematics is providing the overall framework within which the 
concepts of interest are formulated. The scientific framework, such as time 
or Newton's Laws of Motion, can then be added to the system as axioms of the 
system. What marks the model as one potentially about safety as opposed to 
security, financial or any other application, is the Application Domain Problems, 
and the behavioural properties of interest.
7.2.5 Mathematical Modelling and Formal Modelling
The main difference between the Modelling Cycle adopted for the DACS 
example and discussed in chapter 6, and the Modelling Flow Chart of Chapter 
2 is the explicit step for setting up the mathematical framework. This has 
been done because the Formal System is a choice for Formal Modelling. We 
have already discussed that the expressive and cognitive power of the various 
systems are different, and that there is currently no one Formal System that 
handles all aspects well. Hence one needs to be thoughtful when choosing 
the framework because the choice will have consequences.
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7,3 FORMAL MODELLING AND TRADITIONAL SAFETY ANALYSES
7.3.1 Introduction
In this section a comparison is made between the use of Formal Modelling 
as illustrated by the DACS case example, and traditional safety analyses. The 
points covered are: •
a) Systematic Failures
b) Proof verses Case Analysis
c) Manipulation
d) Basic Events
e) Completeness
f) Duality
g) Criticality Analysis.
7.3.2 Systematic Failures
The basis of FTA, FMEA, FMECA and ETA is an analysis of the failure 
consequences of the control system and plant, and traditionally this analysis is 
applied only to the random hardware failures. The assumption is that there 
are no systematic errors, so these analyses are not trying to discover 
unsafe situations in the fully functioning system.
Formal Modelling is addressing systematic failures by scoping the domain of 
safe operation. The DACS case example shows that the specification of 
the artifact's functionality is adequate for the task, which gives confidence that 
systematic errors resulting from incorrect or missing functionality cannot occur.
7.3.3 Proof Verses Case Analysis
A significant difficulty for the traditional analyses is handling the generality 
of the situations. Where there are a managable number of discrete cases then 
provided these are all identified the traditional approaches are adequate.
However, in other cases the situation may not be handled satisfactorily.
For example, HAZOP makes use of check lists which include such guide
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words as "reverse flow". However, this flow could be very slow through to 
extremely rapid. Hence "reverse flow" is not necessarily a single case yet is 
being treated as one. The assumption is made that all cases of reverse flow 
will share the same basic behaviour. Formal Modelling does not force one 
to make such assumptions. Formal Modelling will aim to build a model that 
covers the complete range and then treat with this by mathematical manipulation. 
Hence Formal Modelling is far better able to deal with all situations because 
it is based on a proof that covers multiple ranges of values.
7.3.4 Manipulation
A HAZOP analysis, for example, relies on people having a model of the plant
and process in their heads with the manipulation of the model to determine a
consequence necessarily being informal. With Formal Modelling the manipulation 
of the model is both explicit and formal, and hence more open to scrutiny 
and more reliable.
7.3.5 Basic Events
When conducting an FTA one tends to end up with basic events such as 
"software fails to perform its function correctly", which is not a circumstance 
that can be addressed within the traditional analysis itself. Hence such 
systematic failures are left as "Basic Events". For HAZOP, as for FTA, knowing 
what the plant may do under a given circumstance may be down to a detailed 
definition of the behaviour of the software. Where software behaviour is 
simple then the HAZOP can deal with this. If it is complex then it will be too 
difficult to treat informally and Formal Modelling is the only current technique 
able to treat this effectively. That is to say that Formal Modelling provides a 
framework for a full treatment of complex digital functionality whereas 
engineering judgement may gloss over the details. Hence there are real benefits 
from the integration of Formal Modelling into the traditional safety analyses.
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7.3.6 Completeness
FMEA and FMECA are based on taking each component in turn and considering 
each failure mode and determining the end effect. It is possible to be completely 
systematic with this appraoch, and so FMEA and FMECA are not considered to 
suffer from the problem of missed cases, or completeness. ETA is only applied 
to selected failures so again the completeness problem is not an issue.
The main weakness of FTA and HAZOP is completeness. Checklists and similar 
techniques help, but ultimately the analyst either identifies a contributing 
failure or possible deviation or the analysis is incomplete, and hence very 
probably flawed. Formal Modelling also sufferes from a completeness problem, 
but with Formal Modelling it is completeness of assumptions, limitations, etc. 
not completeness of identified cases. Hence Formal Modelling is in this sense 
complementary to FTA and HAZOP.
7.3.7 Duality
There is an element of duality between the traditional analyses and Formal 
Modelling. The traditional analyses aim to bound safe operation by identification 
of all unsafe cases. By contrast Formal Modelling aims to show the set of 
situations in which safety is met. As a result Formal Modelling identifies 
assumptions, limitations and constraints that the control system must meet.
Hence the Formal Modelling for the DACS example yields:
a) Correct configuration (Constraint)
b) Processing time (Constraint)
c) Correct installation (Assumption)
d) Sampling rate (Limitation).
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7.3.8 Criticality Analysis
A Formal Model will yield assumptions, limitations and constraints, but it 
will not of itself determine the criticality of violating one of these since 
criticality is about real world consequences. One can, of course, apply a
Criticality Analysis to the output of a Formal Model, and Formal Modelling
will support investigation of the consequences of not meeting one of the 
criteria such as a configuration parameter slightly wrong.
7.3.9 Overall Conclusions
Formal Modelling has a number of strenghts in areas where the traditional 
safety analyses are weak:
a) Formal Modelling addresses systematic errors particularly for complex 
digital or software based components,
b) Proof lets one treat with a large space of possibilities without missing the 
special cases. If a full enumeration of cases is too difficult then an informal 
analysis degenerates into a taxonomy of those cases the analyst perceives to 
be worthy of his attention, with a real possibility of missing critical cases.
c) Formality has the potential for greater confidence in the results of an 
analysis than informal techniques.
One needs to recognise that Formal Modelling is an additional technique, not 
a replacement for the traditional safety analyses. It tackles the problem from 
a different direction being focused on correct functionality not failure modes. 
It can therefore be used as an analysis technique in its own right at the 
same level as the other analyses. In addition, it can be used to support 
FTA and HAZOP with a full treatment of complex software or digital based 
functionality that would otherwise be treated as a "basic event" or single 
case. Overall the conclusion is that Formal Modelling is both 
supplementary and complementary to the traditional safety techniques, and 
there is considerable value in a close integration of Formal Modelling into 
the traditional safety analysis process.
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7.4 FORMAL METHODS AND SAFETY
7.4.1 Introduction
In this section we return to the question of the relationship between formal 
methods and safety. Specifically to the question of the role formal methods 
play and where they fit into the overall safety scene.
7.4.2 Role of Formal Methods
Chapter 2 basically concluded that formal methods mainly address system 
development, particularly specification and its validation, and software 
development. Its role is in addressing systematic errors as opposed to random 
hardware failures. However, this is not the complete picture:
a) Gorski (1994) was using formal methods to formalise traditional safety 
hazard analysis techniques.
b) The DACS example is not about system development either, but qualification 
of a pre-existing product.
c) Section 6.22.5 of this report lists the large number of formal method 
techniques employed in the DACS case.
d) A recent trend is to consider linking formal methods with existing informal or 
structured techniques. For example, Polack (1992) has investigated the potential 
for introducing Z into SSADM version 4 (Structured Systems Analysis and 
Design Method) to formalise the Entity Relationship Diagram. In that case 
the intent was to start the process of providing a formal basis for a structured 
method and to enhance the system analysis precision. Halang and Kramer (1992) 
have been formalizing the informal notations such as ladder diagrams used to 
program programmable logic controllers (PLC) in the process industries. Another 
example is the formalization of a CORE requirement (Moulding and Smith, 1992).
Our conclusion must be that formal methods are not a single method 
or technique.
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Prior to the introduction of formal methods the main areas of safety that 
were mathematized were:
a) The treatment of random hardware failures
b) Risk assessment.
Formal methods is a technology that permits the mathematization of many 
additional aspects. Of course the obvious examples are requirements engineering 
and software development, but their use to formalise traditional hazard analysis 
techniques (e.g. Gorski, 1994) points the way to many further initiatives. Indeed 
one can see (e.g. Bradley et al, 1993) the intention to integrate both the system 
developement and safety analysis aspects within a single mathematical framework.
Overall the conclusion is that formal methods are a fundamental enabling 
technology that permits the mathematization of a wide new class of safety 
related issues.
7.4.3 Informality. Mathematization and Ouantification
In chapter 2 of this report the dichotomy between Quantitative and 
Qualitative treatment of safety was discussed. It is the author's f^rception 
that the qualitative should be split into the informal, such as engineering 
judgement, and the mathematical, such as formal methods, A situation can be 
precisely characterised mathematically without the form of the characterisation 
being numeric. Even in cases where a problem is solved numerically, such as 
partial differential equations, the result is a tabulation not a single value. 
Indeed, the preferred solution would be an analytic one, a set of equations, 
not a tabulation of approximate values at a grid of points. The point is that 
quantification is a way of mathematization, but it is certainly not the only one 
and is not appropriate in many cases. The real difference would seem to be 
between the mathematical, whether numeric or not, and the informal. So, while 
acknowledging that safety assessments of systems should ideally be 
quantitative, the aim should be for the progressive mathematization of safety. 
For the author this is an act of faith since this is how other science and 
engineering disciplines have developed.
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8. C O N C L U S I O N S
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this piece of work was to take the idea of using Formal 
Methods as a Validation technique, and apply it to safety. This was achieved 
by integrating the Modelling Cycle with Formal Methods techniques to 
provide a Formal Modelling method. The feasibility and tractability of the 
method is demonstrated by the DACS case example.
The other objective was to contrast the Formal Modelling method with 
traditional safety analyses. The aim was to establish the relationship between 
these thus identifying the role that Formal Modelling can best play.
The aim of this concluding chapter is to look back at the work performed 
and summarise what has been achieved.
8.2 FORMAL MODELLING METHOD
The Formal Modelling Method is defined in chapter 6. This exploits the 
Modelling Cycle to address the validity problem. Considerable help is 
available from a variety of pre-existing Formal Methods techniques, such as 
Formal Notations, Proof and Consistency Verification, which is worth 
exploiting. The work shows these can be readily integrated into the 
Modelling Cycle to produce an overall method that can be further extended 
or modified as required. Chapter 6 shows where in the Modelling Cycle 
the various techniques can be employed.
The work performed on the DACS specification, verification and safety proof 
is given in chapter S. The example stayed close to the original problem and 
was not simplified to make the problem more tractable. It demonstrates 
the feasibility of the Formal Modelling Method illustrating how a thoughtful 
approach can exploit the method to maximise the benefit.
-  194 -
Many of the aspects of the DACS example are not case specific, but recurrent 
problems within the application domain. These application domain problems 
are examples of the kind of problem that needs to be dealt with, which the 
purest view of formal methods would not have lead one to expect. Given the 
nature of the case example, these are particularly relevant to real time 
monitoring and control situations, and give the contribution its safety 
emphasis. Sections 6.2 to 6.7 discussed these as general problems, covering 
the particular difficulties they pose, and how they can be treated.
The case example highlights the actual difficulties encountered in application. 
While the difficulties should not be under estimated, the work here shows they 
can be overcome. These are discussed in section 6.22.
Overall the effect of the work is to pull together the available help from its 
disparate sources to define a Formal Modelling method which exploits the 
power of the mathematics and has wide applicability.
8.3 FORMAL MODELLING AND TRADITIONAL SAFETY ANALYSES
In chapter 7 the relationship between traditional safety analyses and Formal 
Modelling was analysed. This showed that there are many signifcant differences. 
It was recognised that Formal Modelling provides a new technique for 
validation. In particular its ability to handle situations where all cases 
must be addressed means that it is able to deal with systematic failures in 
a way quite unlike any other technique. Overall the conclusion is that Formal 
Modelling is both supplementary and complementary to the traditional 
safety techniques, and there is considerable value in a close integration of 
Formal Modelling into the traditional safety analysis process.
In summary, the message from this work is to practitioners. In the past 
Formal Methods were over sold and are currently under used (McDermid, 
1992). The message from this work is that the use of Formal Modelling is 
both feasible and tractable, and offers benefits not provided by other techniques.
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8.4 FORMAL METHODS AND SAFETY
In chapters 2 and 7 the relationship between Formal Methods generally 
and safety was considered. The conclusion reached was that Formal Methods 
are a fundamental enabling technology that permits the mathematization of 
a wide new class of safety related issues.
8.5 FURTHER WORK
8.5.1 Introduction
There are a number of possibilities for further work:
a) Integration of further techniques
b) Identifying and documenting other Application Domain Problems
c) Extending the DACS case example with a watch dog mechanism
d) Use of the Method with other Mathematical Frameworks
e) Automation
f) Broader issues.
8.5.2 Integration of Further Techniques
The method can be extended to include further Formal Methods techniques. 
For example, the work on Stronger Invariant focused on unintended states 
but unsafe states is a somewhat different perspective. Hence an investigation 
of the reachability of unsafe states would provide further insight into the 
safety of the system.
8.5.3 Application Domain Problems
The most obvious way of furthering the work performed here is the use of 
the method on other problems. This will have the effect of formalising 
more application domain problems.
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8.5.4 Watch Dog Mechanism
One application domain problem studied but not included in this report was 
the addition of a watch dog mechanism to the DACS case example.
A machine should have a circuit called a watch dog that the software has 
to trigger periodically if its status output is to remain in the good state 
(Patent: GB 2013366 General Signal), (Patent: GB 2015774 General Signal), 
(Patent: US 4263647 Allen Bradley). The software is programmed to stop 
triggering its watch dog if the internal test routines detect a fault, but the 
watch dog will revert to the fail state for more serious faults also such 
as processor failure or loss of power.
At the end of the chapter 5 it had been established that there was nothing 
preventing DACS from meeting the real time safety requirement RTSR. However, 
it is not possible to prove that it actually does satisfy RTSR because the 
maximum time the DACS may take is unbounded. Logically this arises because 
the semantics are only that events may happen, not that they must happen. 
Practically the reason could be that the DACS system has broken down. To 
overcome this problem a watch dog mechanism can be introduced to 
monitor DACS and output a "system fall" if it detects that DACS has failed.
Consideration of the watch dog will require an iteration round the modelling 
cycle, as clearly a new requirement is being addressed. We will find 
immediately that the current mathematical framework is not adequate since 
the watch dog represents a third concurrent process. However, the same 
technique as used with the DACS and the Real World can be repeated with 
the watch dog and the DACS, A model can be built based just on the watch 
dog's view of the DACS. The watch dog has no interest in any other aspect 
of the DACS and in particular, the DACS' interaction with the Real World. In 
effect the mathematical framework will incorporate two independent views: a 
DACS/Real World view and a watch dog/DACS view. These two views cannot 
be composed into a single overall model without reverting to the more general 
approach of multiple concurrent traces because each view is of a genuinely 
autonomous process.
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The assumptions and limitations will need to be reconsidered. Certainly the 
effect of the watch dog on the DACS timing must be addressed.
A formulation for the watch dog at the Schuman-Pitt level will be needed, 
and it will also be necessary to modify the DACS formulation to interact with 
the watch dog. As with the DAC/Real World case, it will then be necessary 
to compose the watch dog and DACS to produce a Schuman-Pitt level 
specification with just a single trace of events.
The new safety property is that either DACS complies with RTSR or the watch 
dog outputs "system fail". Clearly the watch dog aspects, being new, will need 
a safety proof constructed for them. However, the compliance of the DACS with 
RTSR is already established, and it should be possible to reuse this proof.
The motivation for the inclusion of the watch dog is that the proof in 
chapter 5 only succeeded in establishing that there was nothing preventing 
DACS from complying with the real time safety requirement RTSR, it did not 
prove that DACS must comply. By adding a watch dog the intention is to 
be able to prove that either the system meets RTSR, or the watch dog 
outputs system-fail. Of course, exactly the same problem as last time will 
be encountered. The fact that the watch dog's precondition is true only means 
it can proceed, not that it must, and since the watch dog may itself fail 
there is a real possibility that it will not proceed. If there is a total failure 
of the watch dog this will dead lock DACS even in those situations where 
DACS would otherwise have continued safely monitoring the plant. Clearly 
yet another mechanism could be added to detect watch dog failures, but 
that could also fail. This is a situation where one can go on reducing the 
logical failure possibilities, without ever being able to show they have 
been totally removed.
In conclusion, the addition of a watch dog mechanism to the DACS case 
example would do more than just demonstrate the use of another application 
domain mechanism. It would show how to extent the technique of working 
with a single trace dispite having multiple concurrent processes. It would 
also reinforce the point already encountered that there are limits as to what 
can be proved regarding the complete removal of the logical failure modes 
of the system.
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8.5.5 Other Mathematical Frameworks
The fact that the DACS example could have been formulated in a subset of 
the Gorski model (Gorski, 1994) is insightful. It suggests that a broad range 
of safety related problems may all be able to reuse the same Mathematical 
Framework. The benefits here would be considerable, as for any standard 
engineering documentation.
The modelling cycle could be used with a completely different type of Formal 
System to that used for DACS. The same overall approach could be adopted, 
but the result would be another variant of the Formal Modelling Method.
8.5.6 Automation
Many of the Formal Notations provide tool support in the form of syntax 
directed editors and type checking. Where applicable these need to be 
extended with machine checking of the consistency verifications.
Such tools should be accommodated readily by the method. Whether more 
aspects of the method would benefit from automation is worthy of further 
work.
8.5.7 Broader Issues
One of the current difficulties is the expressive power of the notations, Needing 
to employ more than one notation, and provide the links between these requires 
extra work and training and is disruptive to the thought process. Work on 
improving this aspect of Formal Systems is therefore to be encouraged.
It has been identified that Formal Methods are a fundamental technology 
that can be used to mathematize Safety, and many examples have been 
quoted in this report. A systematic survey of safety should be made to 
identify other opportunities.
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A N N E X  A  
A . D A C S  S P E C IF IC A T IO N  IN  Z
A.1 INTRODUCTION
This Annex gives the initial specification for AnaIogne_Input, which was in the 
Z notation (Spivey 1989b).
A.2 BASIC DEFINITIONS
A number of basic definitions are needed:
[ANALOGUE] - this is the type of identifiers with continuous values resulting 
from sensors with 0 to 10 Volt or 4 to 20mA interfaces, for example.
N - positive integers (0, 1, 2, ...).
B ::= true j false - Boolean values
ALARM ::= lo | safe | hi - the set of alarm states
A.3 SPECIFICATION
A.3.1 Specification Structure
The state for Analogue Input comprises a set of configuration parameters and a 
run time state. First the configuration state is defined and initialised, then the 
runtime state is defined and initialised in the context of the configuration.
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A.3.2 Configuration State
r  Analogue_Input_Conf 
n : N
an>.value_at_restart : ANALOGUE 
input-channel : l..n 
sqroot_req : B 
alarm_check_req : B 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
hi-alarm, 
lo-alarm : ANALOGUE 
pfs, pQ, xfs, Xq : ANALOGUE
deadband ^  0
alarm_check_req = true => (deadband + lo_alarm < hi-alarm - deadband) 
x f s ÿ  X q
A.3.3 Configuration State Initialisation
Configure_Analogue_Input 
AAnalogue-Input-Conf 
n? : N
an_valuc-at„restart? : ANALOGUE 
input-channel? ; l..n 
sqroot_req? : B 
alarm-check_req? : B 
deadband? : ANALOGUE 
hi_alarm?, 
lo-alarm? : ANALOGUE 
pfs?, po?, xfs?, Xq? : ANALOGUE
n ' = n?
an_value_at_restart^ = an-value_at_restart?
input-channel' = input-channel?
sqroot-req' = sqroot_req?
alarm-check-req' = alarm-check_req?
deadband' = deadband?
hi-alarm' = hi-alarm?
lo_alarm' = lo_alarm?
pfs' = pfs?
Po' = Po? xfs' = xfs?
X q ' =: X q ?
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A.3.4 Run Time State and Initialisation 
The run time state comprises two variables: 
-  An_Value_______________
an_value : ANALOGUE 
alarm : ALARM
r Init_Analogue_Input _  
SAnalogue_Input_Conf 
AAn_Value
an_value' = an_value_at_restart 
alarm' = safe
A.3.5 Operation Schemas
The Scan and Annunciate operations are now defined.
j. Annunciate_Analogue_Input 
E Analogue-Input-Conf 
E An-Value 
warning! : ALARM
warning! = alarm
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r  Scan-Analogue_Input___________
SAnaIog«e_Input_Conf
AAn_Value
an_plant_input? : 1. .n ++ ANALOGUE
sqroot_req = true =>
an.value' = (pfs-po)* J  8B..Plwt-i^nt?(inpnt-channell - ^  Z + p^
sqroot_req = false =>
(pfs - pn) * (an-plant-input?(input-channel) -  Xn) . ^ aii-vaiue -  xfs - Xq ^0
(alann_check-req = true =»
(alarm' = lo 4=>
((an-value' < lo_aIarm) v (alarm = lo a  an-value' < Io„alarm + deadband)))
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an_value' > hi„alarm) v (alarm = hi a  an-value' > hi-alarm - deadband)))
A (alarm' = safe <=>
((lo_alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)
V  ((alarm =  safe) a  (lo-alarm < an-value' < hi-alarm)))) )
(alarm_check_req = false =»- (alarm' = safe))
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A N N E X  B
B. C O N S I S T E N C Y  V E R IF IC A T IO N  1
B.1 INTRODUCTION
The Consistency Verifications performed are those defined for the Schuman-Pitt 
notation (Schuman et, al, 1989). For these proofs ANALOGUE is taken as the 
set of real numbers R.
B.2 ANALOGUE-INPUTl-CONF
P Analogue-Inputl_Conf ( n, an-value_at_restart, input-channel, sqroot-req,
alarm-check-req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo-alarm, 
p f s ,  Pq, xfs, X q ) -------------------------------------------------
n : N
an_value_at_restart : ANALOGUE 
input-channel ; l..n 
sqroot-req : B 
alarm_check_req : B 
deadband : ANALOGUE 
hi-alarm, 
lo_alarm : ANALOGUE 
pfs, pQ, xfs, Xq : ANALOGUE 
deadband ^  0 .0
alanu-check-req = true => (deadband + lo-alarm < hi_alarm - deadband) 
x fs  ÿ Xg
invCAnalogue-Inputl-Conf] ^  (n€ N a  an-value_at-restart € ANALOGUE 
A input-channel € l..n a  sqroot_req€ B a  alarm_check_req€ B 
A deadband € ANALOGUE a  hi-alarm € ANALOGUE a  lo-alarm € ANALOGUE 
A pfs € ANALOGUE a  Po € ANALOGUE a  xfs 6  ANALOGUE a  Xq € ANALOGUE) 
A (deadband > 0.0
A alarm-check-req = true => (deadband + io-alarm < hi-alarm - deadband)
A xfs X q )
-  204.
css CAnalogue_Inputl_Conf] = 3 n, an-value_at_restart, input-channel, 
sqroot_req, alarm_check_req, deadband, hi-alarm,lo_alarm,pfs, pQ,xfs,Xq
•  in v[Analogue-Inputl-Conf 3
The Consistency Verification of state consistency is now discharged by showing 
that the Concrete Example in chapter 4 is a model which satisfies css:
n = 20, an-value_at_restart= 15.0, inpnt_channel = 12, sqroot-req = false, 
alarm_check-req = true, deadband = 0.0, hi-alarm = 40.0, lo-alarm = -10.0, 
pfs = 50.0, Po = -10.0, xfs = 4050.0, Xq = 810.0,
I- css [Analogue-Inputl-Conf]
PROOF;
3 20, 15.0, 12, false, true, 0.0, 40.0, -10.0, 50.0, -10.0, 4050.0, 810.0 •  
in V [Analo gue-Inputl -  Conf]
= (2 0  € N A 15.0 € R A 12 € 1..20 a  false € B a  true € B a  0.0 € R a
40.0 €  R A -10.0 €  R A 50.0 €  R a  -10.0 €  R a  4050.0 € R a  810.0 6  r )
a (o > 0  a  true = true => 0.0 - 10,0 <50.0 - 0.0 a  4050.0 ^  8 IO.0 ) p
init [Analogue-Inputl-Conf] & inv'[Analogue_Inputl-Conf]
uii [Analogue-Inputl-Conf] = V n, an-value-at_restart, input-channel, 
sqroot_req, alarm_check„req, deadband, hi_alarm, lo_alarm,pfs, pg,xfs,Xq
•  inV[Analogue-Inputl-Conf] =>- init [Analogue_Inputl-Conf]
The consistency verification for universal instance initialisation is now 
discharged :
PROOF:
init [Analogue-Inputl-Conf] = inv'[Analogue-Inputl-Conf] by definition. Since 
there are no state variables, it follows that inv = invp
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B.3 ANALOGUE_INPUTl
. Analogue-Inputl (n, an-value-at-restart, input-channel, sqroot-req, 
alarm_check_req, deadband, hi-alarm, lo_alarm,
pfs, Pq, xfs, X q ) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analogue-Inputl-Conf (n, an-value-at_restart, input-channel, sqroot-req, 
alarm-check_req, deadband, hi-alarm, lo-alarm, 
pfs, P q ,  xfs, X q )  
an-value : ANALOGUE 
alarm : ALARM
an-value' = an-value_at-restart 
alarm' = safe
inv[Analogue-Inputl]s inv[Analogue-Inputl-Conf]
A an-value € ANALOGUE a  alarm € ALARM
css [Anaiogue-Inputl] = css [Analogue-Inputl-Conf] a  3 an-value, alarm
•  an-value € ANALOGUE a  alarm € ALARM
The Consistency Verification of state consistency is discharged by noting that 
this has already been achieved for css [Analogue_Inputl-Conf], and that 
values of an_value = 15.0 and alarm = safe satify the need to exhibit values 
for the additional variables. There are no mutual dependencies between 
the new variables and the identifiers in css [Analogue-Inputl-Conf]p
init [Analogue-Inputl] = inv '[Analogue_Inpntl]
A (an-value' = an_value-at-restart a  alarm' = safe)
= inv'[Analogue_Inputl_Conf] a  an-value' € ANALOGUE a  alarm' € ALARM 
A (an_value' = an_value_at-restart a  alarm' = safe)
uii [Analogue-Inputl] â uii [Analogue-Inputl-Conf] A Van-value, alarm
•  inv [Analogue-Inputl] => 3 an-value', alarm' # init [Analogue_Inputl]
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The consistency verification for universal instance initialisation is now 
discharged. Since uii has already been shown for AnaIogue_Inputl_Conf it is 
only necessary to deal with the extra variables, and the dependencies between 
the orignial identifiers and these new variables. Since an_.value_at-restart and 
an_value' have the same type then the new variables do not impose any extra 
constraints on the original parameters. The values of an_value' and alarm' 
that are needed for init to be true are "an_value_.at-restart" and "safe" 
respectively. These clearly satisfy the type requirements.
B.4 SCAN
Analogue-Inputl .Scan(an_plant-input)------------------------------------------------
an_plant_input ; l..n -► ANALOGUE
sqroot-req = true =>
an_value' = (pfs-po)* /  an_plMt^!nput(lnput_channellzXo /  +
y  X t  S “ X q
sqroot-req = false =>
, , (pfs - pn) * (an_plant_input( input_channel) - Xn) .an-value' = --------- ---------------
( a la r m - C h e c k - r e q  =  t r u e  =>
( a la r m ' =  l o  <=>
((an_value' < lo-alarm) v (alarm = lo a  an_value' < lo-alarm + deadband))) 
A (alarm' = hi <=>
( ( a n - v a l u e '  > h i - a la r m )  v (a la r m  = h i a  a n - v a lu e '  > h i_ a la r m  -  d e a d b a n d ) ) )  
A (a la r m ' = s a f e  <=>
((lo_alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm - deadband)
V  ((alarm =  safe) a  (lo-alarm < an_value' < hi_alarm)))) )
(alarm-check-req = false => (alarm' = safe))
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pre [Analogue-Inputl .Scan] = iuv [Analogue-Inputl]
A (an-plant-input € 1. .n ANALOGUE) A true
app [Analogue-Inputl .Scan]
6 3 n, an-value-at-restart, input_channel, sqroot_req, alarm_check-req, deadband,
hi-alarm, lo-alarm, pfs, pp, xfs, Xq, an-value, alarm, an-plant-input 
# pre [Analogue-Inputl .Scan]
The consistency verification of applicability is discharged by showing that the 
Concrete Example in chapter 4 is a model for which app holds:
n = 20, an-value_at-restart= IS.O, input-channel = 12, sqroot-req = false, 
alarm_check-req= true, deadband = 0.0, hi-alarm = 40.0, lo_alarm= -10.0, 
pfs = 50,0, Po = -10.0, xfs = 4050,0, Xq = 810.0, an-value = 15.0, alarm = safe, 
an-plant-input = {l»-> 1.0, 2 »-»■ 2.0, 3 3.0, 4 4.0, 5 5.0, 6 6.0,
7 7.0, 8  8.0. 9 9.0, 10 10.0, 11 11,0, 12 2160.0, 13 13.0
14 M. 14.0, 15 15.0, 16 16.0, 17 17.0, 18 18.0, 19 19.0, 20 20.0}
h app [Analogue-Inputl .Scan]
PROOF;
3 20, 15.0, 12. false, true, 0.0. 40.0, -10.0, 50.0, -10.0, 4050.0, 810.0, 15.0, safe,
{l 1.0, 2 •-*■ 2.0, 3 3.0, 4 4.0, 5 5.0, 6 6.0, 7 ^  7.0, 8  f-»- 8.0, 9
9.0, 10 10.0, 11 11,0 , 12 2160,0, 13 13.0 14 14.0, 15 15.0, 16
16.0, 17 17.0, 18 18.0, 19 »-> 19.0, 20 20.0} •  pre [Analogue-Inputl.Scan]
These values have already been shown to satisfy the invariant and the type 
definitions of an-value and alarm. The type of an-plant-input is also satisfied 
by construction
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post [Analogue-Inputl.Scan] a inv'[Analogue_Inputl]
A ^ sqroot_req = true =>
..value' = (pfs - Po) * M n-Plant-i^ut(lnput_channelLoço /  +an.
A (sqroot_req = false =>
, , (pfs - pn) * (an-plant-input( input-channel) -  Xn) .an-value' = ^ ---------— xfs   + Po
A (alarm_check_req = true =>
(alarm' = lo «=>
((an_value' < lo_alarm) v (alarm = lo a  an-value' < lo-alarm + deadband)))
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an-value' > hi-alarm) v (alarm = hi Aan_value' > hi_alarm -  deadband)))
A (alarm' = safe <=>
((lo-alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)
V ((alarm =  safe) a  (lo-alarm < an-value' < hi_alarm)))) )
A (alarm-check-req = false => (alarm' = safe))
efjf [Analo gue- Inputl .Scan]
= V n, an-value_at-restart, input„channel, sqroot-req, alarm_check_req, deadband, 
hi_alarm, lo_aiarm, pfs, Pq, xfs, Xq, an_value, alarm, an-plant-input 
•  (pre [Analogue-Inputl .Scan]
=> 3 an_value', alarm' # post [Analogue-Inputl.Scan])
To prove effectiveness it is necessary to show that the formulae for au-value' 
and alarm' determine values in all cases allowed by the pre condition. However, 
it is clear by inspection that there are a number of cases where values are not 
determined and hence the proof will fail.
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B.S ANNUNCIATE
j_ Analogue-Inputl .Annunclate(-»waming)_ 
warning : ALARM
warning = alarm
pre [Anaiogue-Inputl Annunciate] & inv [Anedogue-Inputl]
A (warning € ALARM a  warning = alarm)
app [Analogue-Inputl Annunciate]
â 3 n, an_value_at_restart, input-channel, sqroot-req, alarm-check-req, 
deadband, hi-alarm, lo-alarm, pfs, pq, xfs, Xq, an-value, alarm, warning
•  pre [Analogue-Inputl Annunciate]
The consistency verification of applicability is discharged by showing that the 
Concrete Example in chapter 4 is a model for which app holds:
n = 2 0 , an-value_at-restart= 15.0, input-channel = 12 , sqroot-req = false. 
alarm-check_req = true, deadband = 0.0, hi-alarm = 40.0, lo_alarm = -10,0, 
pfs = 50.0, pQ = -10.0, xfs =4050.0, Xq = 810.0, an-value = 15.0, alarm = safe, 
warning = safe f- pre [Analogue-Inputl Annunciate]
PROOF:
320, 15.0, 12. false, true, 0.0, 40.0, -10.0, 50.0, -10.0, 4050.0, 810.0, 15.0, safe, 
safe # pre [Analogue-Inputl .Annunciate]
= 3 20, 15.0, 12. false, true, 0.0, 40.0, -10.0, 50.0, -10.0, 4050.0, 810.0, 15.0, 
safe, safe # iuv[Analogue-Inputl] A (warning € ALARM a  warning = alarm)
These values have already been shown to satify the invariant and the type 
definitions of an_value and alarm. The type of warning is also satified and 
clearly has the same value as alarmg
-  210 -
post [Analogue_Inpntl .Annunciate] a inv'[Analogue-Inputl] 
eff [Analogue-Inputl Annunciate]
s  V n, an_value-at-restart, input-channel, sqroot-req, alarm-check-req, deadband, 
hi-alarm, lo-alarm, pfs, pq, xfs, Xq, an_value, alarm, warning 
# (pre [Analogue-Inputl .Annunciate]
=> 3 an-value',aleirm' •  post [Analogue-Inputl.Annunciate])
The consistency verification of effectiveness is clearly satisfied since the 
operation does not change the state. Hence the dashed variables need only 
be set to the undashed valuesp
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A N N E X  C
C. E X T R A C T I O N  O F SPLIT
C.1 INTRODUCTION
In this Annex it is established that the part of the post condition of 
Analogne_Input2.Scan dealing with alarm can be split into the conjuction of 
two expressions:
split'[Analogne-Input23 A left[Analogue_Input2]
where split'[Analogne_Input2] contains only dashed variables and 
instantiation parameters, and left[Analogue_Input2] contains both dashed 
and undashed variables.
The proof requires the following Lemmas, which are Theorems of Propositional 
Calculus:
Lemma 1: (A =» ( B a C ) )  = (A =» B ) a  (A => C )
Lemma 2: [A <=» (BvC)] = [(A=>B) v (A=»C)] a (B=>A) a  (C=>A)
C.2 POST CONDITION
The section of post condition of interest is:
(alarm_.check_req = true =*- 
(alarm' = lo <=>
((an_value' < lo_alarm) v (alarm = lo a  an-value' < lo__alarm + deadband)))
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an_value' > hi-alarm) v (alarm = hi a  an_value' > hi_alarm - deadband)))
A (alarm' = safe <=>
(((alarm = lo) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an__value' < hi_alarm))
V ((alarm = hi) a  (lo„alarm< an_value' < hi_a!arm - deadband))
V (((alarm = safe) a  (lo-alarm < an-value' < hi_.alarm))))) )
A (alarm_check_req = false => (alarm' = safe))
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C.3 STAGE 1
The predicate:
(alarm-check-req = false =» (alarm' = safe))
contains only dashed variables and constants and is already connected by 
conjuction, so it will form part of split,
C.4. STAGE 2
Dealing with the alarm_check_req = true case, the next stage is to split the 
main section:
(alarm' = lo <=>
((an-value' < lo_alarm) V (alarm = lo a  an-value' < lo_alarra + deadband)))
A (alarm' = hi <=>
((an„value' > hi-alarm) v (alarm = hi a  an-value' > hi-alarm ~ deadband)))
A (alarm' = safe <=>
(((alarm = lo) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm))
V ((alarm = hi) a  (lo-alarm < an-value' < hi-alarm - deadband))
V (((alarm = safe) a (lo-alarm < an-value' < hi-aleirm)))))
into the conjuction of two clauses one of which contains only dashed variables 
and instantiation parameters. This is done by cases using Lemma 2. Lemma 1 
can then be used to move this into split.
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C.S STAGE 3
Firstly consider the lo alarm expression:
(a la r m ' =  lo  <=»
( ( a n - v a l u e '  < lo _ a la r m )  v (a la r m  =  lo  a  a n _ v a lu e '  < lo _ a la r m  + d e a d b a n d ) ) )
=  [ ( ( a la r m '  =  lo )  => ( a n _ v a lu e '  < lo _ a la r m ) )
V ( (a la r m ' =  lo )  => (a la r m  =  l o  a  a n - v a lu e '  < l o - a la r m  + d e a d b a n d ) ) ]
A ((an-value' < lo-alarm) => (alarm' = lo))
A ( (a la r m  =  l o  a  a n _ v a lu e '  < l o . a l a r m  + d e a d b a n d )  =» (a la r m ' =  l o ) )
From which the following can be extracted:
((an_value' < lo_alarm) (alarm' = lo))g 
Similarly, from the hi alarm expression the following can be extracted: 
((an-value' > hi-alarm) => (alarm' = hi)) Q 
C,6 STAGE 4
For the safe case the fact that between the deadbands the alarm is always 
safe can be extracted.
(a la r m ' =  s a f e  <=»
(((alarm = lo) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi_alarm))
V ((alarm -  hi) a  (lo_alarm < an-value' < hi-alarm - deadband))
V (((alarm = safe) a (lo_alarm < an_value' < hi-alarm)))))
The above can be re-written to split out the area between the deadbands:
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=  (a la r m ' =  s a f e )  <=> (
((alarm = lo) a  [(lo-alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi_alarm - deadband)
V (hi-alarm - deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm)])
V ((alarm = hi) a  [(lo„aIarm + deadband  ^ an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)
V (lo-alarm < an-value' < lo-alarm + deadband)])
V ((alarm = safe) a  [(lo_alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)
V (hi_alarm - deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm)
V (lo-alarm < an-value' < lo-alarm + deadband)]))
Using distribution:
= (alarm' = safe) <=> (
([(alarm = lo) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)]
V  [(alarm = lo) a  (hi-alarm - deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm)])
V ([(alarm = hi) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm - deadband)]
V [(alarm = hi) a  (lo-alarm < au-value' < lo-alarm + deadband)])
V ([(alarm = safe) a  (lo-alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm - deadband)]
V [(alarm = safe) a  (hi-alarm - deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm)]
V [(alarm = safe) a  (lo-alarm < an_value' < lo_alarm + deadband)]))
Collecting common bands together:
= (alarm' = safe) <=> (
[(alarm = lo v alarm = hi v alarm = safe)
a  (lo_alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi_alarm - deadband)]
V [ ( a la r m  =  l o  v a la r m  =  s a f e )
A (hi-alarm - deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm)]
V [(alarm = hi v alarm = safe)
A (lo-alarm < au-value' < lo-alarm + deadband)])
Using (alcirm = lo v alarm = hi v alarm = safe) = True
=  (a la r m ' = s a f e )
4=» ( [ ( l o - a l a r m  + d e a d b a n d  < a u -V a lu e '  < h i - a la r m  -  d e a d b a n d ) ]
V [ ( a la r m  =  l o  v a la r m  =  s a f e )
A (hi-alarm - deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm)]
V [(alarm = hi v alarm = safe)
A (lo-alarm < an-value' < lo„alarm + deadband)])
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Using lemma 2:
= [((alarm' = safe) => (lo-alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi.alarm - deadband))
V ((alarm' = safe) => (((alarm = lo V alarm = safe)
A (hi_alarm - deadband < an_value' < hi_alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe)
A (lo_alarm < an_value' < lo„alarm + deadband))))] 
A[(lo_alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm ~ deadband) => (alarm' = safe)] 
A [(((alarm = lo v alarm = safe)
A (hi_alarm - deadband < an_value' < hi-alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe)
A (lo-alarm < an_value' < lo_alarm + deadband))) ^  (alarm' = safe)]
From which the following can be extracted:
[(lo_alarm + deadband < an_value' < hi_alarm - deadband) =» (alarm' = safe)]
C.7 STAGE S
Putting the extracted components together and removing the dashes yields:
split[Analogue_Input2] a (alarm_check_req = true =*
(((an_value < lo-alarm) =» (alarm = lo))
A ((an-value > hi_alarm) =❖ (alarm = hi))
A ((lo-alarm + deadband < an_value < hi-alarm - deadband)
=> (alarm = safe))))
A (alarm-check-req = false => (alarm = safe)) Q
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C.8 STAGE 6
What is left after removing split[Analogae„înput2] is:
left[Analogae_Input2] & alarm_check_req = true => (
[((alarm' = lo) => (an_value' < lo-alarm))
V ((alarm' = lo) => (alarm = lo a  (an_value' < lo_alarm + deadband)))]
A [(alarm = lo a  an-value' < lo_alarm + deadband) => (alarm' = lo)]
A [((alarm' = hi) => (an_value' > hi_alarm))
V ((alarm' = hi) => (alarm = hi a  (an-value' > hi-alarm - deadband)))]
A [(alarm = hi a  an_value' > hi_alarm - deadband) =» (alarm' = hi)]
A [((alarm' = safe) =» (lo_alarm + deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm - deadband)) 
V {(alarm' = safe) =>
(((alarm = lo v alarm = safe) a  (hi-alarm - deadband < an-value' < hi-alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe) a  (lo_alarm < an_value' < lo-alarm + deadband)))}] 
A [{((alarm = lo v alarm = safe) a  (hi-alarm - deadband < an-value' < hi_alarm))
V ((alarm = hi v alarm = safe) a  (lo-alarm < an-value' < lo-alarm + deadband))}
(alarm' = safe)]) g
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A N N E X  D
D. C O N S I S T E N C Y  V E R IF IC A T IO N  2
D.l INTRODUCTION
Once the nature of the problems that the Consistency Verifications aim to 
detect are understood then it is possible to avoid such problems. Hence 
during subsequent schema definitions or previous schema modifications care 
was taken to ensure they would verify. Rather than prepare full proofs in each 
case an informal argument as to why the schemas are consistent is given.
The following are verified in this Annex:
a) Ana!ogue„Input3
b) Pre„emptl
c) Real_worldl
d) Real-world 2
e) Composedl
f) Composed2
D.2 ANALQGUE-INPUT3
Analogue-Input3_Conf and Anal ogue _ Inputs .Annunciate are unchanged.
The css and app both only require that a model is exhibited. The model 
chosen for Analogue-Inputl, the Concrete Example in chapter 4, is a reachable 
model, and hence can be reused for Analogue_Input3 and Analogue_Input3.Scan. 
Regarding uii and eff, the schemas have been very carefully designed not to 
upset things, indeed, the post condition of Scan has not be altered.
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D,3 PRE_EMPT1
Analogue_Input4 is Analogue_Input3 with the aiarm„check_req parameter fixed 
in value. Hence since Analogue_Input3 is verified then Analogue_Input4 is also 
verified. Pre_emptl is Analogue_Input4 extended with a single state variable 
alarm-unchanged, and so only this new variable and its interaction with 
Analogue_Input4 needs to be considered.
Since there is no overlap between the alarm_unchanged and Analogue_lnput4 
regarding the state schema then it is only necessary to show that 
alarm-unchanged part is consistent by itself. This is trivial, it is clearly 
possible to exhibit a model, and alarm-unchanged = true is one. Initialisation 
assigns a constant value in the range of the type, and since there is no 
dependence on instantiation parameters this is always possible. Hence css and 
uii are verified.
The applicability of Scan and Annunciate are both trivial. Since Analogue_Input4 
has already been verified and the pre-condition on alarm_unchanged does
not overlap with Analogue_Input4 it is only necessary to exhibit values
of alarm_unchanged. "true" and "false" are values for Scan and Annunciate 
respectively.
Since Analogue_Input4 is effective both alarm and alarm' will be defined. 
Hence a value will always be defined for alarm-unchanged' by Scan. The
effectiveness of Annunciate is trivial since alarm-unchanged ' is set to a
constant value within the range of the type.
D.4 REAL WORLDl
n = 1, conv-fact = 3.2, sensors = {l 0.0}, bell = false, is a model for the
state. Initialisation assigns a constant value in the range of the type, and
since there is no dependence on instantiation parameters this is always
possible. Hence css and uii are verified.
The model used for the state together with an_plant„input(l) = 0.0 is a 
model for Measurement. Given the closure of real numbers under
multiplication the post-condition will always determine a value.
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Bell and BeIl_Off have no special parts to their pre-conditions. In both cases 
the post-condition just assigns a constant value in the range of the type. 
Hence these are both trivial cases.
D.S REAL WORLD2
Real-World 2 just introduces three additional parameters to Real_Worldl. 
Assigning these values of input-channel = 1, rw_hi = 3510.0 and rw_lo = 810 
together with the values for Real-Worldl is a model. The extra parameters 
do not further constrain the state variables hence verification of uii is trivial.
Real_World2.Measurement is based on Real-Worldl.Measurement and does 
not further constrain Real_Worldl.Measurement, and hence only the constraints 
between the new parameters need be considered. We can see that the three 
cases split the full range of an_plant-input without overlapping or gaps. 
Hence a value for region is always determined.
D.6 COMPOSEDl
Composedl just combines Real-world 2 and Pre-emptl into a single schema. 
These two only have n and input-channel in common and give these have 
identical definitions and no constraints. Hence Composedl is verified 
because its components are. A similar argument applies to Sample where the 
internal schemas only have an_plant-value in common.
Alert combines two schemas but with a condition. Since Bell does not have 
any pre-condition (beyond the invariant) Alert is applicable when Annunciate 
is. Similarly, Annunciate does not have a post-condition (beyond the invariant) 
so the post-condition is that of Bell. Although the condition limits when Bell 
is invoked this does not affect the effectiveness of the whole schema.
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D.7 COMPOSED2
Composed2 is just Composedl with additional constraints between the 
parameters of the component schemas. Section 5.28 verifies that the concrete 
example is still a model so css is still valid. The constraints do not affect 
the state variables in either schema, only the instantiation parameters. Hence 
the only affect is possibly to reduce the number of sets of instantiation 
states that uii needs to cope with. However, the full set has already been 
verified so the sub-set will also verify.
- 221 -
A N N E X  E
E. D E A D B A N D  IT E R A T IO N
E.1 INTRODUCTION
At 5.4.7 item b) the assumption was made that the sensor inputs are exact. 
This assumption is both unnecessary, and probably not valid for the DACS 
kind of application. The DACS already embodies the Deadband mechanism to 
accomodate this problem, so the Intention is to go round the modelling 
cycle again with this assumption removed. In what follows only the parts 
that are changed are given in full.
E.2 STEP 1 - INFORMAL SPECIFICATION
The specification of the Real World is modified to Include the statement that 
the sensor value is noisy, and that for each sensor reading the actual value 
will be somewhere between + e of the measured value.
E.3 STEP 2 - MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
No change to the Mathematical Framework is necessary.
E.4 STEP 3 z ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Although the assumption at 5.4.7.b can be removed it needs to be replaced 
with a limitation. It is already expected that the configuration parameter 
"deadband" will need the value e, and it has already been established that 
the alarm limits need to be reduced by e if alarms are not to be missed. 
The invariant for deadbands is;
deadband > 0 a (deadband + lo_aIarm < hi-alarm - deadband)
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Substituting these values in the invariant for deadband yields:
e > 0  A (lo-alarm + 2 e < hi_alarm - 2 e)
= hi_alarm - lo_alarm > 4e Og
Hence the new limitation is on the maximum size of the interval.
E.S STEP 4 z  PROBLEM FORMULATION
E.S.1 Real World
The change to the Real World specification needs to be reflected in a revised 
version of Real_World2. Real_World3 is therefore defined which is similar to 
Real-World2» but has e as an input parameter and has seven output cases just 
like Analogue_Input.
-Real-Worlds (n, conv-fact, input-channel, rw_hi, rw_lo, e)----------
input-channel : l..n 
rw-hi, rw-lo ; ANALOGUE 
e : ANALOGUE 
last_region ; ANALOGUE 
Real-Worldl (n, conv-fact)
pReal-WorldS.Measurement (-^ an-plant-input, region)------------------------------
region ; ALARM
an-plant-input(input-channel) > rw-hi => last-region' = hi
rw-hi > an-plant-input(input-channel) > rw-hi - s a  last-region = hi =>
iast-region' = hi
rw-hi > an-plant-input(inpnt-channel) > rw-hi - e a  last_region hi ^
last-region' = safe
rw-hi - e > an-plant-input(input-channel) > rw-lo + e => last-region' = safe 
rw-lo +  E > an-plant-input(input-channel) > rw-lo a  last-region lo =>
last-region' = safe 
rw_lo + E > an-plant_inpnt(input_channel) > rw-lo a  last_region = lo =>
last-region' = lo 
rw -lo > an_plant_input(input_channel => last„region' =lo 
region = last-region'
Real-World 1. Measurement (-►an-plant-input)
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In this third version of the Real World model the Bell and Bell_Off schemas 
are the same as those for Real^Worldl.
E.S.2 Composed
As before, we now need to compose Real„World3 with Pre_emptl to produce 
a composite system. However, the new version of Composed needs to inherit 
the contraints established for Composed2. It also needs to embody the constraint 
that deadband = e, giving Composed3;
. Composed3( n, conv-fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, e, an_value_at_restart,
inpnt_channel, sqroot_req, pfs, Pq, xfs, Xq)- 
Real_World3 (n, conv_fact, inputs channel, rw_hi, rw_lo, e) 
Pre_emptl(n, an_va!ue_at_restart, input_channel, sqroot_req,
e, hi_alarm, lo_alarm, pfs, Pp, xfs, Xq)
sqroot„req = true =>• lo_alarm = (pfs - Pp) * ^  ^  ^  Po
A hi„alarm = (pfs - pg) + Po
fsqroot„req = false => lo^alarm = ^ Po
A hi.alarm = ■ + pp
x f s  -  X q
rComposed3.Sample (-^ region)-------------------------------
Real_World3,Measurement (^  an_plant_input, region) 
Pre_emptl.Scan (an_plant_input)
“Composed3.Alert (-^ warning)-----
Pre_emptl .Annunciate (-^ warning)
warning safe 
ReaI_World3.BelI
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E.6 STEP S - SAFETY PROOF
The revised form of Real-World means it is necessary to reconsider the 
Safety Proof. Stage 1 of the proof, the Schuman-Pitt level, is clearly affected 
so it will be necessary to re-establsh that region^ = alarmj|\ It will not be 
necessary to rework any of the subsequent stages of the proof, since they 
only rely on this one result.
V n, conv_fact, rw_hi, rw_lo, e, an_value_at_restart, input-channel, 
sqroot_req, pfs, Pg, xfs, Xg 
# ComposedS I- (s:seq  S | Vi : l..#tr(s) •  tr(s)(i) € Sample => regionj = alarm^'}
PROOF:
tr(s)(l)e Sample => prej[Composed3.Sample] A postj[Composed3.Sample]
- Axiom 5,3
= prCj[Real-World3.Measurement] a prej[Pre_emptl.Scan]
A post^[Real_World3.Measurement] a post|[Pre_emptl.Scan]
= prej[Real_World3.Measurement] a prej[Pre_emptl,Scan]
A [an_plant-input|(input_channel) > rw_hi =»- last_regionj' = hi 
A rw_hi > an_plant_inputj(input_channel) > rw„hi - e a last„regionj = hi =>
last-region/ = hi
A r w _ h i  > a n - p la n t „ in p u t |( in p u t - c h a n n e l )  > r w _ h i -  e a la s t _ r e g io B j  ÿ h i =>
last-regionj' = safe
A rw_hi - E > an_plant_input|(input_channel) > rw_lo + e => last_region/ = safe 
A rw_lo + £ > an„piant_input|(input_channel) 3 rw_lo a last_regionj lo =>
last_region/ = safe 
A rw-lo + Ê > an-plant-inputj(input-channel)  ^ rw_lo a last_regionj = lo =>
last-region/ = lo 
A rw-lo > an_ pi ant- inputs (input- channel => last-region/ =lo 
A region^ = last-region/
A postj[Real_Worldl .Measurement(-^an-plant-inputj)]]
A [invj'[Analogue_Input4]
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A (  sqTOot_req = true =»
an_value,' = (pfs-p„)* /  an -p lan t-i^u t, (inpat-channelLoÇo /  +
A (sqroot_req = false =»-
, , (pfs - Po) * (an_plant-inputj (inp«t_channel) -%n) . _an_value/ = ^ ---------  IdTs ^ ----   + Po
A ((an_valuej' > hi_alarm) => alarmj' = hi)
A ( ( h i - a la r m  > a n - v a lu e j '  > h i_ a la r m  - e a  a la r m | =  h i)  => a la r m j' =  h i)
A ((hi.alarm > an.valuej' > hi.alarm - s a  alarm| ^ hi) => alarmj' = safe)
A ((lo.alarm + e > an.valuej' > lo-alarm a  alarm^ ^ lo) =* alarmj' = safe)
A ((lo.alarm + e > an-valuej' > lo.alarm a  alarm| = lo) => alarms' = lo)
A ( d o . a l a r m  > a n _ v a lu e jO  => a l a r m /  =  lo )
( a la r m .u n c h a n g e d j '  =  t r u e  «=» (a la rm j =  a la r m jO )]A
It is now a matter of verifying that each pair from the seven cases yield the 
same values for alarmj' and Iast_region/, In each case the expressions have 
the same form as can be seen from the case below:
rw_hi > an_plant_inputj(input„channel) > rw_hi *- e a  last-region^ = hi =>
last-region/ = hi
A ((hi.alarm > an.value/ > hi.alarm - e a  alarmj = hi) => alanuj' -  hi)
Since an.value/, hi.alarm and io_aiarm are derived from an„plant„inputj, 
rw-hi and rw_lo respectively, by the same conversion formula then alarm/ will 
track lcist_regionj' exactly. Since region^ = last.region/ the correspondence 
of alarm/ and region^ is establishedg
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